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Summary 
 
This research examines the role of framing in the process of decision-making for new 
capability investments under conditions of policy and technological uncertainty. I 
argue that framing can explain the decision to exploit current capabilities, but is not 
sufficient to explain the decision to explore new capabilities. 
 
This research discriminates between “frames” and “framing” in the investigation: 
whereas “framing” is the process of constructing the meaning of the decision problem, 
“frame” refers to a specific perspective adopted by the decision makers. I develop a 
three-level research design: the industry-level analysis adopts the approach of eliciting 
heuristics to identify general patterns. The firm-level examines sources of variation 
and causal complexity by comparative case analysis. The decision-maker level 
investigates the influence of senior managers’ professional experience using a 
scenario evaluation approach.   
 
Three observations from the case study of Taiwanese solar PV firms: firstly, 
systematic patterns are found in the process of framing environmental uncertainty and 
attributing the causes of the decision problem of capability investments. Secondly, 
whilst differentiated framing exists and corresponds to selective attention; such a 
difference is not necessarily associated with different choice pattern. Finally, the 
loosely coupling framing and choices leads to the speculation that the role of 
deliberate practice, rather than framing has a stronger influence on the decision to 
explore. 
 
This research illustrates that the capabilities investment decision is not a single event 
but a complex process. While the stylised psychological principles explain the 
heuristic judgments, the influencing factors of an organisational decision are 
interdependent and temporally connected in the decision context. I argue that the 
problem of framing lies in prohibiting the alterative frame. Therefore exploration 
needs to be deliberately sought by the specially designed practice. This research 
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contributes to understanding the relationship between behavioural view of descriptive 
analysis and prescriptive view of procedural rationality in the decision- making 
process. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivations and rationale 
 
How does a firm respond to uncertainty? Strategy scholars have proposed that firms 
should develop opportunities from uncertainties and invest in new capabilities for 
future growth (Gary & Prahalad, 1996; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001; McGrath, 2010; 
Teece, 2007).  However, studies have identified the problem that firms often fail to 
explore new opportunities in response to environmental uncertainty. Recent strategy 
literature points to the difficulty of assessing and capturing new opportunities under 
uncertainty (Gavetti, 2012; Powell, Lovallo, & Fox, 2011; Starbuck, 2009) in addition 
to the classic issues of uncertainty avoidance and the tendency of favouring 
exploitation over exploration in the organizational adaptation process (Cyert & March, 
1992; Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991; March, 2008). 
  
Linking the concept of exploration/exploitation to capability investment decisions 
 
The decision to explore new opportunities is integrated to the concept of exploration. 
The original distinction of exploration versus exploitation focuses on organizational 
learning: while exploration includes activities of discovery and experimentation, 
exploitation can refer to as refinement and efficiency (March, 1991:71). Subsequent 
studies have applied the concept of exploration and exploitation beyond the scope of 
organizational learning. In particular, exploration has been associated with a shift to a 
different technology trajectory, addressing the latent need of emerging customers and 
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new product development (Almahendra & Ambos, 2015; Benner & Tushman, 2003; 
Danneels, 2002; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). The underlying idea of exploration 
highlights the spirit of investing in something new with uncertain prospect. This 
notion includes the decision to invest in new capabilities (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001; 
March, 1991; March, 2008). In this thesis I define exploration as the decision to 
“invest in new capabilities”; whereas exploitation corresponds with the decision to 
invest in existing capabilities. I am interested in investigating firms’ strategic 
investment decisions; specifically the timing and level of investments on technology 
platform and product development. These decisions can be regarded as capability 
investments because they involve competence building for capturing opportunities 
from external environmental uncertainty. In this research, the definition of capabilities 
is used interchangeably with the definition of resources, referring to “the tangible and 
intangible assets firms use to develop and implement their strategies” (Ray, Barney, & 
Muhanna, 2004:24). Therefore the focus is on the investment in capabilities rather 
than the capabilities per se. 
 
The condition of uncertainty and the assumption of rational actors 
 
Strategy scholars seek to explain the problem of “why do some firms fail to explore 
new opportunities in response to uncertainty” with different conceptual lenses. There 
are three main approaches: First, from the perspective of external environmental 
assessment, it is suggested that firms should formulate their strategy based on the 
environmental and industry analysis (Porter, 1980). However, there are three major 
criticisms of this approach: (1) the condition of uncertainty questions the static 
analysis of industry structure; (2) a lack of consideration of firms’ heterogeneity in 
resources (Barney, Ketchen, & Wright, 2011; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997); and (3) 
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the assumption of rational actors.   
 
Second, the resources-based view (RBV) addresses the issue of a lack of 
consideration of firms’ heterogeneity with the emphasis of inward thinking of firm 
resources.  From the perspective of the RBV tradition, the problem of why firms fail 
to explore new opportunities can be explained by their resources constraints. While 
some scholars have critiqued whether RBV addresses the condition of uncertainty and 
the role of managers (Kraaijenbrink, Spender, & Groen, 2009), refined RBV and 
Dynamic Capabilities (DC) tackle this problem by proposing the concept of “fitness” 
between firms’ external environment and internal resources and capabilities. In 
particular, DC scholars have emphasized “managerial capabilities” and senior 
managers’ role in driving “entrepreneurial fitness” to explore new opportunities under 
uncertainty (Helfat et al., 2007; Teece, 2007; Teece, 2012). Following the same RBV 
rationale, the problem of why firms fail to explore under uncertainty can be explained 
by their lack of dynamic capabilities. In addition to the criticism of “recurring 
regression” in explaining firms’ behaviour, there is an issue of assuming management 
discretion in the process of strategic decision-making. The assumption of rational 
actors is not addressed (Gavetti, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2007; Kraaijenbrink et al., 
2009).  
 
Finally, the emphasis of managers’ role in DC has been reflected in the trend of 
incorporating the Top Management Team (TMT) perspective and particularly the 
management cognition view in DC. Research from the management cognition school 
highlights managers’ role in “shaping the strategic choices and related processes” 
(Kaplan, 2011:665). Therefore, from the perspective of management cognition school, 
the problem that firms fail to explore new opportunities can be explained by  
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management cognition issues rather than resources and capabilities constraints 
(Tripsas & Gavett, 2000). In addressing the condition of uncertainty, the management 
cognition school suggests that environment is “endogenous” and emphasises 
managers’ interpretation and sense-making of the uncertain environment (Kaplan, 
2011:667, 677; Milliken, 1990). Following this tradition, subsequent management 
cognition studies have focused on managers’ cognitive schema, mental representation, 
and attention focus interacting with organizational factors (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; 
Eggers & Kaplan, 2008; Gary & Wood, 2011; Gregoire, Barr, & Shepherd, 2009).  
 
This research is positioned in the management cognition school’s analytical direction 
in tackling the problem -“why do some firms fail to explore new opportunities in 
response to uncertainty”. Yet, through incorporating the analysis drawing from 
behavioural decision perspectives
1
, this research differs with the main stream 
investigation of management cognition school in two aspects: the first is that it 
explicitly addresses the rationality assumption. The second is that it emphasises senior 
managers’ pattern of judgement rather than representation of cognitive schema.  
 
The behavioural decision perspectives 
 
The behavioural decision school began with a research program on “heuristics and 
biases” by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in 1974 (Gilovich, Griffin, & 
Kahneman, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Drawing on the psychology of 
perception, Tversky and Kahneman firstly explored the problem of judgment under 
uncertainty in their early studies. The key idea is that decision makers use the rule of 
                                                     
1
 In this research, behavioural decision perspectives are narrowly defined as belonging to the school of 
behavioural economics initiated by Tversky and Kahneman. 
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thumb or cues accessible in the decision context when making judgments. While these 
judgments may not necessarily be irrational, decision makers are usually not aware of 
the use of heuristics; thus biases arise in the judgment and decision process. Tversky 
and Kahneman suggest that the behaviour of heuristic judgment is systematic among 
decision makers and that such a pattern can be illustrated by general heuristics and the 
associated biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981).  
 
Later, Tversky and Kahneman proposed the theory of choices, specifically in relation 
to the framing effect. The definition of “framing” is that the interpretation of the 
decision problem can influence judgment and decisions. Beyond this general concept, 
the key idea of the framing effect is that decision makers’ judgment and choices are 
usually susceptible to certain perspectives. In their experiments, Tverky and 
Kahneman demonstrated that different assessments of the choices were invoked when 
the decision problem was framed in a different way. Moreover, their findings 
suggested that decision makers usually passively accepted the assigned decision frame 
in their evaluation of the choices. 
 
On the theoretical basis of heuristics and framing, behavioural decision scholars 
challenge a number of commonly-held rationality assumptions: specifically, the 
dominance and invariance principles in the normative decision utility model which 
are usually assumed in the strategy studies. First, the dominance principle assumes 
that decision makers would aim at the optimal choice and maximize the expected 
decision utility with incentives. Behavioural decision scholars argue that the dominant 
option is usually guided by a frame and is not necessarily the optimal choice. Second, 
the invariance principle assumes preference consistency in the decision making 
process. But behavioural decision theory’s reference-dependent framing effect in 
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choices demonstrates that decision makers’ choices are affected by simply changing 
the description of the decision problems. Thus the rational principle of invariance is 
questioned (Kahneman, 2000b; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). In questioning these 
rationality assumptions, behavioural decision theory emphasises that the decision 
utility is influenced by the experience, which is “triggered by the emotion of change” 
(Kahneman, 2003b). 
 
Behavioural decision scholars argue that the violation of the rationality assumption is 
rooted in the psychological mechanism. The deviations from the rational decision 
model are “common and systematic” and “cannot be treated as random errors” 
(Kahneman, 2000b; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Despite the criticism of detaching 
business reality in the experimental approach employed by behavioural decision 
theory, the application of heuristic, framing and the associated biases have been found 
in numerous examples of real-world investment decisions. Such “persistence of 
cognitive biases” highlights the merit of the behavioural decision perspectives in 
providing stylized principles for predicting decision behaviour (Powell et al., 
2011:1378).   
 
The focus of decision problem interpretation- integrating the behavioural and 
organizational decision perspectives 
 
With the aims of providing nuanced understanding of the “interpretative (decision) 
process” (Kaplan, 2011; Powell et al., 2011) and assessing the pattern of judgment 
under uncertainty, I choose to investigate this problem “Why firms fail to explore new 
opportunities in response to environmental uncertainty” from the perspective of 
decision-making and examine the factors influencing the judgment and decision 
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process.  
 
The understanding of decision problem is central in the board area of management 
and decision studies. While this research draws from the theoretical perspectives of 
behavioural decision theory, it is imperative to integrate key concepts from 
organizational decision theory because the research problem concerns firms’ 
decision-making process.  
 
The behavioural decision and organizational decision perspectives
2
 both share the 
same root – that of bounded rationality – from Herbert Simon (Gavetti et al., 2007; 
Gilovich et al., 2002; Kahneman, 2003b). The central idea of selective attention that 
was developed from Simon’s bounded rationality signifies the divergence of the 
investigation focus between the behavioural and organizational decision perspectives: 
while behavioural decision perspectives emphasize the underlying psychological 
mechanism common in the judgment and decision process, the organizational 
decision perspectives concern the effect of selective attention resulting from the 
decision makers’ characteristics particularly the identities and interests, as well as the 
organisational decision context (March & Simon, 1958; Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 1996a). 
 
From the behavioural decision perspectives, the “selective attention” and different 
salience of the environmental stimulus are described as the “determinants of 
differential “accessibility”3(Kahneman, 2003b:699). The discussion of differential 
accessibility concerns more abstract aspects such as “similarities”, “causal propensity” 
                                                     
2
 Here the organizational decision perspectives refer to the classic and foundational works from Simon 
and March. 
3
 The concept of accessibility refers to “the ease (or) efforts with which a mental content comes to 
mind.” (Kahneman 2003). 
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and “surprisingness” in influencing the different accessibility of “thoughts” in the 
judgment and decision process (Kahneman, 2003b:701). 
 
From the organizational decision perspective, selective attention is defined as the 
process of “channelizing the stimuli” (Simon, 1996a). According to organizational 
decision scholars, selective attention is influenced by specific organizational decision 
context and is driven by organizational identification mechanism such as shared goals 
and expectations. Senior managers’ professional roles and experience may also 
influence selective attention, of which the aspect of information processing is 
emphasized (March & Simon, 1958; Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 1996a). These factors of 
organizational decision context and decision makers’ attributes are the focus of 
investigation in the organizational decision school. The behavioural decision school 
does acknowledge the potential influence of such factors but little inspection on this. 
 
Both the behavioural and organizational decision perspectives are important in 
investigating the process of decision problem interpretation – to examine whether the 
prediction of the systematic pattern derived from the common psychological 
mechanism would hold, or the heterogeneous pattern would be found and be better 
explained by differentiated framing among decision makers.  
 
The integrative theoretical view and analytical approach, which draws on the 
behavioural and organizational decision schools, not only provides a more nuanced 
understanding of the decision problem interpretation, but also addresses the recent 
development found in behavioural and organizational decision perspectives. First, 
organizational decision scholars have called for “reconceptualising bounded 
rationality” through examining individuals’ choice model and the linkage between 
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multiple factors and processes (Gavetti et al., 2007:531-532).  Second, both 
behavioural and organisational decision perspectives have suggested the importance 
of providing insights for prescriptive approach from the descriptive view of decision 
process: while organizational decision scholars advocate “the latent normative value 
of organizational decision theory” as opposed to its “claims for descriptive 
realism”(Gavetti et al., 2007:533), behavioural decision scholars call for producing 
“framework that integrate psychology and strategy practices” (Powell et al., 
2011:1370). 
 
Research question 
 
I have discussed earlier that in addressing the problem “why do some firms fail to 
explore new opportunities in response to uncertainty”, this research focuses on the 
decision –making process. The investigation of decision–making focuses on the 
process of constructing the meaning of the decision problem. Such a concept of 
decision problem interpretation is central in both behavioural and organizational 
decision theory.   
 
The use of the term “framing” as the central investigation theme 
 
From the organizational decision perspectives, the process of interpreting decision 
problem refers to “information processing” or the structuring of the attention (Gavetti 
et al., 2007:537; March & Simon, 1958; Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 1996a). The 
behavioural decision perspectives in particular focus on how the interpretation of the 
decision problem influences influence the judgment and decision process (Kahneman, 
2003a; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In this research, I use the broad definition of the 
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term “framing” - referring to the general concept of decision problem interpretation – 
as the central theme of the investigation.  Therefore, from the organization decision 
perspective, the term “framing” suggests the process of structuring attention focus and 
the effect of selective attention. Drawing on the behavioural decision perspectives, the 
term “framing” encompasses the concept of heuristics judgment and the framing 
effect on reference –dependent evaluation.  
 
In fact, the term “framing” as applied in behavioural decision theory of framing effect 
combines two different concepts – “framing” and “frames” (Kahneman & Tversky, 
2000:xiv). The former refers to the process of constructing the meaning of the 
decision problem, while the latter refers to the specific decision logic or perspective 
adopted by the decision makers. In behavioural decision experiments, the treatment of 
the single term is used because the manipulated changing frames (assigned by the 
researcher) are employed to examine decision makers’ framing process. However, in 
the investigation of the real-world decision problem, the distinction between framing 
and frames can be critical for two reasons: one is that there are no assigned decision 
frames in the real setting, and the other is that decision makers may use different 
frames in the framing process for more complex decision problems. 
 
While I adopt the same treatment of the single term “framing” in the research question, 
a key idea of this research is to examine the two constructs of “framing” and “frames”, 
and their relative effect on judgment and decisions. Therefore, while this research 
investigates the dynamics of the framing process, it also looks into what the prevailing 
frame is and how the decision frame is formed. 
 
The research questions 
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This research focuses on examining the central theme of framing in the decision 
process. The treatment of the role of framing in behavioural and organizational 
decision studies usually assumes a causality connection between framing and choices. 
However, such a linkage may not always be held under the organizational decision 
complex. More recent organizational decision studies call for revisiting the concept of 
“loosely coupling”, in which the role of contingency in timing and context is stressed 
in the organizational decision making
4
 (Gavetti et al., 2007:529; March, 1994).The 
concept of loosely coupled framing and choices questions the basic assumption of 
management cognition studies that “strategic decision process constitutes the decision 
behaviour” (Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993:247). This concept of loose coupling has 
two implications for investigating the role of framing in this research: the first is that, 
it implies that decision makers may use different “frames” in the “framing” process. 
The second is the possibility that “framing” may not necessarily explain certain 
judgement and decision behaviour.    
 
Therefore, drawing on the central theme of understanding the role of decision 
problem interpretation in the judgment and decision process, the first research 
question is to examine to what extent the concept of framing explains firms’ decision 
to invest in new capabilities. The first research question asks: “What is the role of 
framing in the decision-making process for new capability investments?” Then, 
incorporating behavioural decision theory’s analysis on the common structural 
elements in the decision environment with organizational decision theory’s emphasis 
on decision makers’ specific characteristics and their situated decision context, the 
                                                     
4
 March describes this phenomenon mainly as the result of collective decision behaviours in the 
organization, and emphasizes the loose coupling of framing and actions. Here in this research, it 
focuses on the loose coupling of framing and choices.   
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second research question asks: “What factors may influence the role of framing in 
such process?” 
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1.2 The Research plan 
 
The development of the research design is a central part of this thesis. There are two 
issues in need to be resolved here: the first is that the complexity of the concept of 
“framing” makes it difficult to measure in a single construct. The second is that the 
examination of the concept of “frames” needs to consider different influences in the 
decision context. Therefore, a new element of this research is to develop a three-level 
research design to address the interaction of the framing process and the influences of 
the decision frames. 
 
The multilevel analytical approach 
 
The investigation of decision behaviour is generally considered to be focused on the 
micro level analysis. Yet the research questions here actually encompass multi- level 
inquiry. First, the capability investment decisions are the firm-level strategic decisions. 
Second, firms’ reactions to environmental uncertainty are inevitably linked with the 
macro (and meso) industry environment analysis. Finally, senior managers are those 
who made the decisions.  Therefore this research employs the concept of multi-level 
analysis. The approach of multi-level analysis corresponds with the recent call for 
“micro-foundation thinking”: the idea of micro-foundational thinking argues that as 
“different findings may result from different level of analysis”, the investigation 
should emphasises the way “levels of analysis differ and relate to each other”.  Thus 
both the multi-level approach and micro-foundational thinking emphasises the 
investigation of “causal link in process chain” across levels of analysis. Such multi- 
level of analysis addresses the macro-micro bridge and is more in line with the 
concerns of practical predictions (Aguinis, Boyd, Pierce, & Short, 2011:397; 
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Devinney, 2013:82-83). 
 
In the multilevel analysis, the concepts of “examining interrelationship between 
individual's cognitive constrain and structural mechanism allocating attention within 
the organization… and cross- level linkages” have been suggested in organizational 
decision studies (Gavetti et al., 2007:531-532; Ocasio, 1997). This multilevel 
framework has been proposed in the areas of complex judgment and entrepreneurial 
decision-making in recent empirical works (Priem, Walters, & Li, 2010; Shepherd, 
2011).  
 
This research uses the multi-level analysis to examine multiple influences across 
levels and addresses the integrative view of behavioural and organizational schools in 
analyzing decision behaviours. This operating principle guides the research design 
and investigation approach in the empirical section.   
 
The first level of the research design examines the influences of industry incidents and 
structural elements common in these firms’ external environment. In answering the 
research question: “What is the role of framing in the decision-making process for 
new capability investments?”, the concept of framing at the first level of the research 
design draws on behavioural decision theory of heuristic judgement and focuses on 
examining the process of framing external environmental uncertainty. 
 
The second level of the research design examines the firm level, in which differences 
in capability investment and selective attention patterns are assessed. In answering the 
research question: “What is the role of framing in the decision-making process for 
new capability investments?” the second level of the research design focuses on 
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examining the firm-specific pattern of capability investments and decision problem 
interpretation. This level of research design also addresses the second research 
question “What factors may influence the role of framing in such process?” as it 
investigates how organizational factors influence framing and decisions at the firm 
level. Different from the behavioural decision theory of framing, here the definition of 
framing employs the general concept of decision problem interpretation. Specifically, 
the concept of framing in the second level of research design draws on the concepts of 
selective attention and attention-based view from the organizational decision 
perspective.  
 
The third level of the research design looks into the decision-maker level and 
examines the relative influences from senior managers’ professional experience, the 
organization, and industry context on the process of interpreting decision problem for 
capability investments. In answering the research questions: “What is the role of 
framing in the decision-making process for new capability investments?”, and “What 
factors may influence the role of framing in such process?” the third level of the 
research design draws on the organizational decision perspectives of selective 
attention and incorporates the view from the behavioural decision perspectives of 
heuristics judgement. 
 
The structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is organized as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 is the theoretical chapter. Chapter 2 discusses the key concepts of heuristics 
and framing in behavioural decision theory, followed by reviewing the concepts of 
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selective attention and attention-based view in organizational decision theory. Then 
the concept of the two-system cognitive process is introduced to illustrate the different 
focuses between the behavioural and organizational decision perspectives. 
 
Chapter 3 is the methodology chapter. Chapter 3 starts with reviewing strengths and 
limitations of various approaches to decision studies, followed by discussing the 
rationale of employing case study approach in this research. Then Chapter 3 presents 
the three-level research design and the data collection and analysis approach of this 
research. 
 
Chapter 4, 5 and 6 are the empirical chapters. Chapter 4 investigates the process of 
framing external environmental uncertainty in the context of the five Taiwanese PV 
firms. Chapter 5 examines selective attention at the firm level. The investigation 
emphasises comparative analysis of the three c-Si PV firms. Chapter 6 focuses on 
selective attention at the decision maker level with the empirical investigation of 
senior R&D and finance managers from the five case firms. 
 
Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter. Firstly, drawing insights from previous empirical 
findings, Chapter 7 discusses the potential role of deliberate practice in influencing 
the decision to invest in new capabilities. The theoretical concept of deliberate 
practice is derived from the prescriptive view of behavioural and organizational 
decision perspectives. The discussion is illustrated with the empirical finding from the 
case of Greenchild. Secondly, Chapter 7 summarizes the empirical investigations 
from Chapters 4, 5 and 6. An integrated discussion of the findings is organized in two 
parts, comprising the role of framing and the role of deliberate practice. This chapter 
then proposes two perspectives of implications for the domain of strategic decision 
21 
 
making: the application of the rational decision model, and the triggering mechanism 
for exploration. Finally, limitations of this thesis and directions for future research are 
discussed. 
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Chapter 2 
Behavioural and Organizational Decision Perspectives 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 reviews key theoretical concepts in behavioural and organizational decision 
perspectives.  
 
Section 2.1 discusses key propositions in behavioural decision theory, specifically the 
concepts of heuristics and framing in the judgment and decision process
5
. Firstly, the 
inherent use of heuristics has been signified as the foundation of behavioural decision 
theory in predicting common biases and judgment pattern. Secondly, the core concept 
of framing, particularly the narrow framing effect explains the influence of decision 
problem interpretation in the decision-making process. Two elements are 
distinguished in the framing effect: one is “framing”, the process of constructing the 
meaning of the decision problem. The other is the “decision frame”, the specific logic 
or perspective adopted by the decision makers. 
 
Section 2.2 reviews the concepts in organizational decision perspectives, specifically 
selective attention and attention-based view. Different from the proposition of the 
homogenous pattern predicted by behavioural decision perspectives, the 
organizational decision concept of selective attention stresses the heterogeneous 
pattern resulting from the choice context and decision makers’ characteristics. The 
attention-based view proposes that firms’ behaviour can be explained by the issues on 
                                                     
5
 Basically, behavioural decision scholars consider that the process for judgments and decisions share 
similar psychological principles (Kahneman 2003). 
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which they focus their attention; and that firm resources, organizational structure and 
Top Management Team’s characteristics may influence firms’ attention structure. 
 
Section 2.3 introduces the concept of the two-System view adopted by behavioural 
decision research: the automatic System 1 and the controlled System 2 cognitive 
process. It discusses how the two-system view may illuminate the different emphases 
and investigation direction of the behavioural and organizational decision 
perspectives. With the focus on the automatic System 1 process, behavioural decision 
perspectives suggest a common difficulty in developing alternative logic from the 
controlled System 2 process. Viewing decision as problem-solving in the System 2 
process, organizational decision perspectives focus on factors that may distinguish the 
patterns among decision makers. 
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2.1 Behavioural decision perspectives  
 
This section reviews the behavioural decision theory of heuristics and framing. Core 
concepts and theoretical claims of heuristics and framing are summarized in Table 2.1 
 
Table 2.1 Key concepts of heuristics and framing 
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Heuristics 
 
The inherent use of heuristics in decision-making under uncertainty is first explored in 
the research program of behavioural decision theory (Gilovich et al., 2002; Kahneman, 
2003a; Kahneman, 2003b; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). According to Tversky and 
Kahneman, heuristics are described as “principles, processes or sources of cues for 
judgment“ (Kahneman, 2003b: 707; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The heuristics 
judgment process applies the psychological mechanism of perception (Kahneman, 
2003b), and provides the foundation of behavioural decision theory. Following the 
rule of cognitive ease, heuristics are employed to simplify the complexities of 
decision-making, particularly under uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). 
Heuristics are not necessarily irrational or simple; on the contrary, they draw on the 
process of pattern matching and memory retrieval. Heuristics can be efficient and 
sometimes yield good or reasonable judgment under certain circumstances (Gilovich 
et al., 2002; Kahneman & Klein, 2009). However, systematic errors are commonly 
found in heuristic judgment (Kahneman, 2003a; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). 
 
There have been challenges regarding the central themes of “heuristics and biases” in 
behavioural decision theory. One criticism is the applicability of the findings, as the 
experiments were mainly carried out in laboratory environments. Yet as the research 
program was inspired by decision biases in the real world, the aim of the research 
design is to elicit the heuristics by detecting the biases (Gilovich et al., 2002; 
Kahneman, 2003a; Kahneman, 2003b; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). In fact, the use 
of heuristics and the accompanying biases identified by the behavioural research 
program have been found in the real world, particularly in financial investment and 
business decisions (Bondt & Thaler, 2002; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman, Knetsch, & 
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Thaler, 1991; Teece, 2007). Another critique related to behavioural experiment design 
is that the research program usually assumes that the accurate decision logic is to be 
compared with the judgment from the respondents. Scholars have argued that 
behavioural decision researchers may be in danger of applying the wrong normative 
or oversimplified models (Stanovich & West, 2002). However, the essence of the 
research program does not necessarily lie in the assessment of “right” or “wrong”. 
When compared with predictions from the rational model, the findings of the 
behavioural decision model aim to illustrate the limitations in developing alternative 
heuristics and frames in the decision process. 
 
Three general heuristics 
 
Tversky and Kahneman identify three general heuristics: “representativeness”, 
“availability” (of instances or scenarios), and “anchoring” (and adjustment) (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974. These heuristics may serve as the prediction base to evaluate 
decision makers’ judgment under uncertainty. The “representativeness” heuristic 
refers to “some probability judgments that are mediated by the assessment of the 
resemblance” (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002: 49). The “availability” heuristic refers 
to the judgments being made by “the ease with which instances or associations come 
to mind” (Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002: 103). Finally, the “anchoring” heuristic is 
defined as the process of “making estimates by starting from an initial value that is 
adjusted to yield a final answer” (Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974: 1128). Systematic biases can be categorized and linked to each heuristic. For 
example, the use of representative heuristics may lead to the neglect of prior 
probabilities and insensitiveness to predictability and validity. The use of availability 
heuristics may lead to biases due to the ease of retrieving and constructing instances. 
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Also, biases arise when the adjustment from an anchor is insufficient, or from the 
“priming effect” from the target anchor (Chapman & Johnson, 2002; Kahneman, 2011; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
 
Attribute substitution 
 
In Tversky and Kahneman’s early research, the uncertainty of the decision context is 
illustrated as the condition for the use of heuristics and the occurrence of the related 
judgment biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The model of “attribute substitution” 
introduces the idea that the occurrence of the heuristic judgment may lie beyond this 
uncertain context. (Kahneman, 2003a; Kahneman, 2003b; Kahneman & Frederick, 
2002). The definition of “attribute substitution” claims that “judgment is mediated by 
heuristics when the individual assesses a specific target attribute by substituting a 
related heuristic attribute that comes more readily to mind” (Kahneman, 2003b: 707). 
In other words, the model of attribute substitution proposes a common process for 
heuristics: when faced with a complex judgment/decision task, people may answer an 
easier question instead (Kahneman, 2011). In particular, attribute substitution can be 
applied to the representative and availability heuristics (Kahneman, 2003a; Kahneman 
& Frederick, 2002). 
 
Affect heuristic 
  
The affect heuristic was identified later on, in order to highlight the role of emotion in 
the judgment and decision process. While the early three heuristics focus on the 
limitations of cognitive capacity, the affect heuristic emphasizes the influence of 
evaluative attributes (Kahneman, 2003b). For example, the affect (liking or disliking) 
29 
 
can be linked to the sense of loss or gain that may influence decision makers’ risk 
attitude in judgment and choices. Thus decision makers’ evaluations of decisions are 
based on the experienced utility and not necessarily consistent with the preference 
predicted by the normative decision utility theory. The development of affect 
heuristics signifies another central theme of the behavioural decision theory – the 
framing effect and the prospect theory. 
 
Framing 
 
In discussing how choices are affected by the interpretation of the decision problem, 
Tversky and Kahneman introduce the “framing effect” (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000: 
xi; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1986), in which the violation of the invariance 
assumption in the rational decision model is demonstrated (Kahneman, 2003a; 
Kahneman, 2003b; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1986). The “decision frame” is 
defined as “decision makers’ conception of the act, outcomes and contingencies 
associated with a particular choice.” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981: 453). The original 
experiments of framing effects show that the preferences of the choices are altered 
when the decision problems are framed in different ways. In other words, different 
frames of the decision problem may “evoke different associations and evaluations” 
(Kahneman, 2003b: 6), and thus influence choices. In an example of the choice 
between different rescue programs prepared to deal with the outbreak of a disease, 
Kahneman and Tversky found that the program relating the certainty of the number of 
people saved is “disproportionally attractive” compared to the other program that 
describes the certainty of the possible number of deaths. In another experiment about 
changing the description of the statistical outcome in the survival/mortality frame, 
scholars found that the “90% short-term survival rate” of radiation therapy is highly 
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preferable to the “10% immediate mortality rate” of surgery. The results hold for 
patients as well as physicians (Kahneman, 2003b: 702).  
 
In the behavioural decision school’s experiments, the “wealth frame” or the “survival 
frame” is the most commonly assigned frame in terms of choices (Kahneman, 2003b; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). While these frames may not always be relevant to all 
decision problems, the concept can be applied in examining the “frame” employed in 
a specific decision context. For example, in the context of the PV industry, a similar 
proposition would be the profit or loss frame in evaluating the investment projects. 
Thus the 60% chance of earning a 3% margin in the short-term can be preferable to 
the 40% chance of earning nothing (or taking a loss) in the short-term, but gaining a 
6% margin in the long-term.  
 
Prospect theory 
 
The framing of the decision outcome is reference-dependent. In the prospect theory, 
Tversky and Kahneman argue that the determinant of a decision utility is not 
necessarily based on the assessment of the “final state of the assets” (as emphasized in 
the normative decision utility theory) (Kahneman, 2003a: 1457), but rather is based 
on the change of wealth according to the evaluation relative to the “reference point” 
(Kahneman, 2003b; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In 
other words, it is the comparison between the new level of stimulus and the current 
“adaptation level”, rather than the “new level of stimulation” that determines the 
decision utility (Kahneman, 2003b: 704). 
 
Decision makers tend to “attach” the value of gains or losses in the decision utility 
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with the reference point of the status quo (Kahneman, 2000b; Kahneman, 2011). The 
prospect of gains is referred to the outcome that is better than the reference point, and 
the prospect of losses is referred to the outcome that is worse than the reference point. 
In elaborating how the framing of gain or loss prospects influences choices, Tversky 
and Kahaneman suggest two principles: diminishing sensitivity (defined as “marginal 
impact diminishes with distance”6 (Tversky & Fox, 2000: 95) to the evaluation of 
changes in wealth, and loss aversion – where the response to losses is much greater 
than the response to gains (Kahneman, 2003b; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
 
The original model in prospect theory suggests that decision makers are risk-averse at 
the prospect of gain and risk-seeking at the prospect of loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In an experiment dealing with gambling 
scenarios, scholars found that people would reject the gamble when there was an 
equal chance to win or lose; the results stayed the same even with the increase of the 
total wealth level. Then the experiment showed that people became more willing to 
bet, until “the prize of the possible win was at least twice the size of the possible loss” 
(Kahneman, 2003b: 704). In another gambling experiment, Tversky and Kahneman 
found that people’s preferences changed when a description of a certainty of loss was 
added to the gambling scenario. Under this prospect of loss, people would bet on an 
equal chance to win or lose, even when the amount of the possible loss was much 
higher than the prize of the possible win (Kahneman, 2003a; Kahneman, 2003b). 
 
Therefore Kahneman argues that prospect theory reflects the experience of “the 
                                                     
6
 The concept of “diminishing sensitivity” is further discussed in the judgment of uncertainty and risky 
prospects.  
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transition from one state to another”. The emotion of such short-term decision 
outcomes contrasts with the evaluation of the “final state interpretation” of the 
decision utility, as suggested by the rational decision models (Kahneman, 2003a: 
1457). 
 
The concepts of reference dependency and loss aversion in prospect theory can also 
be applied to observations in the real world. For example, scholars found that the 
“actual out-of-pocket losses” are usually weighted with more importance than losses 
of opportunity. Moreover, as the reference point is usually the status quo, it suggests 
that the evaluation of investment projects is based on comparisons with the current 
state and that “disadvantages loom larger than advantages” (Kahneman, 2003a: 1458). 
This explains the notion that investing in current capabilities is usually preferred, 
because exploitation has the advantage of sooner and closer returns than exploration 
in the organization (March, 2008). 
 
Later, in the “cumulative prospect theory”, Tversky and Kahneman include both risky 
and uncertain prospects in the gambling experiment. Four distinct patterns are 
identified in this advanced prospect theory: in addition to the risk-averse behaviour at 
the prospect of gain, and risk-seeking behaviour at the prospect of loss (as observed in 
the original prospect theory)
7
 they found two different patterns of the uncertain 
prospect. The first was that decision makers tend to be risk-averse at the prospect of 
loss with low probability, because they fear larger losses. The second was that 
decision makers tend to be risk-seeking at the prospect of a low probability of gain, 
because they hope for larger gains (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1992). 
                                                     
7
 In the experiments, risky prospects are defined as prospects with high probability whereas uncertain 
prospects are defined as those with low probability. 
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For example, some PV firms may still invest in capacity expansion despite their 
knowledge of policy and market uncertainty. Such risk-seeking behaviour can be 
viewed as the firms’ anticipation of grabbing larger gains from the uncertain prospect.  
 
Judgment for uncertain prospects 
 
Extending the principle of “diminishing sensitivity” in the judgment of probability, 
behavioural decision scholars further distinguish the judgment and decision weights 
between risky and uncertain prospects. Following Knight’s definition of risk and 
uncertainty (risk is associated with known probability, whereas the probability of 
uncertainty is unknown) (Knight, 1971), the behavioural decision scholars propose 
that decision makers are less sensitive to the uncertain than to the risky prospect.  
When the two reference points – certainty and impossibility – are considered in the 
concept of diminishing sensitivity, it is suggested that decision makers judge the event 
with greater weight when it is turning from impossibility to possibility (or from 
possibility to certainty), than when the event simply turns from more to less probable 
(Tversky & Fox, 2000). 
 
Following this concept, another implication for the decision under uncertainty is the 
“unpacking effect”. Behavioural decision scholars found that decision makers weight 
the attractiveness of a prospect higher when the description of an event is unpacked 
into relevant sub-events. Moreover, it is the role of preference or belief to influence 
the judgment and decision under uncertainty. While the observation of ambiguity 
aversion states that decision makers “prefer to bet on known probability rather than 
unknown probability”, behavioural decision scholars further demonstrate the 
“competence hypothesis”, that states decision makers have different preferences over 
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sources of uncertainty (Fox & Tversky, 2000: 140). They prefer to bet on uncertainty 
events in which they have areas of expertise or belief in their own competence than 
bet on events in which they feel less knowledgeable or competent, even when the 
chance of the former can be more ambiguous than the latter (Fox & Tversky, 2000; 
Heath & Tversky, 1991; Tversky & Fox, 2000). 
  
Narrow framing 
 
Considering the central role of framing in the judgment and decision process, an 
important application of framing effects is the notion of “narrow framing”. The 
narrow framing effect suggests that decision makers may not consider all the relevant 
consequences, opportunities and risks when making choices (Kahneman, 2003b), 
because their choices are influenced by the perspective effect from the decision frame 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). The influence of the prevailing frame of gains/losses 
described in prospect theory is an example of narrow framing in evaluating 
investment projects (Kahneman, 2003b). On the one hand, the tendency to overweight 
small risks is coincided with the observation of the attitude of the risk-averse towards 
small-sized investment projects. On the other hand, risk-seeking behaviour towards 
large investment projects can be affected by over-optimistic forecasts resulting from 
the overweighting of the likelihood of gains. Narrow framing implies that decision 
makers tend to isolate the current decision problem from other pending choice issues 
or future opportunities - the isolating effect in evaluating investment projects 
(Kahneman, 2003b; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). 
 
Framing and frames 
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In Tversky and Kahneman’s theory of framing effect, the terms “framing” and 
“frame“ were similarly applied to account for the interpretation of decision issues. Yet 
Kahneman recognizes the fact that there is a distinction between framing and frame. 
Frame originally is labelled as the manipulated account of decision problems in the 
behavioural experiments. It can be extended to refer to decision logic or perspectives 
adopted by the decision makers. Framing is the process of constructing the 
interpretation of the decision problem. The treatment of the single term may help in 
explaining the concept of framing in behavioural decision theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 2000: xiv). For example, the investigated frame is simplified as loss and gain 
in monetary terms in the behavioural experiments. However, the distinction between 
framing and frame can be critical in examining the decision problems in real business 
environments. Also, decision makers may use different frames in the framing process 
for more complex decision problems. 
 
The “passive acceptance” of the decision frame (Kahneman, 2003b) is the key 
assumption in describing vulnerability to framing effects. Further, decision makers 
may not necessarily be aware of the alternative frames for the evaluation of the 
relative effect (Kahneman, 2003a; Kahneman, 2003b; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). 
In a lab environment, the frame has already been assigned in the decision problem. 
But in the complex environment, the investigation of what the prevailing frame is and 
how the decision frame is formed would be a central issue in exploring the framing 
effect. In assessing the phenomena of the “passive acceptance of the decision frame” 
and the “prevalence of narrow frames”, the characteristics of the stimuli (event or 
decision context) (Kahneman, 2003b) and the attributes of decision makers (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1981) may serve as the basis for identifying and discriminating the 
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patterns among decision makers
8
.  
 
Based on behavioural decision theory, the occurrence of differentiated framing effects 
can be possible under the condition that decision makers have different “experienced 
utilities” based on perceived changes of the state (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). Yet 
the role of cognitive ability in reducing the influence from the framing effect is 
questioned when there are no “usable cues” in the decision context. (Kahneman, 
2003b: 7). In this sense, behavioural decision scholars imply that decision makers’ 
cognitive capacity is not necessarily relevant to the evaluation of judgment and 
decision under uncertainty
9
. On the other hand, organizational decision scholars have 
a different perspective on this assertion.  The next section will discuss organizational 
decision theory of selective attention.  
                                                     
8
 Kahneman and Tversky recognize the fact that decision makers’ characteristics may influence the 
heuristics judgment (Kahneman 2003), but discerning the patterns based on decision makers’ cognitive 
ability is not the focus of the behaviour’s decision studies.   
9
 However, there is a slight distinction between Kahneman and Tversky in their later research: 
compared with Kahneman’s focus on the “short-term experience effect” (Kahneman 2000), Tversky’s 
emphasis on the role of belief could be associated with the decision makers’ cognitive capacity in 
certain conditions.  
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2.2 Organizational decision perspectives 
 
This section reviews the concepts of selective attention and attention- based view. 
Key aspects of organizational decision process are discussed. 
 
Selective attention 
 
In the concept of bounded rationality, Simon describes the role of selective attention 
in the process of channelizing the stimuli: “a stimulus, external or internal, directs 
attention to selected aspects of the situation to the exclusion of competing aspects that 
might turn choices in another direction”. The attention is limited by “the span and the 
areas of skills and habitual behaviours” (Simon, 1996a: 101). Therefore the focus of 
attention is selected by a particular value, knowledge, or behavioural pattern which 
can be a learned response from the exposure to previous information or activities 
(March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1996a). Using this classic definition, bounded 
rationality can be explained within the limits of selective attention, which 
encompasses the individual and organizational aspects. The scarcity of attention 
suggests that decision makers may only attend to the salient and accessible aspects of 
their environments. Simon describes the role of environmental stimuli (external or 
internal) as “surprise”, which is the mechanism to focus attention on noticing 
opportunities or problems (Simon, 1996a: 123). In other words, the focus of attention 
is directed through selective perception towards the environment. 
 
In respect to the underlying mechanism for selective attention, there are two views 
that arise from the tradition of organizational and management cognition studies. One 
view is that selective attention is driven by the mechanism of organizational 
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identification, in which shared expectations and goals are emphasized in shaping the 
attention focus of decision makers (Cyert & March, 1992; Dearborn & Simon, 1958; 
March & Simon, 1958). This perspective emphasises organizational influence in the 
judgement and decision process. The other view suggests that individual decision 
makers “enact” the environment, and that they notice and make sense of the 
environment through the mechanism of a “perceptual filter”, which is influenced by 
both organizational and individual characteristics (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; Weick, 
1979). With more emphasis on decision makers’ professional roles and experience, 
this perspective implies that while senior managers from different firms (in the same 
industry) may perceive the environmental stimuli differently, managers in the same 
organization may not necessarily agree on the influence of the environmental stimuli 
(Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella Jr, 2009; Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). 
 
Key concepts of selective attention in the organizational and individual aspects are 
summarized and compared with the behavioural decision perspectives in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2 Selective attention - the organizational and individual aspects 
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Attention-based view 
 
Built on the concept of selective attention, the following scholar suggests linking the 
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“cognition and structure” aspects: the attention based view proposes a “socially 
structured pattern of attention” view in understanding firms’ behaviour and strategic 
choices. It argues that the firms’ behaviour can be explained by the issues on which 
they focus their attention. This view stresses its “open system perspective” that links 
multiple level of analysis. Thus in addition to individual cognition, the influence of 
the special situation of the decision context is highlighted in this attention-based view, 
in which three “premises” are proposed in the analytical framework: “focus of 
attention”, “situated attention” and “structural distribution of attention”. While 
emphasizing “individual cognition – attention processing”, it argues that “firms' rules, 
resources and social relation structure attention in organizations…. and generate a set 
of decision premises and motivations for actions”.  Therefore, in analysing firms’ 
decision behaviour, the application of this perspective suggests that sources of 
variation can be analyzed through the firms’ attention channels which may depend on 
the firms’ economic position, organizational structure and rules, as well as CEO and 
Top Management Teams’ characteristics (Ocasio, 1997:188, 189,196). An empirical 
study adopting this “attention-based view” found that in the context of airline 
deregulation in the United States (Airline Deregulation Act of 1978), the change of 
managerial attention was observed, and the pattern of the attention shift was mediated 
by Top Management Teams’ characteristics and the relevant incentive structure within 
the organization (Cho & Hambrick, 2006).  
 
Organizational decision process 
 
Organizational scholars propose that organizational decision structure and operating 
procedures may shape the organizational decision process (Cyert & March, 1992; 
Simon, 1996a). Specifically, organizational structural factors are said to influence 
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these rules, and may illustrate the differences among organizations. The implication of 
this perspective is two-fold in the concepts of frames and framing: firstly, it suggests 
that organizational decision process is influenced by organizational decision frame of 
shared goals and expectations.   Secondly, the influence of the standard operating 
procedure or policies implies that the choices may not necessarily link with framing 
(the interpretation of the decision problem). 
 
The role of contingency is stressed in the organizational decision process within the 
organization. Scholars suggest that the “small contingency” and “complex interaction” 
of organizational structural factors shape selective attention in the decision process 
(Ocasio, 1997: 191; 202). March proposes the “garbage can model”, in which 
“temporal sorting” is emphasized in the organizational decision-making process 
(March, 1994: 199 ). He suggests that the choices and the influencing factors are 
linked by the timing of the decision context. According to March, “the linkage is 
formed partly because of the simultaneity” (March, 1994:205). Two implications from 
this perspective: the first is the effect of causal combination with respect to the 
influence of the organizational structural factors. Thus applying these organizational 
structural factors as the prediction base for the decision pattern may depend on the 
feature of the choice context and decision task. The second is that the concept of 
“temporal proximity” (March, 1994: 200) corresponds with the behavioral decision 
concept of narrow framing in choosing “local options” (March, 1994: 14), and the 
tendency of short-term focus in the adaptive decision process. 
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2.3 The two-system view 
 
This section discusses the concept of the two-system cognitive process. From 
behavioural decision perspectives, the two-system view illustrates the operation of the 
psychological mechanism in the judgment and decision process. Here it is also 
relevant in exemplifying the different focus between behavioural and organizational 
decision perspectives.  
 
System 1 and System 2 
 
Two modes of cognitive process are distinguished here: System 1 is characterized by 
the automatic, effortless and associate process, which may correspond to intuition. 
System 2 is characterized by the controlled, effortful and deductive process, which 
may correspond to reasoning (Evans, 2003, 2008; Kahneman, 2003a; Kahneman, 
2003b; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 2002; Stanovich & West, 2002). 
System 1 and 2 can be viewed within the concept of “the operating system – software, 
not hardware” (Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010: 439). In addition to their speed and 
controllability, System 1 and System 2 can also be differentiated by their contents: 
while System 1 usually focuses on concrete and specific examples, System 2 can deal 
with abstract ideas (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). In explaining the behavioural 
decision model using the two-system view, Kahneman suggests that as System 2 
refers to explicit expression and monitoring, it can be involved in the judgment from 
both the impression generated by System 1 and the reasoning activated by System 2. 
However, “the difference in efforts” between System 1 and System 2 implies that the 
two systems “compete with resources” in the limited human cognitive capacity 
(Evans, 2003; Kahneman, 2003a). According to behavioural decision theory, System 2 
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is not always “actively and effectively” monitoring System 1; therefore decision 
biases occur, as people are satisfied with the “plausible judgments that come quickly 
to mind” (Kahneman, 2003b: 699). 
 
In addition to their characteristics within the cognitive process, the roles of System 1 
and System 2 may also depend on the conditions of the decision context, such as the 
available information, or the salience of the environmental cues (Kahneman, 2003b; 
Stanovich & West, 2002). Thus the rise of biases can be caused by the way that the 
System 1 automatic process passes the System 2 control process (Kahneman, 2003b), 
or simply because of the lack of information regarding the decision task (Kahneman 
& Frederick, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). From the latter account, judgment 
and decisions under the uncertain context are indeed more susceptible to the heuristic 
judgment and framing effects predicted by behavioural decision theory. 
 
Focusing on the operations of System 1 process, behavioural decision scholars assert 
that the role of decision makers’ attributes in this automatic judgment process is minor. 
But other two-system scholars argue that the characteristics of the decision makers are 
still significant in discriminating the operating process between System 1 and System 
2. (Stanovich & West, 2002). This brings us to the discussion of how the two-system 
view illustrates the differences between behavioural organizational decision 
perspectives. 
 
Bounded rationality with different directions 
 
Behavioural decision theory has its roots in the concept of “bounded rationality”, 
which it shares with organization decision theory (Gilovich et al., 2002; Kahneman, 
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2003b). The evolutionary explanation that historical constraints influence the 
judgment and decision process is also embedded in behavioural decision theory. 
Similar to Simon’s work, Tversky and Kahneman have been concerned with the 
decision process driven by the “satisficing principle” through the mechanism of 
memory retrieval (Gilovich et al., 2002; Kahneman, 2003b; March & Simon, 1958; 
Simon, 1996a). 
 
However, the “bounded rationality” concept extended in the behavioural decision 
research program takes a different direction from the original concept developed by 
Simon. In behavioural decision theory, the decision “errors” are systematic, and are 
caused by the common psychological mechanism operating in the cognitive process. 
In the classic bounded rationality theory, Simon emphasizes that decision errors are 
caused by limited human cognitive capacity in decision-making (Simon, 1996a). In 
this sense, it appears that Simon does not entirely reject the notion from the rational 
decision model that decision errors can be unsystematic (Gilovich et al., 2002). 
Compared with Simon’s problem-solving decisions emphasising the cognitive process, 
Tversky-Kahneman’s decisions are more involved with the automatic judgment and 
perceptual process. Yet cognitive and perceptual may not be an appropriate way to 
discriminate Simon’s (and behavioural decision scholars’) emphasis on the decision 
process. In fact, even Tversky and Kahneman use the terms of perceptual and 
cognitive process “interchangeably” in their studies (Gilovich et al., 2002; Kahneman, 
2003b). 
 
The two-system view may illuminate the different perspectives between Simon’s 
bounded rationality and Tversky-Kahneman’s heuristic judgment. While both 
perspectives recognize human cognitive limitations, Simon appears to focus more on 
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the System 2 constraints in capacity: the lack of knowledge or limited computing 
power in processing the information are causes for potential decision errors (Simon, 
1996a). On the other hand, Tversky and Kahneman focus on the constantly active 
functioning of System 1; the decision biases are results from the “lazy” or disrupted 
functioning of System 2 (Kahneman, 2003b; Kahneman, 2011). Therefore, as Simon 
focuses more attention on exploring ways to avoid System 2 errors in the 
problem-solving decision process, the original concept of bounded rationality may 
neglect the possibility that System 2 could still be overridden by System 1 – which is 
the proposition addressed by behavioural decision scholars. For example, the 
challenges for the problem-solving decision process are: firstly, despite an 
environmental change the decision makers may not be aware of the changing problem; 
secondly, even if they recognize the problem, there are issues regarding the judgment 
on the timing and the impact level. 
 
Then the challenge for behavioural decision scholars is that they appear to assume 
that the effective functioning of System 2 would lead to superior decisions, and pay 
less attention to potential System 2 errors resulting from the deficiency of knowledge 
and computing power- which is emphasized in Simon’s bounded rationality. Thus the 
challenge for behavioural decision perspective is that there is a danger of neglecting 
the factors influencing the System 2 capacity in the decision process.  
 
With the two-system view, the divergence of focus in Simon and 
Tversky-Kahneman’s decision models may lead to different diagnoses about the 
influencing factors in the decision process. For example, in the case of overconfidence, 
the behavioural decision scholars suggest the reason is because “people are more 
sensitive to the strength of the evidence than its weight” (Griffin & Tversky, 2002). 
46 
 
The underlying process can be explained by the representative and availability 
heuristics. On the other hand, the perspective of decision expertise (pioneered by 
Simon) (Chase & Simon, 1973; Ericsson, 2006a) may imply that the characteristics of 
the domain-specific expertise could induce cognitive traps or inflexibility (Dane, 
2010). Further, although behavioural decision scholars are aware of the potential 
influence of decision makers’ selective attention in the System 1 judgmental process, 
the issue has not really been addressed in behavioural decision theory. Yet from the 
perspective of organizational scholars, the effect of selective attention is central in the 
organizational decision-making process (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; March & Simon, 
1958; Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 1996a).  
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Chapter 3 
Research Design 
 
Introduction 
 
This research encompasses enquiries from two aspects: one is the assessment of 
judgment and decision pattern; the other is the investigation of the decision makers 
and the choice context. The behavioural decision school focuses on the former inquiry 
and adopts the experimental approach. The advantage of this approach is that it 
delineates the patterns and conditions for the prediction base of the judgment and 
decision behaviours. But the challenge is that a laboratory environment may not 
reflect real-world decision problems. The organizational decision school emphasizes 
the latter inquiry and examines the influencing factors on multiple levels in the 
decision context
10
 (Ocasio, 1997). The advantage of this approach is that it provides a 
comprehensive analysis of the decision process. Under this “open system” perspective 
(Ocasio, 1997: 188), everything matters and can be contingent on the situational 
factors. However, the question then arises that it may not necessarily illustrate the 
pattern for the prediction of the decision behaviour. This research design incorporates 
the ideas of the behavioural and organizational decision approaches: it employs the 
behavioural concept of eliciting the judgmental heuristics from detecting biases 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) and draws on the organizational concept of examining 
the influencing factors across different levels. 
 
Section 3.1 reviews various approaches including survey, content analysis, 
                                                     
10
 Here it refers to the organizational decision perspective of selective attention. 
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experiments, verbal protocol analysis and case study. Particularly, the limitations of 
experiments, verbal protocol and case study approach are examined. This section 
discusses that case study can be the most suitable approach for this research because it 
facilitates the investigation of supporting factors, causal rules and conditions for 
predictions. Then this section discusses that under the case study approach, this 
research incorporates some design elements of the experiments and verbal protocol 
analysis in this research design. 
 
Section 3.2 discusses the three-level research design. The first level of research design 
focuses on examining the systematically similar patterns predicted by behavioural 
decision perspectives. The analysis focuses on examining heuristic judgement in the 
specific industry and institutional context. The second level examines the diversity 
predicted by the organizational decision perspectives. The comparative analysis 
focuses on examining firm-level selective attention. The third level investigates the 
relative influences of professional experience, organizational and industry practices 
on decision makers’ selective attention.     
 
Section 3.3 reviews the data collection and analysis approach of this research. Three 
categories of data collection sources include the industry, case firms and interviews. 
Validity is addressed through the selection of credible data and the triangulation of 
various sources. The data analysis follows the three levels of research design and uses 
the principle of comparative analysis to exemplify the theoretical concepts. 
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3.1 Approaches to decision studies 
 
The complexity of decision studies presents different challenges for various research 
methods. Several approaches including survey, content analysis, verbal protocol 
analysis and case study have been employed in empirical management decision 
studies (Table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1 Approaches to the study of management decision –making 
 
 
Source: compiled by the author.  
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Survey 
Surveys are one of the commonly used methods in examining management perception 
towards environmental uncertainty, particularly in early and 1990s organizational 
studies (Duncan, 1972; Milliken, 1990; Sutcliffe, 1998; Thomas et al., 1993).  The 
advantage of a survey is that it can be a less expensive way to collect data targeting a 
large group of respondents. However, there are limitations of conducting survey to 
examine senior managers’ perception. Firstly, it could be difficult for senior managers 
or executives to fill in the questionnaire given their busy schedule. The issue becomes 
a critical one if the characteristics of senior managers are central to the analysis and 
the researcher is not able to verify whether or not these senior managers are the ones 
who complete the survey questionnaire. Further, in the research context of examining 
firms’ business decisions, the survey method cannot facilitate the need for verifying 
the answers with the respondents and explaining the questions if senior managers 
have any confidentiality concern.   
 
Content analysis 
Content analysis, particularly the approach of counting of critical words in letters to 
shareholders has emerged as another popular method of examining management 
cognition in the early 2000s (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Eggers & Kaplan, 2008; Kaplan, 
2008a; Kaplan, 2011). Content analysis generally refers to as a “systematic 
examination and interpretation of a particular body of material to identify patterns and 
meaning” (Berg, 2006:303). The major advantage of content analysis is that it can be 
used “non-reactively” in collecting and analyzing data. Moreover, it can be a 
cost-effect way for process study such as comparing the trends or “indicating the 
magnitude” in different periods of time. The major weakness of content analysis lies 
in the relevance of these “non-obtrusive” and recorded messages to the research 
51 
 
question (Berg, 2006:326-329). For example, one criticism of using the word counting 
is that it does not take into account the “literal” meaning used in the context. In this 
research, content analysis is used as a supporting analysis tool rather than a main 
research method. For example, in analysing Letter to Shareholders (LTS), this 
research applies the qualitative content analysis of “concept” rather than “word 
counting” in examining both physically present content and latent content.  
 
The Experimental method 
The experimental method is employed in most of the behavioural decision research 
program. From a general view, experiments “isolate or create conditions to investigate 
predictions” (Webster & Sell, 2007:194).  There are two key elements in 
experiments. The first is that the characteristics of a situation must recur to enable the 
repeated study. The second is that the created and specified situations are served as the 
conditions to predict the outcome. The advantage of experimental method is its 
strength in “assessing theoretically derived predictions”. Specifically, if the 
supporting evidence is derived from the subjects matching the specified conditions in 
a theory, it is others’ problem to demonstrate that the theory cannot be held for some 
“subsets of the population” (Webster & Sell, 2007:192, 196-197). The experimental 
method is employed in most of the behavioural decision research program. It achieves 
the goal of identifying systematic pattern of judgemental heuristics.  
 
However, there are limitations to using experiments. First, the situations created in 
experiments can be very different from those in real life. Therefore, it raises the 
question as to whether the lab findings can be “directly generalized” to the 
environment outside of the lab given the varied conditions. For example, as most of 
the findings from behavioural decision theory are established from the experimental 
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results, the main challenge for the behavioural decision research program lies in the 
question that people may act differently in natural settings
11
. Second, it has been 
suggested that experiments are not suited for answering questions with respect to 
exploring “orientations” or in need of “background interpretation” in specific context 
and time period (Webster & Sell, 2007:195).   
 
Verbal protocol analysis 
Verbal protocol analysis is an experimental method examining the “underlying 
thought processes that occur during problem solving”. Specifically, in the 
“think-aloud” approach, subjects’ immediate verbal expressions of their thinking 
processes are “elicited, recorded and encoded” for analysis. Verbal protocol analysis 
has been widely regarded as a valid approach for studying “expert thought” and 
complex thinking process (Ericsson, 2006b:224, 229). A number of management 
cognition studies have applied this method in examining senior managers’ cognitive 
structure in the problem solving process (Gregoire et al., 2009; Melone, 1994; 
Sarasvathy, Simon, & Lave, 1998). There are several advantages in using verbal 
protocol analysis to examine decision-making as the problem-solving process. Firstly, 
compared with other verbal reports (such as interviews), the concurrent verbalization 
of the problem-solving process may avoid the “reactive effect of generating 
explanation”, referring to the potential issue that participants may make other 
inferences or “after-the-fact reconstruction” in explaining the decision problem. 
Secondly, with standardized conditions and process measures targeted representative 
and domain specific tasks, verbal protocol analysis elicits the features of the cognitive 
structures and rules in a specific domain, not just the general problem–solving 
                                                     
11
 Scholars have criticised the lack of considering social influence in the choice context (Kogut, 2008), 
and the manipulated decision frame in the decision problem (Stanovich & West, 2002). 
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strategies (Ericsson, 2006b:230-231).  
 
However, these “constrained conditions necessary” for yielding valid data in verbal 
protocol analysis are just the limitations of this approach. First, as it requires the 
“well-defined” and “representative task analysis, the question lies in whether the 
“specific tasks and activities” defined in verbal protocol analysis can really “capture 
the essence” of certain type of expertise under the “recreated and standardized 
conditions” (Ericsson, 2006b:231, 236). For example, verbal protocol analysis can be 
good in understanding and predicting the expert performance in the domain of 
memory, computation and chess but may not necessarily be a good indicator for 
medical tasks (Ericsson, 2006b; Lipshitz, Klein, & Carroll, 2006). Second, verbal 
protocol analysis aims at “revealing the sequences” and structure of thought processes; 
the implicit assumption is that expert performance of these representative tasks can be 
reproduced. But in real world people can be easily influenced by the decision context 
and employ different strategies in the decision process. This corresponds with the 
same limitation faced with the experimental method
12
.  
 
The case study approach 
The case study approach have been employed in a number of organizational decision 
studies (Bourgeois III & Eisenhardt, 1988; Burgelman, 1994; Hoffmann, Trautmann, 
& Hamprecht, 2009; Kaplan, 2008b; Tripsas & Gavett, 2000). The major goal of case 
study is deep understanding of a case. With “thick descriptions” (Mabry, 2008:214, 
219)of analytic details, case study is strong in examining the complexity of 
                                                     
12
 One of the major differences between the behavioural decision experiments and verbal protocol 
experiment is that the latter aims at identifying the reasoning pattern from the controlled System 2, 
taking the opposite path to the experimental approach of the behavioural decision school in eliciting the 
heuristics from the automatic System 1. 
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interrelated factors.  Also, while case study “retains more noises” in real life, the 
investigation permits the exploration of the “unexpected” or “unusual” cases and 
factors (Hodkinson & Heather, 2001; Platt, 2007). 
 
Limitations of case study 
 
The major limitation of case study generally points to the issue of generalizability, 
referring to “the capacity of a case” to reach “generalization for causal propositions” 
beyond the specific context of a case (Mabry, 2008:222; Platt, 2007:108). In 
quantitative study, the “case-to-population generalization” emphasises the 
representativeness of a population through random sampling.  However, random 
selection may still be susceptible to skewing findings because of sampling bias 
(Mabry, 2008:223). Further, the assumption of sharing similar causal principles in 
randomized control trials raises the practical question as to whether these empirical 
findings can really be applied in other settings (Nightingale, 2013). 
 
Therefore, scholars have argued that the generalization mode from case study is 
“theoretical” not “empirical” from the statistical perspective. For example, the 
concept of “analytic generalization” emphasises the “theory in question is embedded 
in a broader web of theories ….. to link specific study findings to the theory of 
interests”. Also, because the selection of cases is based on their “informativeness”, the 
choices of examining exemplar, deviant or extreme cases reflect different features of 
the study and may help modify or strengthen the theory (Mabry, 2008:223; Platt, 
2007:108, 113-114).  Further, case study may aim at comparing rival theories and 
applying the findings in other settings (Hodkinson & Heather, 2001). For the latter 
account, case study can be a way to facilitate the investigation of supporting factors, 
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causal rules and conditions for predictions. It will then help to make the valid claim 
for the effectiveness of practical policy or management advice (Nightingale, 2013).   
 
Another limitation of case study is the issue of validity, referring to the “accuracy of 
data” and “warrantedness of data-based interpretation”. Observation, interviews and 
document analysis are the three main qualitative data collection methods employed in 
case study research (Mabry, 2008:221,218). Particularly, observations and interviews 
tend to be easily criticized for the “subjectivity” issue. For example, compared with 
experiment methods, interviews usually lack the rigor and control of environment and 
measurement. Data collection and interpretation is highly dependent on the 
researcher’s own judgement and experience. In addition, there are other potential 
limitations associated with using interviews method in case study. First, the accuracy 
and credibility of the interview data may rely on the assumption that interviewees 
“understand the question intended by the researcher“ 13 (Alvesson, 
2011:114,143).Second, the retrospective issue arises when using interviews for 
decision studies: there is doubt as to whether interviewees may rationalize their 
behaviour in explaining the decision process
14
  With respect to the senior manager 
interviewees, another potential worry is that whether they answer some questions with 
the purpose of impression management. 
 
To address the validity issue of case study, triangulation is the common principle. 
Scholars have suggested “triangulation by data sources”, referring to collecting data 
                                                     
13
 In this sense, survey method relies on this assumption, too. Verbal protocol analysis also has the 
similar assumption that the participants have the ability to express their spontaneous thought in the 
problem-solving process. 
14
 Verbal protocol analysis is strong in addressing the retrospective issue. While survey method suffers 
the same issue, interview method is stronger than survey because the interviewers have the chance to 
remind interviewees about the time line and verify their responses in the interview process. 
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from different stakeholders and sources. “Methodological triangulation”, referring to 
verifying data with different methodologies: for example, examining whether 
interviews data confirms with document analysis or observation. “Theoretical 
triangulation” refers to examining different implications suggested by various theories. 
Finally, “triangulation by observer” may help to expand the angle of interpretation 
and address the potential subjectivity issue resulting from the single researcher. With 
respect to interviews, in addition to employing the principle of triangulation in 
interviewing different stakeholders and examining related “supportive studies” 
(Mabry, 2008:222), it is suggested that some “thoughtful intervention” such as 
intentionally increasing certain level of control and assessment can be employed to 
enhance the validity of interview practice and process (Alvesson, 2011:143). 
 
Case study approach in this research 
 
This research selects the case study approach because it is most suitable in 
investigating the research questions “what is the role of framing in the 
decision-making process for new capability investments, and what factors may 
influence such process?” The case study approach addresses the complexity of 
interrelated factors in the decision–making process and facilitates the analysis of 
specified conditions for predictions in the decision context.  
 
Although with the strengths of controlled measures and assessing theoretically 
derived predictions, the limitations of experiments are the reasons why the pure 
experimental method is not suitable for this research. As discussed earlier, the first 
limitation is that while the situations created in experiments can be very different 
from those in the real world; this research aims at understanding of behaviours outside 
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of the controlled lab environment. The second is that while experiments are not suited 
for answering questions with respect to interpreting specific background, this research 
concerns exploring firms’ orientations in natural settings..   
 
There are two reasons why verbal protocol may not be suitable for the investigation of 
this research: firstly, similar to the limitations of using experimental methods, 
although the way verbal protocol analysis in “eliciting, recording and encoding” 
verbal reports in well defined task analysis can be valid for investigating the expert 
thought in specific domain. But these controlled environments and conditions are 
opposite to this research question investigation in which the behaviours in natural 
settings and the influence of the decision context are the central concerns. Secondly, 
whereas the central interest of verbal protocol analysis draws on the understanding of 
“cognitive constructs and rules” (Ericsson, 2006b:237), such topic of diagnosing 
thinking process and expert performance is not the central interest of this research.  
 
While case study is most suitable in examining firms’ behaviour and the interactions 
of factors in the decision context, some design elements of experimental approach and 
verbal protocol analysis are incorporated in this research design. For example, the 
concept of eliciting heuristics in behavioural experiments is employed in this research: 
it uses structured questions to elicit interviewees’ comments on specific incidents and 
then their remarks are compared with industry data to yield the pattern of heuristics 
used in the judgment process. Further, although not using the verbal protocol 
approach, this research purposefully selects the subjects fitting the scope of conditions 
(e.g. the professional experience in certain corporate functional role) and uses the 
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concept of eliciting patterns, cues and action plans
15
 in the judgement and decision 
process. In particular, besides using semi-structured and structured interviews, this 
research also employs the scenario evaluation tool to capture the pattern of 
opportunity recognition. 
 
This research uses both the single- case and multiple case study approach. The single- 
case presentation aims at understanding the specific decision context and process. The 
multiple case comparison facilitates the exploration of diversity and causal 
combination among cases (Ragin, 1997; Ragin, 1994b, 2007). With respect to 
enhancing the validity of case study and interview approach, this research employs 
the principle of triangulation.  Firstly, this case study research is not purely relied on 
interview data but also uses document review, industry analysis and content analysis 
of Letter to Shareholders. Secondly, this research interviews senior managers with 
different functional roles and relevant third-party stakeholders including government 
official, research community, venture capitalists and different industry participants in 
the value chain.  Meanwhile, prior to the formal interviews, this research employs 
expert review to enhance the credibility of the structured interview questions and 
scenario design. Finally, the retrospective issue is lessened because the 
forward-looking responses are emphasised in the scenario evaluation approach.  
                                                     
15
 In this sense, the concept is similar to Natural Decision Making (NDM) approach in which pattern 
analysis and decision making under natural settings are emphasised. However, it is different from 
NDM in terms of the research goal – NDM concerns the expert performance. 
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3.2 Research design principle and case selection 
 
This section discusses the three-level research design and the rationale of case 
selection.  
 
Research design 1 
 
Three levels of research design are employed in the research (Table 3.2). At the first 
level, the research design aims at examining the phenomenon of framing effect 
suggested by the theoretical concepts from the behavioural decision theory. On the 
one hand, this level of the research design focuses on the decision makers’ perception 
toward the decision issues and follows the concept of detecting decision makers’ 
potential biases. On the other hand, it also emphasises the investigation of the choice 
context; specifically, the salience of the environmental cues and the sources of 
uncertainties. The use of the qualitative approach in this research design is to 
exemplify the similarities across cases. With the goal of seeking commonalities to 
identify general patterns, (Ragin, 1994b), the case selection strategy is to justify the 
representativeness of the selected cases for the validity of the plausible explanations.  
 
Table 3.2 Research Design 
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Source: The author. 
 
Following the experimental concept of theoretical sampling in the comparative 
approach, the cases are purposefully chosen and comparable in a defined category in 
which the variances of the contextual factors are minimized, yet the interested factors 
are saliently demonstrated (Ragin 1994, 2009). Firstly, to control the influencing 
factors from the different institutional and industry environments (DiMaggio, 1997; 
Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008), the research setting is located in a single industry in the 
same country. In view of the uncertainties, the Solar Photovoltaic (PV) industry is 
selected as the appropriate industry setting. Taiwan is selected because the Taiwanese 
PV industry has experienced impressive growth for the past few years. These two 
conditions lead us to a specific investigation period of the years 2006-2011, to 
exemplify the influence from environmental change. Secondly, as the firms’ position 
in the industry value/supply chain is expected to influence their investment strategies 
(Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Teece, 1986), I focus on firms in a similar position in the 
industry value chain. PV cell firms are selected because they represent the vast 
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majority of the PV firms in the Taiwanese PV industry (PIDA, 2011; WealthPress, 
2009).  
 
Next, as the research concerns firms’ capability investments, the condition of similar 
networking and access to external technological resources is controlled. The 
participation of the government R&D innovation programs serves as the criterion. 
Two programs from the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) are used, because they 
are benchmark government programs for R&D innovation projects in terms of both 
the scale and the strict review process by a group of experts from academia and the 
research community. 
 
There are a total of eight PV cell firms, in four categories of PV technologies, which 
have been awarded MOEA programs over the past five years (2006-2011). However, 
not all of the eight firms could be studied, due to constraints upon resources and 
access. The five case firms were selected
16
 according to the below criteria (Table 3.3). 
Firstly, three out of the four Crystalline Silicon (c-Si) firms were chosen because they 
had been awarded the most recent projects. The one excluded firm’s last award was in 
2006. Secondly, the one selected Amorphous Silicon/Macro Crystalline Silicon Thin 
Film (a-Si/μc-Si TF) firm was awarded with more government innovative R&D 
programs in recent years than the other a-Si/μc-Si TF firm. Thirdly, the only 
Copper-Indium- Gallium-Diselenide Thin Film (CIGS TF) firm was selected. Lastly, 
the Dye Sensitized Solar Cell (DSSC) firm was omitted because the firm withdrew 
the DSSC business line in 2011. 
 
 
                                                     
16
 Case firms are given as pseudonyms 
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Table 3.3 Case firm profile 
 
Source: Company annual reports, MOEA projects and TSE (Taiwan Security Exchange) filing. 
Compiled by the author. 
 
Research design 2 
 
The second level of the research design aims at examining the phenomenon of 
selective attention suggested by the theoretical concepts from organization decision 
theory. While this research design addresses the sources of variation at the 
organization level, it also emphasizes explaining which organizational factor or causal 
combination discriminates the patterns across firms. With the goal of exploring 
diversity in mind, the second level of research design has a stronger flavour of the 
comparative case approach than the first because it is “more concerned with causal 
complexity” in the organization.     
 
To sharpen the comparison at the organization level, another condition is added to 
increase the homogeneity of the comparable cases (Ragin, 1997). With the condition 
of c-Si PV technology, the cases are narrowed down to the three c-Si firms. The 
reason for choosing c-Si technology is that this technology is relatively mature. Thus 
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these c-Si firms are similarly associated with a certain scale and public trading type. 
In fact, these two factors obviously differentiate the three c-Si firms from the other 
two thin film firms (besides the technology). The exclusion of the two smaller firms 
not only facilitates the collection of public data but is also justified for the purpose of 
comparative analysis at the organization level. 
 
Research design 3 
 
Continuing the investigation of the phenomenon of selective attention as the source of 
variation, the third level of the research design examines whether individual decision 
makers’ attributes influence the framing effect. Specifically, the research design 
focuses on categorizing the relative influence of individuals’ professional 
backgrounds, and organizational decision contexts. With the goal of examining 
individual decision makers’ attributes and identifying sources of similarities and 
variation, the similar concept of the quasi-experimental approach is adopted in the 
research design, but with a modified implementation approach. The decision problems 
are not designed from hypothetical cases, but are drawn from the real business 
environment. Rather than following the verbal protocol approach in coding the 
specific term or semantic analysis to recognize cognitive patterns, the research design 
focuses on the description of the decision issue, and the analysis of the interaction 
with the decision context.  
 
With the concept of the quasi-experimental approach in management cognition 
studies, each interviewee is purposely selected to meet the criterion of a professional 
background. Two functional groups – technology (R&D) decision makers and 
business (finance) decision makers – are categorized in the research. Initially, the 
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research targets ten senior managers (one for each functional group) from the five 
case firms. Finally, eight senior managers are available for interview. This size is 
considered reasonable as it matches the average group size of eight to nine in previous 
management cognition studies employing the quasi-experimental approach (Gregoire 
et al., 2009; Melone, 1994; Sarasvathy et al., 1998). Among the eight senior managers, 
four are in the technology function group while the other four are in the finance 
function group (Table 3.4). Most of the senior managers (except the deputy Chief 
Finance Officer) are the heads of their departments. In fact, it may be more 
appropriate to refer them as executives of the firms. Generally, their positions reflect 
their expertise in the function group. For example, of the four senior R&D managers 
who joined their firms since inception, three of them have PhDs and research 
experience in the field of PV technologies. 
 
Table 3.4 Senior managers’ profile 
 
Source : Company annual reports, interviews and compiled by the author. 
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3.3 Data collection and analysis 
 
This section reviews the data collection and analysis approach of this research. 
Archival documents and interviews are the main sources of data. The emphasis is on 
the triangulation of the different data sources as well as among firm and
 
third-party 
interviewees. Data analysis follows the structural approach of the three-level design. 
 
Data sources 
 
The PV industry 
  
The first stage of data collection begins with the PV industry. The analysis of the PV 
industry is not simply conducted for the purpose of background information; it also 
serves as the basis for examining uncertainty in the choice context. Further, in order to 
investigate decision issues in real business environments, an understanding of the 
industry is essential for the design of interview questions.  
 
In addition to the primary goal of amassing comprehensive information, the collection 
of industry data ensures the principle of validity. Firstly, the data sources encompass 
perspectives from different industry stakeholders, including governments, industry 
associations (NGOs), research and academia communities, investment bankers and 
industry analysts. Secondly, I pay specific attention to the credibility of the data 
providers. For example, I reviewed the industry reports published by the major 
government agencies, leading PV industry interest groups and top financial 
institutions. Thirdly, the data sources comprise a variety of media formats, including 
professional white papers, books and market reports, as well as business news. Then 
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comes the observation: to gain a practical perspective on trends within the industry, I 
attended two of the largest international Solar PV conferences and exhibitions
17
, and 
had conversations with a number of industry participants during the trade shows. 
 
Case firms 
 
From the solid base of PV industry knowledge and networking, the second stage of 
research was to review the background information of the five case firms. Firstly I 
reviewed the annual reports and extensively researched all the relevant business news 
regarding the case firms. Specifically, I examined details of the three c-Si firms’ 
annual reports, including the shareholder and organizational structures, financial 
performance and investment projects, as well as key announcements in the board 
meetings. An additional stage of research was to collate the relevant interviews of (or 
news regarding) the case firms’ CEOs and collect any related remarks from the 
third-party interviewees. Secondly, the details of the five case firms’ MOEA 
government projects were examined, with specific attention paid to the technologies
18
 
and the collaborating partners. Moreover, as the two thin film firms are private, the 
information from MOEA projects provided some company data that is not publicly 
available. For the three c-Si firms, the MOEA information provided another source for 
cross-checking the data from the firms’ annual reports.  
  
Interviews 
 
Aided by the MOEA officials’ support as well as by the researcher’s personal contacts 
                                                     
17
 EU PVSEC in September 2010 and InterSolar in June 2011. 
18
 For the non-confidentiality aspects of the technologies; with permission from the MOEA official. 
67 
 
(friends and networking from tradeshows), the interview arrangement began in 
parallel with data collection from the case firms. Prior to formal interviews with 
senior managers of the case firms, I conducted expert reviews (pilot interviews) with 
three industry professionals to validate the interview questions
19
. To arrange the 
official interviews, I sent emails to target interviewees, in which the purpose of the 
interview and the profile of the researcher were briefly introduced. Then the 
confirmations were followed by subsequent emails or calls. Finally, I managed to 
interview eight key decision makers in five case firms, and six industry
 
third-party 
stakeholders.  
 
As discussed earlier, the representativeness of the eight senior managers is 
exemplified by their position in their firms; it is also provided by the assumption that 
senior managers’ perception may reflect the firms’ decision process (Cyert & March, 
1992; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Starbuck, Barnett, & Baumard, 2008; Starbuck & 
Milliken, 1988). The representativeness of the six
 
third-party interviewees is also well 
justified in that the selection encompasses the government, the research community, 
the venture capital community, and industry players in the value chain. Also, these 
interviewees are qualified in terms of their professional positions as well as their 
experience within the industry (Table 3.5). These official interviews were conducted 
during the period of November 2011 to March 2012. The interview time ranged from 
one to two hours (for senior managers from the case firms), to two to three hours (for 
the industry professionals). 
 
Table 3.5 Interviewees’ profiles 
                                                     
19
 The expert interviewees also agreed to participate in the formal interview (from the perspective of 
third-party stakeholders). 
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Source: the author. 
 
Interview question design 
 
Two perspectives are adopted in designing the interview questions. On the one hand, 
the retrospective interview questions focus on the firms’ activities relevant to 
capability investments, including the MOEA projects, search activities in R&D and 
the firm’s decision issues. Senior managers’ responses were triangulated with the 
interviews with third-party industry stakeholders and archival documents including 
annual reports, industry sources and government records. On the other hand, the 
investigation of “decision frames” and “framing” is examined through interviewees’ 
perceived environmental uncertainty, and future trends. These related questions are 
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constructed around the scenario analysis. The concept of the case scenario has been 
used in management cognition studies, mostly in the form of the survey or the verbal 
protocol approach (Gregoire et al., 2009; Melone, 1994; Thomas et al., 1993). In 
contrast to the hypothetical case scenario employed in these studies, the scenario here 
is built on the basis of solar PV industry analysis.   
 
The design of the scenario is based on the idea that through addressing the interaction 
effect of the influencing environmental forces, the industry dynamic can be visualized 
to reflect the business context (Day, Schoemaker, & Gunther, 2000). Two major forces 
which are of particular interest to the industry, and critical in shaping its future 
development are identified: policy uncertainty and technology uncertainty. Firstly, the 
impact of policy uncertainty on the PV market can be categorized through two 
scenarios – baseline and advanced – according to the level of introduction and the 
enforcement of the government support measures (EPIA, 2010). Secondly, the two 
scenarios of technology uncertainty – the roadmap scenario and the accelerated 
scenario – are categorized by the development pace of the emerging PV technologies 
relative to the prediction from the current technology roadmap (IEA, 2010; SEMI, 
2011, 2012).  Finally, combining the interaction effect of the policy and technology 
uncertainty, four scenarios are identified: business as usual; policy driven; technology 
driven; and the transforming prospect (Figure 3.1). Interviewees were asked to rank 
the relative predictability and possibility of scenarios, and then evaluate their 
influence on the firm’s timing and direction regarding new capability investments. 
Specifically, interviewees would select a most probable scenario, and indicate the 
location of the chosen scenario. Meanwhile, interviewees were also asked to describe 
the relative influence of the policy and the strength of the technology. In this way, the 
researcher would be able to identify and discriminate each interviewee’s evaluation 
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within the selection of a particular scenario.     
 
Figure 3.1 Scenario analysis 
 
Source: the author. 
 
The interview process and organizing data 
 
In the last confirmation email of the interview appointment (usually two or three days 
prior to the interview), I emailed the interviewees the question list
20
. Two issues 
needed to be considered: one was that the question list could not be too long, because 
it might intimidate busy senior managers who had other things to do. The other was 
that the list needed to cover the topics under discussion: because of their positions as 
the firms’ executives, they would be sensitive to unexpected questions in the 
interviews. Therefore, the question list I sent prior to the interview included the key 
questions, but presented them in a concise manner
21
. The question list was in both 
Chinese and English. Then, at the interview meeting, I prepared the complete 
interview question list with instructions and detailed descriptions. I found that this 
                                                     
20
 Some secretaries or assistants of the senior managers requested the question list even earlier (i.e. as 
soon as their bosses confirmed the meeting).  
21
 I found that every interviewee did read the question list before the interview. 
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helped to clarify the terminologies and questions during the interview process.  
 
I did not record the interviews, because making recordings was frowned upon due to 
the sensitive position of the senior R&D managers involved
22
. Instead, I took notes 
during the interviews. These notes were recorded quickly, and in brief form. Therefore 
as soon as the interview was completed, I reviewed these notes immediately at the 
firm’s reception lounge (if it was allowed), or on the train home. Then when I got 
back to my desk, I wrote down detailed elaborations on these notes, following the 
24-hour rule (Bourgeois III & Eisenhardt, 1988). I also had the chance to re-examine 
the interview questions during phone conversations with some of the interviewees.     
 
I did not use the coding method for specific terms. The focus is not on the frequency 
of the usage of certain terminologies, but on descriptions in the responses, particularly 
in terms of the open questions (e.g. the critical issues influencing capability 
investments). In some of the structurally-designed questions (e.g. the scenario, or 
market signals), or questions with prompts (e.g. investment evaluation criteria or 
search activities), I was able to compare the interviewees’ responses both on the 
indicated ranking and in the corresponding descriptions. For some of the questions, I 
triangulated with the answers from the
 
third-party interviewees: for example, in the 
question on the firms’ search activities and the decision practices. For some questions, 
such as the opinion on future prospects, the interviewee’s individual comments 
already adequately met the purpose of the questions. 
 
                                                     
22
 I have provided the confidentiality assurance in the interview invitation. But some senior mangers 
still raised some concerns prior to the interviews and suggested that I interview PR managers instead. 
PR managers would, however, be the wrong interview target, so I tried to ease their concerns. 
Non-recording was one the courtesies.   
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The categorization of the interview data serves as the preliminary analysis framework. 
To organize the interview data, I started by grouping the similarities and differences 
among cases. Firstly, the comparison was organized using three interview sections – 
the scenario and market signals, MOEA projects, and R&D strategy. Then in 
organizing the scripts of the interview responses, I briefly listed each interviewee’s 
points using tabular display forms. These tables include the comments from
 
third-party interviewees and notes from archival sources. I found such visual 
representation helped in analysing and discriminating patterns among case firms and 
individual managers (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
Analytical approach 
 
The three-level analysis framework is constructed based on the three research design 
principles described earlier in Section 3.2.  
 
Research analysis level 1 
 
The first level of analysis emphasizes the commonality among the five case firms.  
The analytical strategy of “selecting the dependent variable” is adopted to examine 
the causal condition shared by the five cases with similar outcomes (Ragin, 2007; 
Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). Here the causal condition is the framing effect suggested by 
the behavioural decision perspective. The dependent variable is the firms’ investment 
patterns in the investigated period (2006-2011). The focus on existing capability 
investment is verified as the general pattern shared among these Taiwanese PV firms. 
 
Following the investigation of the pattern of environmental uncertainty in the decision 
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context, the analysis focuses on comparing the theoretical concepts from behavioural 
decision theory with rival explanations from the rational decision models: for example, 
how does the investigated phenomenon deviate from the prediction of the rational 
decision perspectives? The analysis approach of eliciting heuristics is adopted. The 
researcher then examines the pattern of when heuristic thinking would arise, and 
which heuristics would be invoked. Specifically, the analysis focuses on the framing 
of environmental uncertainty, investment project evaluation and resource constraints. 
Interviewees’ responses are compared with evidence from industry data. Then, using 
the concept of data triangulation across cases (Ragin, 1994b), the similarities of these 
cases serve to exemplify the phenomenon of systematic patterns suggested by the 
behavioural decision perspective. The empirical findings of this level of analysis are 
discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
Research analysis level 2 
 
The second level of analysis focuses on diversity among the three c-Si firms, 
following the logic of comparing the differences among cases under the selected 
conditions. The analytical strategy of “selecting the independent variable” is adopted 
in order to investigate the diverse causal pattern among the three firms (Rihoux & 
Ragin, 2009: xix). There are two dependent variables based on the two investigation 
problems: one is defined as the three firms’ capability investment patterns throughout 
the firm’s history. The other is the three firms’ selective attention pattern. As verified 
by desk research, there is variation of patterns among the three firms. In the analysis 
of the first investigation problem, three firms’ selective attention patterns are 
compared to examine the relevance to their capability investment pattern. Then, in the 
analysis of the second investigation problem, the independent variables are the 
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investigated causal conditions derived from the organizational decision perspective 
(the attention based view). Specifically, three organizational factors influencing the 
selective attention are examined and compared within the three firms: firm resources, 
firm ownership, and firm CEO’s experience. Finally, the comparative method of 
configuration is introduced by constructing a simple truth table summarising the 
causal combination of the comparative analysis of the three firms (Ragin, 1994b, 
2007). The empirical findings of this level of analysis are discussed in Chapter 5.   
 
Research analysis level 3 
 
The third level of analysis focuses on examining the conditions influencing selective 
attention at the decision maker level.  While the comparison logic of senior 
managers’ professional experience is similar to the verbal protocol approach 
employed in management cognition studies, the difference lies in the analysis here 
also encompasses the investigation of the relative influences from the organizational 
and industry context. 
 
Data sources are mainly based on interviews with the five case firms’ senior managers. 
Firstly, selective attention (represented by opportunity recognition) is examined from 
three aspects, including the perception towards the long-term market trend (from 
market scenario analysis), short-term market signals, and technology development. 
These senior managers’ responses are then cross-analyzed with their firm and 
functional group affiliation. Secondly, as competition is indicated as one of the most 
salient signals influencing the decision to make capability investment, the perceived 
competition and the comparison with industry data is investigated.  
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Thirdly, to incorporate the influence from the industry context, these senior managers’ 
responses on the firms’ search activities are examined. Data sources focus on 
interviews with the R&D senior managers and these firms’ MOEA projects. The 
design of the investigation focuses on the firm’s search activities relevant to new 
technology development, referencing the innovation management literature (Freeman 
& Soete, 1997a; Tidd & Bessant, 2009). In addition to their remarks about the firms’ 
search activities; senior mangers’ weightings for these activities are examined, and 
cross-analysed with the firms’ data. The empirical findings of this level of analysis are 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4 
Uncertainties and Framing 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 examines the process of framing external environmental uncertainty to 
answer the research question: what is the role of framing in the decision-making 
process for new capability investment? 
 
The analysis of Section 4.1 indicates the potential judgment issue of framing 
environmental uncertainty for capability investments. Section 4.2 starts with 
examining the general concept of perceived environmental uncertainty and proposes 
the behavioural decision concept of diminishing sensitivity to uncertainty. Given that 
perceived uncertainty may not sufficiently explain firms’ investment decision pattern, 
the analysis then leads Section 4.2 to investigate what are the additional influences 
explaining the focus on exploitation. Section 4.2 applies the behavioural decision 
concept of narrow framing effect to analyze two empirical investigations: the first is 
the propensity of optimistic market forecasts for growth opportunities derived from 
exploitation investments; the second it the tendency of isolating the uncertainties and 
future opportunities in assessing investment projects. 
 
Section 4.3 identifies additional influences which help to explain the specific findings 
about Taiwanese PV firm. Section 4.3 starts with an assessment of the influence of 
demand-pull and technology-push policies in Taiwan. The analysis suggests that both 
policy measures are not evidently influential on Taiwanese PV firms’ capability 
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investments. Then Section 4.3 discusses an empirical investigation showing the 
heuristics judgment process of attribute substitution in framing the resources issue. 
Finally, advancing the application of the narrow framing effect in the concept of 
prevailing frame, Section 4.3 argues that the industry and institutional experience 
effect reinforces narrow framing and thus help to explain Taiwanese PV firms’ 
exploitation focus.  
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4.1 PV industry dynamics 
 
Section 4.1 starts with examining the influence of policy uncertainty in the PV 
industry. Then it explains how the characteristics of PV technologies and key industry 
concepts of LCOE and system cost structure inform us about technological 
uncertainty and the exploitation/exploration issue in the context of PV industry. 
Finally, this section discusses the PV industry transition and Taiwanese PV firms’ 
investment pattern during the period of 2006- 2011.  
 
Feed –in-Tariff, (FiT), policy uncertainty and market demand 
 
The PV industry has shown significant growth for the past decade. Government 
incentive policy, particularly FiT (Feed-in-Tariff) has been considered as the main 
force in driving the demand of the solar PV industry in the past few years (EPIA, 
2011; Fulton, 2010; IEA, 2009, 2011; O'Rourke, Kim, & Polavarapu, 2010).
23
 Under 
the FiT scheme, utility operators can purchase the power generated by customers’ 
solar PV systems on a guaranteed rate in a 15-25 year period. A degression rate is 
included in the FiT program to balance the anticipated cost reduction of the solar PV 
system. The design and implementation of the FiT has driven the growth of the solar 
PV market, because it provides guaranteed return on investment (ROI) for the solar 
PV projects. Thus the deployment capital for PV has been driven by the market which 
provides the most attractive return (Fulton, 2010). 
 
With the root in the Renewable Energy Sources Act in 2000, the adoption of FiT was 
                                                     
23
 Compared with other key government support measures for renewable energy sources such as tax 
credits and direct capital subsidies, FIT is generally regarded as the most favourable scheme for the 
solar PV (IEA 2009). 
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officially launched in Germany in July 2004 (Fulton, 2010; Fulton & Capalino, 2012; 
Hoppmann, Huenteler, & Giord, 2014). Then this government incentive program was 
widely adopted in EU countries. With the implementation of FiT, EU (particularly 
Germany) has become the major solar PV market since the emergence of the PV 
industry. Such market concentration on specific regions and countries seems to 
suggest the industry’s vulnerability to policy uncertainty, which is inevitably 
correlated with both economic and political situations. 
 
Policy uncertainty in the PV industry was coincided with the timing of global 
financial and EU debt crisis in the past few years. Yet the data showed that the global 
PV market demand was not necessarily influenced by the uncertainty of government 
incentive policies. In fact, PV market reported record growth in 2011 despite EU debt 
crises and continued government incentive cuts (Fig. 4.1). 
 
Fig. 4.1 Global PV Annual Installations 2000-2011 
 
Source: industry sources(ECJRC, 2011; EPIA, 2010); data compiled by the author. 
 
Policy uncertainty in Spain and Germany 
80 
 
  
Here policy uncertainty in the PV industry is illustrated by the two representative 
cases of Spain and Germany. In 2008, Spain took the lead of the global solar market 
following announcement of the generous FiT scheme in June 2007. The annual PV 
installation in Spain surged from 544MW in 2007 to 2.7GW in 2008, which 
accounted for around 50% of the global PV installation in 2008. Then the Spanish 
market collapsed soon in 2009 (the annual PV installation turned to zero in 2009) 
after sizable reduction in the incentive scheme (ECJRC, 2010; Rio & Mir-Artigues, 
2014). Both policy design and policy uncertainty are considered to cause the dramatic 
up and down of the Spanish PV market. Because the design of degression schedule 
was not incorporated in the Spanish FiT in 2007, PV project investors and developers 
saw excess guaranteed profits. For example, the ROI of some projects were estimated 
to reach 10-15%, which is much higher than the targeted 5-9%. Then, the one-year 
transition period for adopting the new reduction program was too long, which 
inevitably induced the rush installation in a short period of time. Moreover, economic 
uncertainty also triggered the collapse of the Spanish PV market, particularly on the 
aspects of government tariff deficit and credit crunch for PV project financing starting 
in 2008.    
 
In Germany, the government announced first FiT cuts in 2009: in addition to the 
upward adjustments of the degression rates (8 to10%), a dynamic degression schedule 
was introduced to substitute the static 5% degression rate prior to 2009. Other changes 
in FiT include the additional one-time remuneration reduction and the caps based on 
previous installation. Then, further FiT cuts were announced in 2010 and 2011 with 
accelerated degression rates of 9 to 13% and 12 to 15% respectively. Generally, FiT 
rates were reduced by 23 to 25% from 2009 to 2010, and 25 to 26% from 2010 to 
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2011(Hoppmann et al., 2014; Kim & Polavarapu, 2011) (Fig. 4.2). 
 
Fig. 4.2 German FiT Rates 2008-2011 
 
Source: Deutsche Bank 2011 Estimates(Kim & Polavarapu, 2011), data compiled by the author. 
 
The forecasted and actual impact of German FiT changes 
 
As the design of German FiT mechanism aimed at regulating market demand and 
incorporating PV technological progress (Fulton, 2010; Hoppmann et al., 2014), it 
was expected that the PV market demand would be reduced after the announcement of 
FiT cuts. For example, analysts estimated that following FiT cuts in 2010, the annual 
PV installation in Germany could be managed to around 3 GW in 2010. But the actual 
PV installation turned out to be 7.2 GW in 2010. Then in early 2011, analysts 
forecasted that following further FiT cuts, the annual PV installation would be 
reduced to around 5.8 GW in 2011. The actual PV installation in Germany was 
7.6GW in 2011(ECJRC, 2011, 2013; Kim & Polavarapu, 2011; O'Rourke et al., 2010; 
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Shah, J., & Min, 2014) (Fig. 4.3). 
 
Fig. 4.3 Forecasted vs. Actual PV installation in Germany 2009-2011. 
 
Source: (ECJRC, 2011; Kim & Polavarapu, 2011; O'Rourke et al., 2010; Shah et al., 2014), data 
compiled by the author. 
 
Beyond incentive policy mechanism 
 
In explaining the discrepancy between the forecasted and actual PV market demand, 
industry analysts later emphasized the short-term effect of rush installation in 
accelerating the overall demand (Shah et al., 2014). Similar to the case of Spain, PV 
project developers and system integrators speeded up the installation in expectation of 
further incentive cuts and policy uncertainty. The demand acceleration was also 
caused by the faster PV module cost reduction than the predicted FiT degression rates 
(Bazilian et al., 2012; Fulton & Capalino, 2012; Hoppmann et al., 2014). Although the 
German FiT scheme has already incorporated the adjustment design following PV 
industry experience curve(Hoppmann et al., 2014), the pace of PV industry dynamic 
has speeded up since 2009. In particular, one important indicator is that PV module 
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ASP (Average Selling Price) has been falling much faster than expected. For example, 
as of 2012, the average PV module price has dropped more than 45% since 
2010(Bazilian et al., 2012; Kim & Polavarapu, 2011). While PV cell/module 
manufacturers suffered from shrinking margins, the substantial decrease in PV 
module price has indeed stimulated the level of PV installation and deployment. 
 
PV technologies – characteristics and technological uncertainty 
  
The development of PV technologies dated back to the 1950s: the Bell Lab 
researchers developed the first c-Si PV module based on silicon semiconductor 
technology. The oil crises of the 1970s then spurred PV technology development, 
particularly in US government research. The development of PV technology 
continued in the 1980s and 1990s, with efforts primarily funded from government 
research and universities(Bradford, 2006; Breyer et al., 2010). Since the introduction 
of FiT in 2004, the growing trend of patent application has been in line with the 
growth of PV shipment (Fig. 4.4). If using patent counts as the measure, it appears to 
justify the claim that FiT is influential in inducing technological 
innovation(Hoppmann et al., 2014; Johnstone, Haščič, & Popp, 2009). However, 
judging from the development history of PV cell efficiency rate (the key indicator of 
PV technology performance), there has been no major technological breakthrough 
since the early 2000s (Selya & Robert, 2010) (Fig. 4.5). This evidence is consistent 
with the finding from an empirical study of the wind power industry, in which the 
influence of government incentive policy in stimulating non-incremental technical 
change is questioned (Nemet, 2009). 
 
Fig. 4.4  Annual PV applications (first filing) and shipment 1970-2009 
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Source: Figure adapted from EPO, Boneschanscher et al., 25
th
 European Solar Energy and Exhibition 
2010 
 
Fig. 4.5  Best PV Research Cell Efficiencies 1975-2010 
 
Source: Figure adapted from National Renewable Energy Lab Report (Selya & Robert, 2010). 
 
PV: the manufacturing centric technology 
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Further, it highlights the characteristics of PV technologies – the development of 
research lab based cell is one thing, but how to achieve mass production with lower 
cost is another. In fact, as the lab results are based on small production quantities 
under ideal conditions, the efficiencies for mass-produced PV cells are lower than 
those produced in the lab, and the efficiency of the PV module is lower than the 
efficiency of the PV cell (Selya & Robert, 2010).  
 
The manufacturing issue is central to the development of various PV technologies 
which are categorized by the differences in materials and manufacturing technologies 
of the PV cell: c-Si cells represents 85 to 90% of the global PV market share, thin- 
film based cells account for around 10-15% of the market
24
.  A number of emerging 
PV technologies, including concentrator PV (CPV) and dye sensitized solar cell 
(DSSC, a branch of organic PV cell) currently only account for less than 1% of the 
market(EPIA, 2011; IEA, 2010). 
 
There are two implications for the exploitation/exploration discussion in this research 
context. The first is that given the manufacturing-centric characteristic, development 
of a particular PV technology involves more than the simple purchase of a turnkey 
solution or equipment; it requires long-term investment in the manufacturing process. 
The second is that the investment of a different PV technology (other than the firm’s 
current technology platform) would be an important decision to build new 
capabilities.  
 
Technological uncertainty interlinked with commercial uncertainty 
                                                     
24
 There is a variety of thin-film technologies, but the majority of the global market share is from a 
single firm – First Solar, using Cadmium Telluride (CdTe) thin film technology. 
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The long development history and the manufacturing-centric characteristic seem to 
suggest that technological progress in the PV industry is subject to some level of 
predictability. As indicated by the cell efficiency development in the past few decades 
(Fig.4.5), the uncertainty of “fundamental research and invention” may not 
necessarily be applied to PV technologies. In this research, technological uncertainty 
is defined as the development of emerging technologies relative to the prediction of 
current technology roadmap. Here technological uncertainty is distinguished from 
technical uncertainty which refers to the uncertainty of technical problems that could 
be reduced by investments in technical development or production improvement 
(Freeman & Soete, 1997b: 243-244). The definition of technical uncertainty is 
generally applied in the real options model, suggesting that such uncertainty is mostly 
on the project level and thus can be reduced by firms’ investments (Dixit & Pindyck, 
1994). As for technological uncertainty, it is related to industry-level dynamic and 
may not be reduced by firms’ investments (Oriani & Sobrero, 2008; Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986). Therefore, with the definition of exogenous industry force, here the 
notion of technological uncertainty emphasizes the embedded element of commercial 
uncertainty in the PV industry.  
 
The Impact of polysilicon price 
For example, the development of an industry-shared c-Si technology roadmap more or 
less indicates the industry participants’ collaboration in reducing the technology 
uncertainty (SEMI, 2011, 2012). The reduction of technology uncertainty of c-Si cells 
is also evidenced by the experience curve: the historical PV module price experience 
curve indicated that PV module price decreased around 15-24% when the PV 
shipments were doubled (Fig. 4.6). It is generally suggested that manufacturing scale 
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definitely helped; and the advanced manufacturing process – particularly the 
improvement of efficiency – is undoubtedly the cost-down driver (Wawer, 2010). 
However, from a closer look at the PV cost structure, polysilicon is the key 
component in the price reduction, as it makes up around 20% of the total module costs. 
Thus in fact the sharp decrease in the cost of polysilicon since 2008
25
  apparently 
contributed a much more significant portion of the PV module price reduction than 
the factors of increasing manufacturing scale and efficiency improvement(Bazilian et 
al., 2012; Nemet, 2006; O'Rourke et al., 2010). 
 
Fig. 4.6  PV module experience curve 1976-2011 
 
* First Solar is the largest CdTe Thin film maker. 
Source: Figure adapted from Bloomberg New Energy Finance report (Bazilian et al., 2012). 
 
The fluctuation of polysilicon price has also influenced the development of other PV 
technologies. Despite with a slower pace in commercialization than c-Si cells, the 
                                                     
25
 Polysilicon cost was around $82/kg in 2008 dropped to less than $45/kg in the first quarter of 2011. 
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development of alternative PV technologies such as thin film and CPV can also be 
dated decades ago (Fig 4.5). In fact, the share of PV patent families of CPV and a-Si 
thin film has actually peaked earlier before 2000(Breyer et al., 2010). The commercial 
emergence of thin film PV was firstly encouraged by the rising silicon cost of the c-Si 
cells around 2005. Then in 2009, the scaling of the c-Si technology, coupled with the 
significant price reduction of polysilicon has dampened the investment for the 
development of alternative PV technologies which have already been struggling with 
high cost and manufacturing issues. Therefore, despite the potential in various 
applications and markets, the uncertainty level of these emerging PV technologies has 
been raised with the downward price trend of polysilicon price and the c-Si PV 
modules.  
 
LCOE (Levelized cost of electricity) 
The statement that technological uncertainty in PV industry is interlinked with 
commercial uncertainty can also be illustrated by the concept of LCOE (Levelized 
Cost of Electricity), the measure for comparing the generation cost of different energy 
sources. In the LCOE model, the sum of total costs is divided by total output (kWh). 
Main cost input items include PV system and installation cost, operation and 
maintenance (O&M) as well as financing cost (sensitive to interest rates) of the PV 
system. The output mainly refers to electricity generation -annual harvest which is not 
only associated with the yield rate (related to PV cell efficiency) of the PV system, but 
is also a function of local sun irradiation (Kim & Polavarapu, 2011). Another key 
concept of LCOE is that the cost is amortized over the life-time of the PV system 
(Selya & Robert, 2010).  
 
With the concept of LCOE, there are two aspects for understanding the technological 
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uncertainty in PV industry. One aspect is that although c-Si cell/modules have a 
relatively complex supply chain in the upstream manufacturing process
26
 and with 
limited potential in efficiency advancement, c-Si cell/modules have the advantage of 
proven long life- time and product reliability – which is crucial to LCOE as one of the 
key factors for technology adoption. From this perspective, the perceived technology 
uncertainty for c-Si cells is indeed lower than other alternative technologies – 
particularly from the viewpoint of downstream system integrators and end customers.  
 
The other aspect is that the output calculation in LCOE illustrates that the economic 
feasibility of a PV system is sensitive to the cost of financing, locations and 
applications (Bloomberg, 2011a, b; O'Rourke et al., 2010). In other words, the value 
generation of the PV system depends on different market segments. Thus alternative 
and emerging PV technologies (other than c-Si technology) can have the unique 
advantages for opportunities in various market segments and applications. For 
example, a-Si/u-Si thin film is suitable for Building Integrated PV (BIPV) or 
customized solutions. CIGS thin film has the greatest potential in achieving 
comparative efficiency with the c-Si cells with much lower costs. CPV has the highest 
efficiency rate and particularly suitable for areas with high sun irradiation where the 
technology can demonstrate its advantages. As for DSSC, the low efficiency-rate cells 
have the potential to help in integrating end-consumer applications with their flexible 
texture and low cost. From the perspective of currently dominant c-Si firm, the 
investment in alternative PV technologies justifies the rationale to explore market 
potential in the PV industry. 
 
The LCOE concept in explaining technological uncertainty hints the 
                                                     
26
 Please refer to Appendix 1: c-Si cells manufacturing supply chain. 
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exploitation/exploration issue particularly from the perspective of c-Si PV firms. 
Exploitation, the investment in current c-Si platform would involve the commercial 
uncertainty derived from the complex value chain and competition from numerous 
industry players. As there are proven applications and markets based on current 
platform, the judgment for the investment decision would heavily rest on the 
assumption of market demand forecasts.  As for exploration, the investment in 
alternative and emerging PV technologies, the apparent issue lies in the variable 
stability of mass production. Further, there is commercial uncertainty associated with 
the cost-down pressure from c-Si cells and the prospect for developing niche market 
applications(IEA, 2010). The exploratory investment for emerging PV technologies 
relies on the expectation for future industry change and market development. 
However, in view of the uncertainties, it may not necessarily be easy to find 
justifications for exploration investment if based on measures in comparison with 
investments for exploitation. The investment decision of exploration would rest on the 
judgment of investment timing and the wiliness to take the chance with an attitude of 
experimentation(March, 2008). 
 
Industry transition 
 
The dominance of c-Si cells and the changing competition landscape (Table 4.1) 
illustrate the importance of scale and cost reduction in the PV industry over the past 
decade. Before 2005, the leading PV technology firms – including some Japanese and 
Europe-based companies – accounted for the worldwide top ten solar PV 
manufacturers; among them were several large electronic and oil companies. Since 
2005, with the foundation of semiconductor manufacturing technologies and 
aggressive expansion, Chinese and Taiwanese solar PV firms have been starting to 
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take the lead. As of 2011, there were eight Chinese and Taiwanese c-Si firms among 
the top ten solar PV cell manufacturers
27
. 
 
Table 4.1  Worldwide top ten PV firms 2001, 2003, 2005-2011 
 
Source: industry data compiled by the author. 
 
The concept of the appropriability regime and complementary assets suggested in the 
PFI (Profit from Innovation) framework (Teece, 1986) may explain the rise of these 
Chinese and Taiwanese c-Si PV cell firms over the past few years. Although there are 
several leading c-Si patents being developed by some US and Japanese firms, these 
patents have not been proved to be cost competitive on approaching their expiry 
dates
28
. Further, not all PV technologies are patentable, especially those involved in 
manufacturing knowhow such as propriety process or material composition (Breyer et 
al., 2010). Therefore, while patent may not necessarily be an effective mechanism for 
appropriating profit, the complementary asset of  cost-effective production can be 
critical in capturing profit during the industry growth period. 
 
                                                     
27
 First Solar is the only thin film (CdTe) maker among the top ten PV firms.  
28
 For example, IBC (Interdigitated Back Contact) from Sunpower (US) and HIT (Heterojuction with 
Intrinsic Thin layer) from Sanyo (Japan). 
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Changing value proposition 
 
Yet the value proposition applied for the past few years may not incorporate the recent 
changes in the PV industry. In fact, the rapid expansion of these Chinese and 
Taiwanese PV firms has planted the seed for the transition. Historically PV modules 
and BOS (Balance of System)
29
 accounted for around 60% and 40% of the total PV 
system cost respectively (Bazilian et al., 2012; O'Rourke et al., 2010). Since the 
recent module price decline
30
, BOS now accounts for around 50% of the PV system 
costs and represent the major source of cost reduction. The rising value of BOS is 
further demonstrated in the increasing need to integrate current intermittent and 
peak-loaded PV energy into the electricity network. Downstream players now have 
the potential to capture higher profit in the PV industry. (Bazilian et al., 2012; Bony, 
Doig, Hart, Maurer, & Newman, 2010), 
 
Therefore, while the c-Si firms have been striving for technological advancement in 
cost reduction efforts such as efficiency improvement, the potential impact on the 
total PV system can be relatively limited - judging from both the PV system cost 
structure and the c-Si technology roadmap (SEMI, 2011, 2012). Moreover, given the 
prospect of continued oversupply and unutilized capacity, further price competition 
and margin squeezing is to be expected in the near future.   
 
During the early growth period, scale and manufacturing excellence have been the 
sources of value capturing in the PV industry.  Now with the expansion of 
                                                     
29
 Cost break-down for BOS include electrical system (particularly electrical installation and inverter), 
structural system (particularly racking and structural installation) as well as the business processes 
Bony et al, 2010). 
30
 The trend of declining PV module price has started since 2008; in 2011, the retail price was actually 
lower than that of the manufacturing cost. 
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production scale and the commoditized manufacturing, the value proposition has 
shifted from upstream manufacturers to downstream players who own the customers. 
For Taiwanese PV cell firms, this transition represents challenges to access end 
customers and new markets. From the perspective of changing value proposition, the 
implication for exploitation/exploration issue in this research context is that while 
improving exiting capabilities of cost reduction through optimizing supply chain 
management and manufacturing process are still crucial to survive in the near-term, 
developing new capabilities in downstream business matters for the Taiwanese PV 
cell firms to capture the opportunities from industry transition.  
 
Taiwanese PV cell firms’ investment pattern 
 
The five case firms’ investment patterns are examined. Here new capability 
investments include the investment in alternative PV technologies (other than the 
firms’ domain technology) and downstream system business. The vertical integration 
of c-Si PV modules (assembly) or the improvement of c-Si PV cell yield rates are not 
included as new capability development, because the majority of the efforts are based 
on exploiting the existing capabilities in c-Si cell technology. 
 
Similar investment pattern focusing on exploitation 
 
Based on the data from MOEA projects and the firms’ investment histories, firstly, it 
shows that the majority of the MOEA projects were targeted at current technologies, 
not exploratory technologies
31
. Although Greenchild’s CIGS and Amorphous’ CIGS 
                                                     
31
 Solar one’s MOEA project leader claimed that “next generation cell structure is the firm’s 
exploratory technology”. However, the project is based on c-Si technology (the firm’s current domain 
technology) and new cell structure is not new in the industry (EPIA. 2011. Solar Generation 6: EPIA.). 
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projects were the two exceptional cases, the former was not mentioned in the firm’s 
annual report and the latter was later withdrawn (Table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2  MOEA projects 
 
Source: MOEA projects and interviews; compiled by the author. 
 
Secondly, as the three c-Si firms’ senior managers stated that MOEA projects were not 
the firms’ only new technology or capability investments, the three c-Si firms’ 
investment histories from 2006-2011 are further investigated
32
. The data shows that 
the three c-Si firms were particularly similar in terms of the timing and investment for 
capacity expansion and vertical integration. Certain patterns were observed according 
to the investment time lines. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Also, the project output is still aimed towards efficiency improvement. Newsun’s CIGS project aims at 
resolving some measurement issues in the firm’s CIGS production process.     
32
 The two thin film firms’ (Amorphous and Newsun) senior managers described that MOEA projects 
represented the firms’ new technology investments. After examining the related business news from 
2007-2011, there is no evidence relating to the two private firms’ new capability investments since their 
inception in 2007. 
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From 2006-2008: the three firms were all engaged with production expansion, 
including new production lines or sites in Taiwan and China, which also reflects their 
rapid sales growth. 
 
From 2008-2009: there are signs of a shared interest in polysilicon wafer-related 
projects
33. The three firms’ MOEA projects during 2008-2009 were all related to 
polysilicon technology
34
; these actions were then reasonably followed by the sharp 
price increase of polysilicon, which was caused by the temporary shortage of 
polysilicon in 2007-2008 (Bazilian et al., 2012; O'Rourke, Kim, & Polavarapu, 2009). 
  
From 2009-2011: While these firms similarly experienced fluctuations of sharp sales 
decline and growth in 2009, this is very much a period marked by continued capacity 
expansion and the development of module operations (vertical integration). Solar one 
acquired module businesses in the US and Japan; FabPV set up a module company 
(Taiwan); and Greenchild launched new production sites and increased the proportion 
made up of its module business line. The investment in module manufacturing reflects 
these firms’ intention to shift away from specialized cell manufacture towards a more 
vertical integration of cell and module businesses. This is in part triggered by the 
strong competition – based on low cost and large scale – from the big, vertically 
integrated Chinese c-Si solar PV firms. 
 
Thirdly, regarding the investment of downstream capabilities, the three firms have had 
only limited investment in related activities compared to their aggressive product 
                                                     
33
 Solar one seemed to be a little ahead on the related investment with its acquisition of a polysilicon 
firm in 2006. 
34
 Although not specifically targeted at polysilicon technology, the aim of FavPV’s MOEA project was 
mainly material (polysilicon) cost reduction.  
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improvement and capacity expansion plans over the past few years. As the first 
Taiwanese solar PV firm, Solar one actually started the business line in PV equipment 
and system integration in 2002, but this line has been relatively small and focused on 
the domestic market
35
. Greenchild had started some initial investment plans in 
overseas EPC business (US and India) through the firm’s subsidiary in 2011, but the 
firm has not confirmed any continued investment in the near future. According to the 
firm’s records and the interview data FabPV has had no investment in PV systems 
over the past few years. Regarding the two thin film firms, Amorphous had no further 
development on the BIPV application except the MOEA project, while Newsun’s 
senior managers stressed that the firm has only focused on achieving the mass 
production of CIGS thin film since the firm’s inception. 
 
Overall, the data shows that a similar investment pattern during the period of 
2006-2011 is observed among the five Taiwanese PV cell firms: while these firms 
were able to catch the industry trend, they were not simultaneously actively investing 
in developing new capabilities. The next section will examine the reasons why the 
investment in exploiting current capabilities appears to be the main focus for the five 
case firms. 
 
Summary 
 
Two findings from the investigation of the influence of policy and technology 
uncertainty on firms: First, although FiT policy aims at regulating demand and supply 
on the basis of PV experience curve, the expectation of further incentive cuts induces 
a chain of responses in stimulating short-term supply and demand (i.e. rush 
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 Solar one did not officially announce new inverter products for overseas markets until 2012. 
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installation).  
 
Second, the reasoning that incentive cuts favour low-cost manufacturers therefore 
influence their exploitation focus is based on the interaction between policy and 
technological uncertainty in the PV industry: As a manufacturing –centric technology, 
the exploitation investment strategy appears to be preferred by the c-S- cell/module 
manufacturers in view of capturing short-term profit induced by policy uncertainty 
and the seemly predicable technology roadmap. However, the influence of 
technological uncertainty can be underestimated – both on the aspects of commercial 
uncertainty associated with exploitation (particularly on PV cell/module) and the 
potential of emerging technologies. Here it points out a judgment issue of investment 
timing: it may not be easy to find justifications for exploration investment if based on 
measures in comparison with investments for exploitation. 
 
The finding of Taiwanese PV firms’ investment pattern during the period of 
2006-2011 is consistent with the exploitation focus. Specifically, Taiwanese PV firms’ 
investment strategy appears to be in line with the prediction from the perspective of 
complementary assets in the PFI framework. However, industry transition and 
changing value proposition hint the shrinking margin from PV cell/module 
manufacturing and the importance of investing new capabilities to capture growth 
opportunities. 
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4.2 Perceived uncertainty and narrow framing 
 
Section 4.2 starts with examining the general concept of perceived uncertainty and 
related empirical studies, followed by illustrating the behavioural decision concept of 
diminishing sensitivity to uncertainty. Then this section discusses how the narrow 
framing effect explains firms’ exploitation focus.    
 
The effect of perceived policy uncertainty 
 
To better understand the relationship between organizations and their environment in 
the context of decision studies, scholars suggest the concept of perceived 
environmental uncertainty, in which the way decision makers experience uncertainty 
is emphasized. Three types of perceived environmental uncertainty are proposed: (1) 
state uncertainty refers to the unpredictability of the environment; (2) effect 
uncertainty refers to the inability to predict the impact of the uncertainty; (3) response 
uncertainty refers to the inability to predict the consequences of options responding to 
uncertainty(Duncan, 1972; Milliken, 1987).  Here the investigation of perceived 
uncertainty is relevant to the definition of “effect uncertainty”, referring to the process 
of how decision makers perceive the impact of the uncertainty.  
 
In some empirical studies, the role of perceived policy uncertainty has been 
considered as being critical in influencing the firms’ investment decisions, particularly 
in the area of the energy industry sector. Yet findings showed mixed results. On the 
one hand, studies suggest that policy uncertainty would have negative influence on 
investment decisions.  For example, an study of the Californian wind power industry 
found that although the government stimulus policy is in place, firms’ technological 
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investments involving long payoff time can be dampened as a result of the 
expectation of policy uncertainty during a longer time frame (Nemet, 2009). On the 
other hand, studies show that policy uncertainty may not necessarily have negative 
influence on investment decisions.  In a case study based on the German power 
generation industry, findings suggest that, from the strategic consideration of securing 
competitiveness, firms may not delay investment decisions despite perceiving the 
policy uncertainty of the European CO2 Emission Trading Scheme (Hoffmann et al., 
2009)
36
.  
In the context of the Taiwanese case firms, while their investment in current 
capabilities (exploitation) was not dampened by policy uncertainty; the investment in 
new capabilities (exploration) seems to be influenced by policy uncertainty. Some 
study suggests that rather than policy uncertainty, it is the “positive income effect” 
from the deployment policy explains PV firms’ focus on exploitation (Hoppmann, 
Peters, Schneider, & Hoffmann, 2013). However, it is arguable to disregard the effect 
of policy uncertainty. In particular, the period of 2010 -2011 (which is not covered in 
this study) happened to be the transition year in PV industry: the industry was 
characterized by a sharp profit loss and industry downturn.  Therefore the “positive 
income effect” and “reduced pressure for exploration” may not necessarily explain 
firms’ continued investment in exploitation during this period. 
 
While taking into account the influence of perceived policy uncertainty, this research 
argues that the general concept of perceived uncertainty employed in previous studies 
                                                     
36
 Both cases could be explained by the real option theory with different assumption of uncertainties. 
In the first case, policy uncertainty can be categorized as the “input cost uncertainty” which is 
exogenous to the firm. As there is no way to reduce the uncertainty, a feasible strategy is to postpone 
the investment until more confirmed and favourable market signals are received. In the second case, 
policy (regulatory) uncertainty could be explained by the category of uncertainty that could be reduced 
and create pressure for increasing investment to enhance competitiveness. 
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may not be sufficient in explaining firms’ investment behaviour. It suggests that the 
concept of diminishing sensitivity to uncertainty may better explain the influence of 
temporal pattern of uncertainty and the less-than-estimated effect of policy 
uncertainty on PV firms’ investment decisions.  
 
Diminishing sensitivity to policy uncertainty – General finding from the global PV 
investments in the period of 2004-2011    
 
Drawing on the concept of diminishing sensitivity to uncertainty from behavioural 
decision theory, the pattern of uncertainty in influencing the perceived prospect may 
explain the perceived impact of the government incentive policy on overall PV 
industry investments in different periods. In the period 2005-2008, the 
implementation the FiT program triggered the first investment boom of the PV 
industry. At this point the incident turned from impossibility to possibility (the first 
official launch of FiT in Germany in 2005 and following adoptions in other EU 
countries), in a manner in which the influence on the perceived prospect was expected 
to be significant (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Fox, 2000). Historical data witnesses 
the substantial impact on new investments in the early industry growth period. Then 
the first industry downturn and the incident of policy uncertainty during 2008-2009 
showed a negative influence on the growth of new investments. Then in late 2010, 
policy uncertainty of further incentive cuts were announced, but this time new 
investments in the global PV industry were not affected (Bloomberg, 2012)(Fig. 4.7). 
Applying the effect of diminishing sensitivity to policy uncertainty, the second 
industry downturn (the period of 2010-2011) marked the point at which the incident 
was perceived more probable on the basis of previous reference points (i.e. earlier 
incidents of policy cuts in 2008). Thus at the point where the incident simply move 
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from probable to more probable, the influence of policy uncertainty on the perceived 
prospect can be less significant compared to the experience started from zero.  
 
Fig. 4.7 Global new financial investments in solar technology 2004-2011  
 
* Solar technology includes solar thermal and PV; solar PV accounts for the bulk of the investment.  
* Global new financial investment includes investment from VC, Government R&D, Corporate R&D, Private 
Equity, Public market and Asset finance.  
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance, UNEP. 
 
Diminishing sensitivity to uncertainty –Scenario evaluation of Taiwanese PV firms 
 
In the context of Taiwanese PV industry, the concept of diminishing sensitivity to 
policy uncertainty is illustrated by the scenario evaluation of Taiwanese case firms. 
Firstly, the interview data from the scenario evaluation shows a convergence towards 
the policy driven scenario in the next five years (Fig. 4.8). While senior managers had 
slightly different views on the development pace of the emerging technologies, the 
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majority of them agreed that the policy force would be relatively stronger than the 
force of technology in driving the PV industry, on the grounds that emerging 
technologies would still be faced with the commercialization issue in the next few 
years. This perspective reflects the facts of industry development in the past few years, 
and most senior managers assumed that such trends would be continued in the next 
five years. 
 
Fig. 4.8 Scenario result for the five firms 
 
Source: interviews and compiled by the author. 
 
However, when being asked about the effect of policy uncertainty, these senior 
managers similarly expressed that neither government incentive nor environmental 
related policies would affect the firms’ decisions in new capability investments. As 
described by Greenchild’s R&D Head:”although policy uncertainty may influence our 
business, it would not affect our investment in new technologies”. Similar remarks 
were received from most senior managers. This seemingly conflicting view reflects 
their experiences with the uncertainty of government support policies. These 
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interviewees agreed that government incentive programs had been critical to the PV 
industry and would continue to have an impact on the market. But after the ups and 
downs of the past few years, they realized that the uncertain nature of government 
support policies would be inevitable for the PV industry. As the Solar one CTO and 
Amorphous R&D Head commented:”policy uncertainty is expected in the next few 
years”. 
 
Some scholars have argued that the expectation of future policy (e.g. the direction of 
environmental policy) rather than current incentive measures, may have a positive 
impact on firms’ innovation investments, because firms’ decisions can be based on the 
prospect of future policy rather than today’s valuation price (Popp, Newwell, & Jaffe, 
2010). However, in this research, senior managers expressed different views on the 
expectation of future environmental policy. For example, while Solar one’s senior 
managers described the optimistic prospect of environmental policy, Amorphous’ 
senior managers showed relative pessimistic attitude towards the development in the 
near future. The influence of expectation effect of future policy is not evident among 
senior managers of these case firms.  The finding here is more consistent with the 
explanation from the concept of diminishing sensitivity to uncertainty: the perceived 
effect of uncertainty is influenced by decision makers’ adjustment of the reference 
point derived from previous experience (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). 
 
Both global PV investment trend and Taiwanese PV firms’ scenario evaluation 
illustrate that, the concept of diminishing sensitivity to policy uncertainty may explain 
senior managers’ perceived less effect of policy uncertainty on investment decisions.  
Next, this research further argues that the root cause influencing the decision of 
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capability investments may lie in these Taiwanese firms’ (represented by senior 
managers’) confidence about the most plausible way to seize the market opportunity, 
despite the experience of uncertainties (Starbuck, 2009). 
 
Narrow Framing 
 
Drawing on the behavioural decision concept, narrow framing effect refers to that 
choices and decisions are limited by heuristic judgments or certain perspectives 
(Kahneman, 2003b; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). 
 
Optimistic forecasts 
 
These senior managers showed an over-optimistic attitude about the market forecast 
and overestimated the potential growth through production expansion. Firstly, during 
the scenario interview, most managers favoured the advanced policy scenario with the 
assumption of strong market growth (which is indicated by their choice leaning 
towards the right hand side of the scenario table). Although recognizing current 
gloomy economic condition, these senior managers generally expressed optimism 
about future market growth. With this optimistic view about the potential of PV, none 
of the senior managers mentioned that the possibility of accelerating PV industry 
structural change would similarly imply threats under the overall growth outlook; for 
example, the competition from other renewable energy sources and new competitors 
in the PV industry, or protection policies in different countries
37
. Basically, these 
managers considered that the possibility and the potential impact of these variables 
were unlikely to be significant in the near future. With this perspective, these senior 
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 Specifically, over 95% of Taiwanese PV cells are exported.  
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managers seemed to emphasize more on the prospect of overall market growth than 
on the opportunity resulting from possible industry structural change. 
 
Secondly, despite signs of over capacity in the c-Si value chain since 2009 (Table 4.3) 
(ECJRC, 2009; EPIA, 2011), historical data shows that the three c-Si firms had 
continued their production expansion during 2009-2010. Indeed, these firms had 
enjoyed a very profitable period in 2010. Yet the catastrophe of plummeting ASP 
(Average Selling Price) started soon after in 2011, and the over-supply situation has 
accelerated with sharply increased capacity from Chinese PV firms. If based on the 
conservative policy scenario, PV market growth might be stagnant (EPIA, 2010, 
2011). Even with the optimistic policy scenario, the capacity would still be far beyond 
the expected market size. Further, judging from the unutilized capacity from Chinese 
PV firms, it would be reasonable to expect continued pricing pressure. The downward 
trend of both ASP and profit margins has appeared to be irreversible since the first 
signs of trouble in 2008 (Bazilian et al., 2012).While these senior managers are 
familiar with the market forecast numbers and aware of the oversupply situations, 
they are convinced that their core capabilities (such as cost reduction through the 
advancement in cell structure/material and relevant manufacturing processes) is key to 
survive in the changing market environment. 
 
Table 4.3  PV Cell Production Capacity as of 2009 
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Source: (ECJRC, 2009; EPIA, 2011), data compiled by the author. 
 
In the interview, these senior managers suggested that as more “weak” PV 
cell/module firms exit the market, those that survived would capture the market 
growth; they also suggested that Taiwanese first tier PV firms
38
  are generally more 
competitive in terms of PV cells’ price/performance ratio than their Chinese 
counterparts
39
. As described by FabPV’s CFO, “the situation of over capacity actually 
includes the estimation of the so-called invalid stock produced by second tier firms; 
and only the high performance product will be in demand.” However, these senior 
managers may potentially underestimate the volume of the quality cells produced by 
the first tier Chinese firms
40
 and overestimate the market’s demand for 
premium-priced high performance products. Moreover, from the perspective of end 
customers, even Taiwanese PV cell firms may excel in the quality and efficiency 
performance, but, such slight advantage can be significantly diluted in the PV cost 
                                                     
38
 The first tier Taiwanese PV cell firms here refer to the top 5 Taiwanese cell firms in terms of the 
capacity data (PV cell production volume). As of 2010, there are total 33 PV cell firms (including 15 
c-Si firms). The three c-Si case firms in this research are among the top 5. 
39
 Excepting the ITRI deputy director, other
 
third party industry stakeholders expressed the same view.  
40
 The definition of the first tier Chinese PV firms is also in terms of the capacity data (production 
volume) based on the worldwide PV cell production data. Thus here the first tier Chinese PV firms are 
those among the worldwide top 10 firms. With this definition, only Solar one and FabPV are among 
the worldwide top- 10 list. As of 2011, there are total five Chinese firms among the worldwide top 
10(Table5.2). Some first tier Chinese PV cell firms surpass Taiwanese peers in terms of cell production 
volume and the scale of vertical integration (upward silicon production or downward module 
assembly). 
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structure and the amortization of PV project life times from the calculation of LCOE. 
 
These senior managers’ judgment of the competition and the market for their current 
products can be explained by the heuristics utilized in the judgment process, 
particularly the representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The 
resulting bias in overconfidence shows in that these senior managers were highly 
sensitive to the extremes or the “representativeness” of the incidents. For example, the 
short industry recovery in 2010; the impression gained from some Chinese
 
second tier 
PV firms
41
 and the recent anti-dumping policy against Chinese firms in the US and 
EU. On the other hand, they may not be sufficiently sensitive to the variation and the 
predictability of these “representative” events as the basis for judgment (Griffin & 
Tversky, 2002). As these interviewees possess the knowledge of the context and did 
not report high level of perceived uncertainty, the judgment is not necessarily 
resulting from lacking of information in the decision context, but is subject to the 
process of attribution substitution in which environmental uncertainty is not a 
necessary condition for the occurrence of heuristic judgment (Kahneman & Frederick, 
2002)
42
.  
 
Isolating effect in project evaluation 
 
The tendency to isolate the uncertainties and future opportunities in the overall impact 
assessment is illustrated by the findings of senior managers’ evaluation of new 
                                                     
41
 Here the definition of second tier Chinese PV firms generally refers to those that are not among the 
top 10 worldwide PV firms. As of 2011, there were more than 100 PV cell firms in China (ECJRC 
2011). 
42
 As discussed in Chapter 2, attribute substitution refers to that decision makers “assess a specific 
target attribute by substituting a related heuristic attribute that comes more easily to mind” (Kahneman 
2003b: 707). 
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investment projects. While expressing the view that all the prompted factors would be 
taken into consideration, these senior managers similarly indicated the factor of 
“market potential” as the most important criterion, followed by the factor of 
“expected revenue stream” (Table 4.4). At the first sight, the result appears to suggest 
that these managers are aware of the importance of future market opportunities in 
selecting projects. But the issue here is the judgment as to the timing and the level of 
impact. As discussed earlier in scenario analysis, their judgment of “market potential” 
is based on the most probable scenario with the assumption of optimistic incentive 
policy measures. This basis of judgment may overlook the possibility that investment 
decisions in new capabilities sometimes need to be based on the less probable 
scenario to take into account uncertainties, because profits may arise from “true 
uncertainties” (Freeman & Soete, 1997a; Knight, 1971). The assessment of “expected 
revenue streams” reflects the propensity towards the short-term measurement for 
investment projects. For example, in this research context, most senior managers 
mentioned that their firms usually use indicators such as ROI or payback period for 
assessing investment projects. These commonly used financial models for new 
investment evaluation can be biased in favour of projects with certainty (Bowman & 
Moskowitz, 2001; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2004).  
 
Table 4.4  Evaluation Criteria for Selecting Investment Projects 
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Source: Interviews, compiled by the author. 
 
In the context of increasing price competition on c-Si cell/modules, the prospect of 
gain from c-Si- firms’ current product platform could be possible; but it is also clear 
that this possibility could be low. According to the advanced prospect theory, 
risk-seeking behaviour is observed for the “hope of larger gains” (Kahneman, 2011; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1992). In view of the over-supply trend, the investment of 
capacity expansion is a sign of risk-seeking behaviour. Although in this research 
context those projects related to process and efficiency improvement may not 
necessarily be categorized as “risk-seeking”, the emphasis on investing in current 
capabilities shows the willingness to continue betting on the prospect of gain even 
with the low probability of success. 
 
On the other hand, comparing to the investments for current capabilities, new 
capabilities investments such as projects for developing new technologies or solutions 
are usually smaller in size. Therefore the potential loss from the new capability 
investment project is expected to have less impact on the overall revenue stream. 
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However, even with the prospect of a low probability of loss compared with the 
investments on current capabilities, the risk-averse behaviour towards these 
smaller-sized projects can be explained as the “fear of larger loss” in view of the loss 
resulting from the investment on current platform (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & 
Lovallo, 1993). Within this decision frame, the potential of gains from investing in 
new capabilities could be underestimated. 
 
Summary 
 
Firstly, Section 4.2 discusses that the commonly used concept of perceived 
environmental uncertainty may not sufficiently explain firms’ investment decision. 
The concept of diminishing sensitivity to uncertainty is proposed as a more refined 
concept of perceived environmental uncertainty. This concept also demonstrates that 
the level of perceived uncertainty may not necessarily be a valid indicator in 
explaining firms’ decision behaviour. Section 4.2 argues that the root cause of 
exploitation focus lies in narrow framing effect in the heuristic judgment process. 
Specifically, this analysis of narrow framing is illustrated with two empirical 
investigations. The first is the propensity of optimistic market forecasts: these senior 
managers showed an over-optimistic attitude about the market forecast and 
overestimated the potential growth through exploitation investment. The second is the 
tendency to isolate the uncertainties and future opportunities in the overall impact 
assessment for new investment evaluation. The analysis shows that with the 
inclination of using short-term measurement for investment projects, the potential 
prospect of gains from exploration investments could be underestimated in the 
evaluation process. 
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4.3 Institutional experience effect 
 
Section 4.3 examines how the institutional environment creates specific influences on 
forming the prevailing frame among Taiwanese PV firms. It starts with assessing the 
influence of demand-pull and technology push policy in Taiwan. Then, it illustrates an 
investigation on narrow framing effect – senior managers’ framing of the Specialized 
Human Resources Issue. This section concludes with the discussion of prevailing 
frame and experience effect. 
 
 
Assessing the Influence of demand-pull and technology- push Policy in Taiwan 
 
The reason for a consolidated discussion on the influence of policy in the Taiwanese 
institutional context firstly lies in that scenario evaluation analysis shows a 
convergence trend on the policy – driven scenario. Secondly, while the definition of 
“policy” in scenario evaluation refers to demand –pull policies, the reason for 
examining technology-push policies is that one of the selection criteria of these 
Taiwanese case firms is based on the participation of MOEA program, a major 
technology- push policy mechanism in Taiwan.  
 
The influence of demand-pull (government incentive) policy 
 
Given the strong orientation of export-led production of these Taiwanese PV cell 
firms, it is obvious that senior managers’ conception of government incentive policy 
focuses on the overseas market. In 2012, Taiwanese PV firms produced 12.5 % of 
annual worldwide PV cell/module production. But the accumulated PV installation in 
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Taiwan only accounts for around 0.14% of the worldwide PV cumulated PV 
installation. In fact, Taiwanese government initiated the “Renewable Energy 
Development Plan” since 2002. Later, the government approved the incentive 
measure (FiT) based on the “Renewable Energy Development Act” in 2009. Later, the 
government further announced the new “Million Solar Rooftop Program” with an aim 
to boost the installation capacity (ECJRC, 2010, 2013). However, the effect of the 
government demand pull policies including FiT incentive and procurement programs 
has not proved significant effect in inducing domestic PV installation in Taiwan.           
 
The reason why the Taiwanese FiT may not work as effective as the German FiT 
implies a global issue in the PV market – the infrastructure problem. For example, one 
of the key indicators of PV adoption is grid parity, of which the comparison is 
associated with the price of local electricity generated from conventional energy 
sources. Thus it would be more difficult for PV to achieve grid parity in countries 
with lower electricity price
43
. Comparing with other Asian countries, Taiwan has 
relative lower electricity price
44.  Further, Taiwan’s utility provider (Taiwan Power 
Company) remains as the dominant state-owned enterprise. Therefore, although the 
feasibility and economic benefits of PV have been demonstrated in many market 
sectors, the policy issue is not only the implementation of government incentive 
measures, but also the battle of transforming the longstanding infrastructure built for 
the incumbent energy source/utility providers (EPIA, 2011; Lovins & RMI, 2011). 
 
For the case of Taiwanese PV firms, it is obvious that the effect of foreign demand 
pull policy is stronger than domestic demand pull policy; as suggested in the findings 
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 IEA data (2012) suggests that high fossil fuel subsidies have been provided in many countries.  
44
 IEA data (2013) suggests that Taiwan has the second lowest residential and industrial electricity 
price among Asian countries. 
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of some cross-country study in the PV industry (Peters, Schneider, Griesshaber, & 
Hoffmann, 2012).  Given the fact that incentive policy measures are inevitably 
influenced by local governments’ economic and political situation, PV firms’ reliance 
on importing countries’ incentive program may not necessarily be a sustainable 
business model. For example, the German FiT policy has faced with the skeptics’ 
criticism of subsidizing foreign PV cell/module companies with tax-payers’ money. 
Although others argued that German equipment providers and system integrators also 
benefit from low-cost PV cells/modules (EPIA 2011), the opposition to Chinese PV 
cells/modules was emerged in 2012 (Hoppmann et al., 2014). For Taiwanese PV firms 
and investors, the sense of lacking of control over policy uncertainty (from other 
governments) may encourage the opportunism for chasing short-term gains
45
. 
 
The influence of technology-push (government R&D funding) policy 
 
From the perspective of global PV industry, public R&D investments have 
contributed significantly in the PV technology development in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Bradford, 2006; Breyer et al., 2010).  Yet public R&D investment has played a 
much less significant role than corporate investments since the past decade
46
 
(Bloomberg, 2012; Breyer et al., 2010). Still, when interviewed, most of the senior 
managers suggested that academia and government research institutes should lead the 
investments in basic research for PV technologies and that the link with research 
communities should be critical for the firms’ new technology development. In the 
context of Taiwanese PV industry, the discussion of technology-push policies focuses 
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 For example, risk-seeking behaviour with low prospect of gains such as capacity expansion under 
policy uncertainty as discussed in Section 4.2. 
46
In 1980, public R&D investments (estimated by international PV patent families) accounted for 
around 70% of the total PV R&D investments of which less than 30% were from the corporate. And in 
2005, more than 90% of the PV R&D investments were funded by the corporate (Beyer et al. 2010). 
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on government sponsored “R&D Innovation Program” provided by MOEA (Ministry 
of Economic Affairs).  
 
The reason why MOEA’s R&D Innovation Program is a flagship technology-push 
policy firstly lies in the scale of funding - the MOEA Innovative R&D program is the 
most generous government funding scheme for technology firms in Taiwan. Table 4.5 
shows the project budget and funding scale of the five case firms’ MOEA projects.  
As the design of the MOEA R&D innovation projects aims to stimulate firms’ 
exploratory investments, the “innovativeness” of the technology to be developed in 
the projects is served as the basis of evaluation criteria for awarding the government 
funding.  This program is characterized by the rigorousness of the evaluation process: 
after passing the initial assessment, firms’ proposals are required to be reviewed 
several times by the evaluation committee consists of government officials and 
referees from academia.  Secondly, this program “implicitly” encourages the link 
with research communities: usually, collaboration plans with academia and research 
institutes proposed in the MOEA projects are highly valued in the application 
assessment process. 
 
Table 4.5  MOEA project time line and budget 
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Source: MOEA, data compiled by the author 
 
However, it seems that the mechanism of MOEA’s R&D Innovative Program may not 
necessarily work effectively to encourage firms’ exploratory investments in many 
cases. In this research context, the majority of PV firms’ projects were targeted at the 
firms’ current technologies (please see Table 4.2 in Section 4.1). There are two 
possible explanations. Firstly, it is not evidently difficult to utilize MOEA projects as 
a source of funding support for firms’ current R&D projects; particularly for those 
firms with related experience have always been familiar with the operating rules for 
applying funding from this program. Although matching new investments/funding 
from the firms are required, most firms are skilful with ways of how to leverage their 
current resources for MOEA projects
47
. The additional government funding can then 
be used for hiring new people and equipment. For some firms, these new hires and 
equipment may also be utilized for firms’ internal projects other than the MOEA 
projects.    
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 Informal interviews with several experienced MOEA proposal counsellors. 
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Secondly, it is the mechanism of KPI (Key Performance Indicator) for measuring the 
output of the MOEA projects. Apart from patent applications (usually filed in Taiwan), 
estimated production value (e.g., the projected sales or market value derived from the 
MOEA projects) are the most common and important indicators. While these KPIs 
emphasize the substantial evidence to justify government’s investment funding, the 
mechanism could discourage firm to invest in exploration because it would be much 
easier to demonstrate near-term evidence for investment projects based on current 
capabilities. 
 
With respect to the link with research community, although MOEA projects are 
designed to encourage collaboration between the firms and the research institutes, the 
reality of the limited cooperation is due to the firms’ concerns over confidentiality and 
project ownership. In particular, there is an infrastructure issue of government- 
sponsored research institute such as ITRI (Industrial Technology Research Institute)
48
: 
although one of the goals of the research institute is to facilitate knowledge and 
technology transfer with the firms, the research institute also has its own goal in 
producing new technologies and creating new ventures. This may creates the sense of 
potential interest conflict in the collaboration between the firm and the research 
institute
49
. 
 
Framing of the specialized human resources issue 
 
In responding to factors with respect to resources that may affect their firms’ decisions 
in capability investments, senior managers similarly expressed the view that shortage 
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 ITRI is the largest government research institute in Taiwan. ITRI has been regarded as the incubator 
for many high-tech firms in Taiwan. 
49
 Interviews from senior managers and ITRI (MOEA project leaders). 
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of technology talents and skilled engineers influences the firms’ investments in 
developing new capabilities. Firstly, they claimed that talent competition from the 
related industries, particularly the semiconductor industry is a serious issue. These 
senior managers described that since the downturn in 2011, the PV industry has 
experienced the pressure of losing technology talent. The reasoning is that as stock 
options and awards are usually the major parts of the total compensation package for 
RD talents in Taiwanese high-tech firms, the suddenly plummeted stock price of these 
Taiwanese PV firms in 2011 (compared with their soaring price during 2008-2010) 
contributes to the outflow of technology talents and skilled engineers in 2011.  
 
However, the data from R&D expense
50
 shows that, in comparison with the leading 
firms in the Semiconductor and TFT-LCD industry
51
, the three c-Si PV firms 
generally invested at a lower level both in 2010 and 2011
52
 (Table 4.6). The two 
semiconductor firms allocated the R&D expense as high as around 8% of total sales. 
And, despite similarly experiencing industry downturn and losses as the PV firms, the 
two TFT-LCD firms kept R&D expense stable at 2% in 2010 and 2011.  As for the 
three c-Si firms (excepting Greenchild), both Solar one and FabPV invested in a 
much lower level of R&D than TFT- LCD firms, even during the very profitable year 
of 2010. Therefore the finding from R&D Expenditure suggests that the talent 
shortage issue claimed by the senior managers may not necessarily result from the 
labour market’s perceived outlook of the PV industry, but from these PV firms’ 
wiliness to retain technology talents and invest in new hires.      
                                                     
50
 In these firms, R&D expense refers to payroll for R&D staff, and does not include the purchase of 
specific equipment or system in the R&D department. 
51
 There are similarities in the required skills and experiences of R&D people in the three industry 
sectors. 
52
 As Solar one, FabPV and Greenchild are regarded as the top technology-leading and R&D intensive 
firms in the PV industry, the comparison of R&D expense is conducted with the top two firms in the 
Semiconductor (manufacturing focus) and TFT-LCD industries. 
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Table 4.6 R&D Expense Comparison among Three c-Si firms and Leading Firms 
in the Semiconductor and LCD Industries in Taiwan 
 
Source: the firms’ annual reports, data compiled by the author. 
 
Secondly, the five case firms’ senior managers specifically indicated the issue of 
lacking skilled engineers on PV application products and system design(MOEA, 
2011). Generally, these managers suggested that the shortage of product design 
developers or engineers in Taiwan’s labour market is closely linked to the ill-equipped 
infrastructure for solar PV adoption in Taiwan. Quoting from Solar one’s CTO:”As 
PV technologies are characterized by applications, the talents in product 
design-related technologies need to be cultivated in the usage environment, as in the 
case of Japan or Germany”.  However, despite the low PV installation in Taiwan, 
these PV firms could have the choice to develop related capabilities from working 
with partners from abroad, particularly given the fact that their predominant market 
share is not based on the domestic market.  
 
From these senior managers’ comments about the factors limiting their firms’ new 
capability investments, the reason why these firms were not actively engaging in new 
capability development was generally attributed as a common resources issue of talent 
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shortage in the industry and institutional environment. Here the judgment process can 
be illustrated in the model of attribute substitution in which decision makers may 
answer an easier question with more accessible heuristics (such as the representative 
and availability heuristics) to substitute the attribute of a complex decision 
problem(Kahneman, 2003b; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Firstly, in the claim of 
talent resource competition from other related industries, the comparison of perceived 
industry outlook with the semiconductor industry was served as an immediate 
instance to construct the possible correlation between the profitability and the 
availability of technology talents for the firms to develop new capabilities. Yet the 
claim was not validated based on the R&D expense comparison with another related 
industry (employing technology talents with similar skill sets) suffering worse 
downturn in 2010 and 2011. Secondly, in the claim of lacking infrastructure 
environment to cultivate technology talents, the perceived shortage of a specific 
category of skilled labour (such as PV system design) in the local market was 
substituted as the reason for insufficient investments in new technologies or 
applications: but this statement was not that in line with these firms’ need and 
planning in expanding global markets. In reality, these firms simply may not have the 
plan to hire PV application and design engineers from local market as much as they 
claimed.          
 
The prevailing frame and experience effect 
 
From the scenario interview, besides the converged view towards the policy driven 
scenario(Fig. 4.9), all the interviewees (including the
 
third party stakeholders) 
expressed the similar perspective that Taiwan’s manufacturing and technological 
capabilities in the electronics and semiconductor industries have been competitive 
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advantages in the PV industry (Lin & Hsu, 2011; MOEA, 2010): in particular, the 
consensus is on the ground that it is reasonable to expect that management and 
knowhow of the manufacturing process in these industries can be successfully applied 
in the PV industry. In fact, the vast majority of PV firms in Taiwan has indeed 
inherited background assets from these related industries (WealthPress, 2005, 2009). 
Not only engineers and middle managers, but also senior managers are usually 
equipped with the relevant experience in the related industries. The influence of such 
professional experience on high-level management is as described by one VC 
interviewee: “The owners of most Taiwanese PV firm are basically running the PV 
business with the same mode for their electronics or semiconductors business.” The 
VC interviewees and the ITRI interviewee (deputy director) similarly suggested that 
the Taiwanese PV industry’s tendency of focusing on manufacturing has been rooted 
in the prevailing success model that the electronics and semiconductor industries have 
been using for decades
53
. 
  
Fig 4.9  Scenario Result (with
 
third party stakeholders) 
                                                     
53
 The influence of professional knowledge and experience in the institutional context is also reflected 
in the perspective of institutional theory. To some extent, the prevailing frame of manufacturing 
excellence corresponds to the notion of concept of institutional logic (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). 
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Source: interviews, compiled by the author. 
 
These interviewees were knowledgeable about the fact that as the PV industry grows; 
the characteristics of PV further differentiate its development with the trajectory of 
the electronics or semiconductor industries. It is not because of their lack of 
awareness but because of their past successful experience strengthens the mindset of 
overconfidence in current capabilities: indeed, the rapid growth of these Taiwanese 
PV firms during the past few years can be attributed to applying the best practices 
from the related industries in Taiwan. While these senior managers and the
 
third party 
stakeholders perceived that the technological and manufacturing excellence inherited 
from the semiconductor and electronics industries has been the competitive advantage 
for the Taiwanese PV firms, such capabilities and experience may constrain these 
firms’ framing of plausible ways to capture future opportunities (Levinthal & March, 
1993; March, 2010). Although these competitive advantages and experience are still 
important, the issue is whether these capabilities can really address the future 
development in the industry. The “dilemma of competitive advantages” refers to as 
that whereas the competitive advantages may enhance the current performance, it also 
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increases the cost of developing new capabilities and “competing for primacy” 
(March, 1994: 252). 
 
Heuristic bias 
 
These interviewees’ similar pattern in framing the scenarios and contingencies can be 
explained by the process of heuristic judgment in using the availability heuristic. Here 
availability heuristic refers to the ease of recalling the best practice accessible in the 
industry and the institutional environment. Thus the judgment based on successful 
experience is susceptible to the biases derived from the familiarity and salience of the 
instance, as well as the ease of constructing the correlation (March, 2010; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). In addition, the influence of heuristic judgment based on 
successful experience is related to the endowment effect of which the propensity of 
overestimating the value of owned assets and current capabilities is 
demonstrated(Kahneman et al., 1991). The process of heuristic judgment is stressed in 
the “moment-based experience effect” (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000), suggesting that 
it is easier to make quick judgment based on immediate examples, and that it is 
relatively difficult to make rational assessment of current possessions (assets) 
envisioned in different scenarios or context. 
 
Perspective bias 
  
With respect to the accumulated experience effect, it stresses the role of belief in 
influencing the judgment and decision process. The competence effect suggests that 
decision makers are more willing to bet on areas that they feel more in control of on 
the basis of prior belief  (Heath & Tversky, 1991; Starbuck, 2009; Starbuck & 
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Milliken, 1988; Tversky & Fox, 2000). For example, c-Si firms’ senior managers and 
third-party interviewees appeared to be confident in the firms’ capabilities in existing 
technologies (i.e., they showed the sense of control over this source of technology 
uncertainty). But as discussed earlier in Section 4.1, although the technological 
progress of c-Si PV cells can be predictable to certain degree, the elements of 
associated commercial uncertainty such as the silicon cost and industry structural 
change can be overlooked. 
 
Further, this research context, the prevailing frame constructed from successful 
experience can also be traced from interviewees’ shared perspective of using the 
rationale of “national competitive advantages” in perceiving the potential and 
direction of capability development in the institutional context. The commonly held 
assumptions such as the sustainability of competitiveness and the timing for new 
opportunities could be susceptible to the perspective bias derived from the long-term 
experience. Moreover, the seemingly rationality-based decision model such as the 
national competitive analysis(MOEA, 2010; Porter, 1980, 1990) may just serve as the 
tool in narrowing and justifying decision makers’ perspectives. 
 
Summary 
 
Firstly, the assessment of the demand-pull and technology-push policy in Taiwan 
suggests that both policy measures are not necessarily influential on Taiwanese PV 
firms’ capability investments. Secondly, following the line of argument on narrow 
framing effect in influencing these firms’ exploitation focus, this section illustrates a 
resources framing issue of capability investments in the institutional context of 
Taiwan. At the first sight, senior managers’ comments that shortage of technology 
124 
 
talents limits the firms’ new capability investment appears to be reasonable from a 
common sense. But the analysis shows that these claims are not validated. Senior 
managers’ statements demonstrate the heuristic judgment process of attribute 
substitution. Thirdly, further advancing the argument that industry and institutional 
experience reinforces narrow framing effect, this section concludes that the prevailing 
frame – in particular the influence of best practices and successful experience explains 
Taiwanese PV firms’ exploitation focus. 
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<Appendix 1> c-Si cells c-Si cells manufacturing process 
 
Compared with the cell integrated thin film modules, c-Si cell/modules have more 
complex supply chain in the upstream manufacturing process. These steps include: (1) 
converting raw silicon to solar-grade silicon; (2) second, forming the ingots, the solid 
block of polysilicon; (3) slicing ingots into wafers; (4) transforming the wafers into 
cells through wafer surface treatment, p-n junction creation, coating deposition and 
metallization; (5) connecting and coating to form modules (EPIA, 2011).  On the 
other hand, thin film modules are made by depositing thin layer of photovoltaic 
sensitive materials on a backing made of glass, stainless or plastic; then the material 
attached backing is laser-cut into thin cells/modules. 
 
c-Si cells manufacturing process- supply chain 
 
Source : Figure adapted from Solar Generation 6, (EPIA, 2011) 
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Chapter 5  
Selective Attention in the Organizations 
 
Introduction 
 
In addressing the research question: what is the role of framing in the decision-making 
process for new capability investment? Chapter 5 focuses on examining firms’ 
differences in capability investment and selective attention pattern. Here the definition 
of framing employs the general concept of decision problem interpretation, which is 
drawing on the concepts of selective attention and attention-based view from the 
organizational decision perspective.  
 
Section 5.1 examines to what extent selective attention explain variation of capability 
investment pattern among firms. It starts with investigating the three firms’ patterns in 
capability investments and the presence of selective attention among firms. Based on 
analysis of firms’ investment history and LTS (Letter to Shareholders), Section 5.1 
shows that there are mixed findings as to whether selective attention is relevant to 
firms’ variation in capability investment pattern. 
 
In addressing the second research question in this research: “What factors may 
influence the role of framing in such process?” Section 5.2 examines to what extent 
firm-level characteristics explain variation in selective attention. Drawing on the 
attention-based view, Section 5.2 employs a comparative analytical view in 
investigating the two firm-level factors that are critical in influencing firms’ selective 
attention : the first is firm resources (representing firms’ economic position), and the 
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second is firm ownership (representing firms’ high- level corporate structure)(Ocasio, 
1997).  
 
Section 5.3 starts with examining firms’ selective attention from the perspective of 
key individual decision makers. Specifically, it discusses the influence of CEO 
experience on firms’ selective attention and capability investment patterns. Then, in 
advancing the comparative analysis, Section 5.3 proposes the framework of causal 
combination view in analyzing the sources of variation and explaining each firm’ 
distinct pattern in different time period. 
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5.1 Capability investment and selective attention patterns 
 
Section 5.1 starts with examining the three c-Si firms’ capability investment pattern. 
Different from Chapter 4’s review of the investment pattern in the comparable period 
2006-2011, here the investigation includes the period pre-2006 to take into 
consideration the firm Solar one’s early investment history. Thus the emphasis is not 
only on the comparison among the case firms, but also on the in-case comparison of 
the firm’s new capability investment pattern over a different time period.  
 
Investment patterns of the three c-Si firms 
 
In Chapter 4, the similarities in the general direction and timing of the investments 
were found among the three c-Si firms during the period 2006-2011. Still, certain 
different patterns are found in the three firms’ capability development strategies 
throughout their investment histories (Figure 5.1). Particularly, while all three firms 
demonstrated an attempt to evaluate other PV technologies during 2008-2010, only 
Greenchild officially invested in the emerging PV technologies (in 2010 and 2011). 
Solar one, a relatively early entrant, was more actively engaged in new capabilities 
investments during the firm’s early period pre-2007 than its recent years.  
 
Figure 5.1 Three firms’ capability investments  
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Source: firms’ annual reports and interviews, complied by the author.  
Solar one:  
Solar one started out as a firm designing and manufacturing testing equipment, and 
entered the PV industry in 2000. During the period 2002-2005, Solar one initiated the 
PV system integration business line, and the R&D for the PV inverter, the main 
component in the PV BOS. In 2006, Solar one acquired a US-based polysilicon firm. 
There were some capability investments involved in this acquisition, and the firm 
continued to make related investments in 2007-2008.  In 2007, Solar one also set up 
a new firm targeting energy-saving IC design. There was no official investment into 
new capability development after 2008, and Solar one actually terminated investment 
funding for the energy IC design firm in 2010. Further, Solar one decided to 
consolidate the PV inverter and system business line and sell the testing equipment 
(the firm’s original business line) in 2011. 
 
The data from Solar one’s investment history shows the fact that the firm engaged in 
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more new capability investments in the first few years after the inception of the solar 
PV business. After 2006, despite the tendency towards a more focused development 
strategy based on the PV cell business, there were still several new investment 
projects. The strategy of being professional PV cell/module manufacturers and 
focusing on the c-Si technology platform has been clear since 2010. 
 
Greenchild 
Greenchild entered the PV industry in late 2004. The firm did not engage in the 
investment of new capability development until 2010, when the firm announced a 
partnership with IBM and Solar Frontier to develop CZTS, an emerging thin film PV 
technology. In the same year, the firm proposed a project to invest in a German power 
plant. In 2011, the firm invested in a five-year MOEA project in CIGS thin film 
technology, following an initial pre-study project in 2010. Starting in late 2010, 
Greenchild initiated PV system business investment in the firm’s sales office in the 
US and India. 
 
The firm initially showed its interest in developing alternative PV technologies in 
2007. Yet the firm did not officially invest in thin film technologies until 2010. With 
respect to the new investment in EPC, although Greenchild evaluated the proposal to 
invest in a German power plant in 2008, the firm did not start investing in the EPC 
business until 2010. In contrast to Solar one’s pattern, Greenchild focused on the 
development of c-Si cell/module technology in the firm’s early years and started the 
investments in developing new capabilities later on in 2010 and 2011. 
 
FabPV 
Since its establishment in 2005, FabPV has been focusing on the development of c-Si 
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cell technology and has made no official investment in developing new capabilities 
other than c-Si cell products. Although FabPV demonstrated some intent to evaluate 
alternative thin film technologies, no official investment has been made. 
 
In contrast to Solar one, FabPV and Greenchild were established as c-Si cell 
manufacturers and entered the market around the same time.  Yet the two firms had 
different investment strategies: While Greenchild invested in other PV technologies 
and EPC businesses a few years after the firm started, FabPV has focused on c-Si cell 
investment since the firm’s inception. On the other hand, it appears that Solar one and 
FabPV pursued a similar investment strategy focusing on exploiting current 
capabilities of c-Si -platform since 2010. 
 
Selective attention of the three c-Si firms 
 
Next, the investigation of firm-level selective attention is examined by three firms’ 
Letter to Shareholders (LTS) during 2003-2011
54
.  LTS are signed by Chairman (and 
CEO for some firms) and announced the direction of the firms’ most important plans 
to shareholders. Therefore they are considered as a viable firm-level indicator of the 
firms’ attention towards the environment and responding strategies, particularly for 
the purpose of collecting retrospective data (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Eggers & 
Kaplan, 2008; Kaplan, 2008a; Kaplan, 2011). 
 
Here the analysis of LTS emphasises on capturing the specific description pertaining 
to attention towards the environment and the responding strategies
55
. The context of 
                                                     
54
 LTS 2003-2006 only available in Solar one. 
55
 Most management cognition studies use the quantitative measure of specific word- counts in LTS. 
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the firms’ external environment is categorized by policy and technology uncertainty56.  
Specifically, attention towards the environment examines what issues these firms 
focus on and how they interpret the effect. Then the firms’ responding strategies57 are 
compared during the period of 2007-2011
58
 (Table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.1 Three firms’ LTS comparison  
                                                     
56
 Here these firms’ internal environment is examined by their sales and EPS (an indicator of 
profitability) trend of which the pattern is quite similar among all three firms in the comparable period 
2006-2011. See Appendix 5-1. 
57
 Taiwanese firms’ annual reports (with LTS attached) are usually published in the first quarter in the 
next following year. Therefore the messages on LTS are considered to reasonably reflect firms’ strategy 
in responding to the previous year’s environmental change. 
58
 Basically there is consistency of style and messages in Solar one’s LTS 2003-2006. 
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Source: Three firms’ LTS 2003-2011, complied by the author. 
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General trend of LTS 
 
LTS 2003-2007 
During the period of 2003-2007, the three firms’ LTS similarly show the optimism 
towards PV market growth driven by environmental and incentive policies. In 2007, 
polysilicon shortage amid strong demand was the three firms’ attention focus.  
 
LTS 2008-2009 
The period of 2008-2009 marked the years of the global financial crises. Three firms 
obviously attributed the gloomy economic situation and policy uncertainty 
(particularly Spanish incentive scheme change) as the main reason for the first 
industry downturn. In contrast to the concern of rising silicon cost in 2007, in 
2008-2009, the attention shifted to the over-supply issue resulting from pricing 
pressure (plummeting silicon price) and growing competition in the industry. 
 
LTS 2010-2011 
The period of 2010-2011 marked the two contrasting years of the industry boom and 
bust. The three firms’ LTS in 2010 expressed similar optimism towards strong 
demand growth driven by the wide implementation of incentive policies. All three 
firms recorded rapid sales and profitability growth in 2010. Then in 2011, when the 
PV industry faced the second industry downturn, there was a dramatic change of 
mode in three firms’ LTS in 2011. Although these firms may have slightly different 
perspectives about policy uncertainty, changes in incentive policies were not the only 
attention: these firms similarly recognized the challenge of worsening over-supply 
resulting from capacity competition and falling ASP (Average Selling Price) in the 
industry.  The issue of how to achieve price competitiveness and cost reduction was 
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apparently the focus of three firms’ LTS in 2011. 
 
Selective attention – environmental uncertainty 
 
While there are similarities regarding attention focus towards policy and technology 
uncertainty, the three firms’ LTS also show differences with respect to interpreting the 
effect of environmental uncertainty. Firstly, in 2007, Solar one was the only one 
showing the early awareness of increasing industry players and competition
59
. 
Secondly, in 2008-2009, while Solar one and Greenchild showed a conservative 
attitude towards the pace of market growth, FabPV expressed a different view: the 
firm stressed the opportunity of fast growing demand derived from lower PV 
cell/module price module, on the grounds that PV technology would achieve grid 
parity sooner than expected. Further, the firms’ LTS in 2008 indicate different 
perceived effect of policy uncertainty on the firms: while FabPV stressed the growing 
market size, Solar one was more concerned about the shrinking gross margin and 
Greenchild was the first one hinting the PV industry structural change in LTS. 
 
The first difference in three firms’ LTS in 2010 is the attention towards other PV 
technologies. While Solar one and Greenchild mentioned about the potential of 
alternative and emerging technologies in the PV industry, there was no messages 
about technologies other than c-Si cells in FabPV’s LTS. The second difference in 
three firm’s LTS in 2011 is the attention towards industry change.  Both Solar one 
and FabPV pointed out the structural change in the PV industry supply chain. But the 
two firms have different expression about the change: while Solar one emphasised the 
                                                     
59
 Another reason could be that FabPV and Greenchild were just officially entering the PV industry in 
2007. 
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technology uncertainty associated with development of emerging technologies and 
value proposition, FabPV’s attention focused on the structural adjustment of the 
supply chain.  Although Greenchild firstly pointed out the sign of industry change in 
2008 and the opportunity of emerging PV technologies in 2010, yet the firm did not 
address these messages in 2011. One of the attention focuses in the firm’s LTS was 
the recognition of polysilicon contract issue leading to the firm’s losses in 2011. 
 
Selective attention – responding strategies 
 
The three firms’ LTS in 2008 illustrate the different strategy emphases in responding 
to the challenges of the first industry downturn. In fact, the indications of their 
different direction in responding strategies can already be traced from their LTS in 
2007. Solar one stressed the firm’s capacity in upward vertical integration (polysilicon 
wafer) and downstream PV system. Fab PV emphasized capacity expansion and the 
firm’s competencies in cost control and operational management. Greenchild 
expressed the view that the firm would continue to pursue self-developed technology 
platform
60
 and “not too aggressive” capacity expansion. Then in 2009, when the first 
signs of recovery were sighted after the easing of the financial crisis, the three firms 
still appeared to follow their same responding strategies since 2007. Solar one 
stressed the firm’s vertical integration in both upward polysilicon wafer and 
downward module assembly. FabPV emphasized the firm’s focused cell 
manufacturing. Greenchild continued to highlight the importance of self-developed 
technology platform.   
 
                                                     
60
 It emphasises the total technology solution including manufacturing line (most PV cell firms 
purchase turn-key solution) on the c-Si platform. 
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Basically, the three firms responding strategies in 2010-2011 followed the same 
themes as those in 2007-2009. Although in 2010, the similar focus among the three 
firms was capacity expansion, which appears to be a reasonable action in the 
anticipation of rapid demand growth in 2010. While both Solar one and Greenchild 
stressed the firms’ entry in PV module business in 2010, FabPV still focused on cell 
production. In responding to the industry downturn in 2011, apart from the central 
messages of cost reduction and technology improvement (c-Si technology), there 
were slight differences in three firms’ LTS in 2011. While FabPV continued the focus 
of cost competitiveness, Solar one addressed the importance of reaching 
end-customers and Greenchild indicated the firm’s efforts in developing emerging 
markets.        
 
The relevance of selective attention to the firms’ capability investment decisions 
 
In investigating the relevance of selective attention to firms’ investment decisions, the 
analysis is to find whether there is evidence linking these firms’ selective attention to 
their capability investment pattern. Firstly, for the comparison of messages inside the 
firms’ LTS, it draws on the connections between attention towards environmental 
uncertainties and responding strategies. Secondly, the LTS messages of these firms’ 
responding strategies are cross-examined with their capability investment patterns.  
 
Cases illustrating the linkage between firms’ attention towards the environment and 
responding strategies 
  
From the evidence of LTS, there are two cases illustrating the relevance between 
firms’ attention towards the environment and their responding strategies. The first 
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case is that FabPV is the only firm held more optimistic view towards market demand 
growth during the period 2008-2009, when the industry experienced the first recession. 
The difference of attention in interpreting the effect of policy uncertainty was indeed 
reflected in FabPV’s announcement of capacity expansion strategies earlier than the 
others in 2008-2009.  
 
The second case is that Greenchild is the only firm expressing the view of industry 
transition earlier in 2008, and different from the other two firms, Greenchild did 
announce investments of emerging PV technologies and PV system in the firm’s LTS 
in 2010. Although there was two-year time lag, Greenchild’s responding strategies in 
2010 could be reasonably traced from the firm’s selective attention back in 2008.      
 
Linking responding strategies to capability investment actions – the three firms’ 
distinct patterns 
 
However, a more important finding from the evidence of LTS is that these firms seem 
to follow similar responding strategies despite the change of attention towards the 
environmental uncertainty in different time period. To understand each firm’s distinct 
pattern in different period of time, the evidence of LTS is further examined with 
capability investment pattern.   
 
FabPV is the case illustrating the consistent pattern of the firm’s attention towards 
environment, responding strategies and capability investments. Basically, the firm 
pursues the similar focused c-Si cell manufacturing strategy and there are no 
messages of developing alternative PV technologies, vertical integration or PV system 
in the firm’s LTS.  
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Greenchild is the case demonstrating the inconsistent pattern in 2011. This firm is the 
only one with the evidence of new capabilities investments in 2010-2011. But the 
firm’s LTS messages on attention towards the environment and responding strategies 
were not much different from those of the other two firms. Greenchild’s new 
capability investments of downstream PV system, the initiative of overseas PV system 
integration business was not mentioned in the firm’s LTS in 2011; although this 
investment project was listed in the firm’s board meeting notes and financial 
statements in the Annual Report of 2011. Moreover, despite with its large funding and 
project scale, Greenchild’s five- year MOEA project of CIGS thin- film technology 
was not mentioned in the firm’s LTS in 2011, either. These missing statements may 
imply the fact that the initiatives of developing new capabilities were not necessarily 
considered by the firm as key strategies in coping with environmental uncertainties 
during this time period.  
 
Solar one is the case showing that capability investment decisions may not necessarily 
be observed from the firm’s attention toward the environment during different time 
periods. While most of Solar one’s LTS messages can be linked to the firm’s vertical 
integration investments, the first noticeable gap is the attention towards PV 
technologies. In fact, Solar one’s LTS in 2010 and 2011 clearly pointed out the 
potential of alterative and emerging technologies, but the firm did not invest in 
technologies other than c-Si platform. The second gap is that although Solar one’s 
LTS in 2011 emphasized the awareness of industry structural and changing 
proposition change towards end customers, there was no evidence of increasing new 
investments in downstream PV system. On the contrary, there was a sign of 
contracting investments in the firm’s system business line. 
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Summary 
 
The attention-based view suggests that firms selectively perceive the environment: 
firms may “selectively focus” on particular issues while ignore others. The basic 
assumption is that firms’ selective attention may affect their strategic choices (Cho & 
Hambrick, 2006; Ocasio, 1997). The findings from analysis of LTS show that there 
are evidences of selective attention among these firms: while there are traces of 
variation with respect to how these firm notice and interpreting the effect of 
environmental uncertainties in different period of time, the indications of variation in 
the firms’ responding strategies are evident since 2007. However, the pattern of 
selective attention may not sufficiently explain the firms’ heterogeneous pattern of 
capability investments. 
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5.2 Factors influencing selective attention 
 
In examining to what extent firm characteristics influence the pattern of selective 
attention in the organization, Section 5.2 investigates two factors: firm resources and 
ownership.   
 
The influence of firm resources 
 
The “attention-based view” suggests that firms’ resources influence how they notice 
and interpret the relevant issues in the environment
61
 (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; 
Ocasio, 1997). Here the analysis of firm resources comparison is operationalized 
based on the competitiveness measurement in the PV industry. Four categories of 
critical resources in the PV industry are identified: scalable and differentiated 
technologies, operational excellence, access to markets/customers, and financing 
strength (Table 5.2). 
 
Table 5.2 Three firms’ resources comparison 
                                                     
61
 The resources and capabilities view (RBV) literature suggests that the firms’ possession of resources 
and capabilities can be sources of heterogeneity in explaining firms’ decision behaviours. Different 
from RBV, the attention based view emphasises that firms’ attention is “shaped, but not fully 
determined, by existing organizational resources”(Ocasio 1997: 198). 
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Source: data compiled by the author  
 
Scalable and differentiated technologies 
 
There are three measurements in this category including the firms’ (1) current 
production scales, (2) progress of technology developments and (3) patenting 
activities
62
. 
 
Firstly (with the exception of Greenchild), two of the firms – Solar one and FabPV – 
have competitive production scales that rank highly worldwide. Secondly, the three 
firms have made commensurate technological progress on the c-Si platform in terms 
of c-Si cell efficiencies (Lin & Hsu, 2011) and new product releases over the past few 
years (Appendix 5-2). Thirdly, there are no significant differences in terms of granted 
patents
63
 as well as the US and EP patent application process
64
. The vast majority of 
                                                     
62
 Although patents may not necessarily be the critical entry barrier in the PV industry, but may still 
represent technological resources to a certain degree.  
63
 Greenchild has one solar cell/module patent, Solar one has one granted US patent (not on solar cells 
but on related equipment), and FabPV has no granted patents as of yet. 
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the three firms’ patents are consistently categorized under H01 L31 and H01 L21, the 
two most prevailing IPCs for solar PV cells and module technologies. Both the 
indicators of new product release and patenting information suggest that the three 
firms’ current efforts and developed technologies are not diversified, and that their 
focus of “differentiated technologies” still lies in the development of next generation 
c-Si cells and the respective manufacturing process. Overall, in the category of 
Scalable and differentiated technologies, apart from the advantage of production scale 
possessed by Solar one and FabPV, there is no significant gap in technological 
resources between the three firms. 
 
Operational excellence 
 
In this category, two measurements including the firms’ supplier relationships 
(particularly the supply management of polysilicon) and the streamlining of the 
supply chain (particularly vertical integration in PV cell and module manufacturing) 
are evaluated. Firstly, all three firms have to rely on securing key procurement 
contracts (during the polysilicon shortage in the early years), or manage flexibility to 
avoid losses from price fluctuation (in recent years). Solar one appears to have more 
assets in terms of polysilicon wafer production, yet such a lead may not be 
significant – Solar one only produced around 500MW wafers, while first-tier Chinese 
PV firms’ wafer production (as suppliers to most Taiwanese PV cell firms) ranged 
from 1000MW to 6500MW. On the other hand, Greenchild seemed to suffer badly 
from their polysilicon supplier contract, as the firm committed to a much higher price 
                                                                                                                                                        
64
 FabPV seems to be more aggressive in filing patents in China and Taiwan. However, the firm’s CFO 
admitted that there may be only 1-2 patents that are critical to the firm, and that the firm’s patenting 
activity may be an indication of image management. Similar comments on the potential technological 
value of these patents owned by FabPV were confirmed by the ITRI Solar division’s deputy director. 
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before the sharp decrease in polyslicon costs. With this respect, Greenchild lags 
behind the other two firms in terms of supplier management.  
 
Secondly, although Solar one led the way in vertical integration, such advantage only 
lasted for a short period of time: the firm’s lead in module production has not 
necessarily been an advantage after the severe price drop in late 2011, as it may add to 
the cost (material and inventory) burden and further squeeze the composite margin. 
Accordingly, there is no significant gap in supply chain streamlining of PV cell and 
module manufacturing between the three firms.  
 
Access to markets/customers 
 
There are two measurements in the category including the degree of global market 
reach and the development of downstream business. Firstly, all three firms have 
already adjusted the previously EU-dominated market base to a more 
globally-distributed market structure by 2011, although Greenchild seems to be a little 
behind, with the EU share at over 55% in this case. Secondly, Solar one is the only 
firm that has developed both the PV system (including the PV inverter) and system 
integration for years. Yet the firm’s EPC business has been limited in the domestic 
market since its development in 2003. Overall, there is again no significant resources 
gap among the three firms in the category of “access to markets/customers”. 
 
Financing strength 
 
This category of resources is critical for PV firms’ business operations, not only 
because the PV industry is capital-intensive (in terms of the need for purchasing 
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equipment and materials), but also because this resources may sustain investment 
activity during the credit crunch. The firms’ financing strengths in terms of their basic 
financial structures and fund raising abilities are evaluated. While debt/equity ratios 
increased substantially at Solar one and Greenchild from 2010-2011, FabPV had a 
relatively stable debt structure. As for the operating cash flow, Solar one and FabPV 
seemed to be better-set to cope with the liquidity issue, yet it was Greenchild that had 
the strongest back-up from its owner – a large electronics company. Overall, judging 
from these indicators, there is again no significant gap in financing strength among 
the three firms. This fact also corresponds with the interviews: senior managers in the 
three c-Si firms expressed the same view, that their firms had no funding pressure 
regarding investment activities. 
 
To what extent resources gaps explain selective attention? 
 
The first noticeable gap among the three firms is that Solar one’s vertical integration 
(upstream and downstream) has been ahead of that of FabPV and Greenchild. 
Specifically, Solar one may have a certain lead in terms of the early entry into 
downstream PV system technology and experience.  The influence of resources and 
experience in downstream PV system since 2003 is evident in Solar one’s attention 
towards the environment, particularly during 2010-2011, when the industry 
experienced dramatic structural change. However, Solar one did not capitalized this 
early advantage in the firm’s responding strategies but pursued the same focused c-Si 
strategy similar to FabPV in 2010 and 2011. 
 
The second noticeable resources gap among the three firms lies in the level of 
production capacity in which both Solar one and FabPV have substantial lead over 
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Greenchild. FabPV’s advantage in c-Si cell product scale appears to explain the firm’s 
focused attention on c-Si platform and somehow pay less attention to the development 
of other emerging PV technologies. But Solar one, the firm with the commensurate 
c-Si production scale still shows the attention on the potential of alternative and 
emerging PV technologies. With respect to Greenchild, the firm’s smaller production 
scale was not necessarily the rationale influencing the attention and responding 
strategies towards developing emerging PV technologies during 2010-2011. In fact, 
Greenchild has also been pursuing focused c-Si technology strategy since the firm’s 
inception. The key message of “self-developed technology” in the firm’s LTS from 
2007-2011 refers to c-Si technology platform. Greenchild announced the speeding up 
of capacity expansion in 2010 and 2011, but the timing appeared to be late slow as the 
over-supply issue worsened during 2011
65
.   
 
Owner’s influence 
 
Next, from the three firms’ profile, the difference in ownership type and structure is 
another noticeable firm attribute. It is reasonable to assume that the characteristics of 
the firms’ owners may reflect the firm’s high-level management structure and strategic 
directions (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 
2002; Zahra, 1996).
66
 Therefore, here the factor of firm ownership is treated as 
another firm-level characteristic representing the aspect of organizational structural 
rule that may influence firms’ attention towards the environment and responding 
                                                     
65
 In 2009, Greenchild’s capacity was 192MW, only around 50MW less than FabPV‘s 240MW. In 
2010, FabPV’s capacity expanded to 800MW while Greenchild’s capacity only reached 400MW. In 
fact, Greenchild’s R&D Head admitted that compared to FabPV, the firm has been too conservative in 
business practices such as pricing and capacity utilization strategy during the past few years. 
66
 Empirical studies on ownership suggest certain ownership structural factors such as ownership and 
shareholder types in predicting firms’ attention focus and investment orientations. 
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strategies(Ocasio, 1997).  
 
Looking into the three firms’ ownership structure, they actually share similar traits, 
particularly ownership concentration and business group ownership. Thus here the 
comparison focuses on examining the characteristics of the three firms’ owners and 
their influences on firms’ selective attention (Table 5.3). 
 
Table 5.3  Three firms’ ownership 
 
Source: three firms’ annual reports, complied by the author. 
 
Solar one owner’s influence: attention on c-Si process technologies  
Unlike the other two c-Si firms, in which the ownership was backed by business 
groups during the founding period, Solar one was founded as an entrepreneurial firm, 
with the ownership dominated by original founders and angel investors. In 2010, a 
major shift of the firm’s ownership structure was that Solar one introduced strategic 
partnership with a semiconductor company which became the firm’s largest 
shareholder. The ownership of the semiconductor firm has brought in a new top 
management team (a new CEO and several new executives). According to remarks 
from Solar one’s CTO (who has been with the firm since 2000), the large 
semiconductor company is well regarded for its manufacturing R&D excellence, and 
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such influence is now evident on Solar one’s R&D, particularly in regard to the more 
systematic and performance-driven (e.g., targeting in cell efficiencies and yields) 
management. The messages of responding strategies from Solar one’s LTS in 2009 
also showed that the firm highlighted the role of improving operation management 
and process technologies through introducing the process know-how utilized in the 
semiconductor manufacturing process. 
 
Greenchild owner’s influence: attention on self-developed platform 
Greenchild’s owner has been characterised as a company interested in various 
technological innovation investments
67
.  As a diversified venture of a large 
electronics company, Greenchild is considered to have been backed by the parent 
company’s R&D resources. The firm’s R&D Head expressed the view that Greenchild 
has been able to leverage the R&D pool from the parent company
68
. For example, 
Greenchild’s parent company invested in several research centres with universities, 
and these R&D sources could be shared among several company ventures. In addition, 
considering its relatively small size in comparison to Solar one and FabPV, 
Greenchild actually invested more in R&D expense (as a percentage of sales and as 
an absolute amount) than either of them (Appendix 5-3). Further, while Solar one’s 
CTO admitted that the “Research” portion of the firm’s R&D activities was quite 
small, Greenchild’s R&D Head revealed that the firm’s “Research” accounted for 
around 30% of the R&D investment. The evidence of the firm’s LTS from 2007- 2011 
consistently delivers the message of the responding strategy of self-developed 
                                                     
67
 Greenchild’s parent company has been given an award for being the most innovative firm in Taiwan, 
based on the measures of new product development and its patent portfolio. Data sources are from 
Greenchild’s parent company’s annual reports, the comments from the third-party stakeholders and 
from various business news. 
68
 Greenchild’s R&D Head indicated that this is the reason why the firm could manage to develop 
different product lines (PV cell and module) and alternative PV technologies, given the firm’s relative 
small size compared to Solar one and FabPV. 
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technology platform
69
  
   
FabPV – no evident owner’s influence 
While the cases of Solar one and Greenchild suggest the strong influence of a single 
business group owner on the firms’ selective attention, the case of FabPV did not 
show the evident firm owner’s influence. FabPV had business group ownership when 
the firm was founded. However, unlike Greenchild, the ownership was not in the form 
of a diversified company venture, but rather in the form of a financial investment. In 
fact the main shareholder, a DRAM company, sold most of its share as soon as FabPV 
was IPO-listed in 2009. Since then, FabPV has had a more distributed ownership 
structure composed of of several VCs and various institutional investors. At first sight, 
FabPV’s previous business group owner’s interest in profiting from IPO seems to 
explain the firm attention focus on profitability, cost control and cash flow 
management highlighted in FabPV’s LTS in 2008. Yet after the exit of the main 
business group owner, the evidence from LTS showed no major change in the firm’s 
responding strategies. 
 
To what extent owners’ traits explain selective attention? 
 
The cases of Solar one and Greenchild suggest that their owners’ traits such as 
industry experience or research propensity may influence the firms’ selective attention 
in responding strategies. From a general perspective, the differences in the two firm 
owners’ industry experience appear to lead the prediction of differentiated attention 
towards exploitation (focused c-Si platform) or exploration (developing other 
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 Greenchild developed its manufacturing turn-key solution and owned a US granted PV module 
patent. 
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technologies): the semiconductor company (Solar one’s owner) is well- known for the 
process technologies, which corresponds to the propensity of improving c-Si 
manufacturing process; the electronic company (Greenchild’s owner) is famous for 
developing of electronic devices and systems, which can be associated with the 
inclination of exploring various technologies. However, the finding suggests that, 
while owners’ industry experience may explain the differences, it may not be 
sufficient to predict the orientation towards exploitation or exploration. In the case of 
Solar one, the semiconductor owner actually invested in a CIGS venture (an evidence 
of developing alternative and emerging PV technologies) in 2010. Therefore, the 
reason why Solar one didn’t invest in exploration for other PV technologies may lie in 
that the firms’ technology direction would need to be orchestrated with the 
semiconductor owner’s solar PV development strategy70.  
 
Summary 
 
Drawing on the attention-based view, the analysis of Section 5.2 focuses on 
examining to what extent firm-level characteristics - firm resources and ownership 
explain variation in selective attention (Ocasio, 1997). Firstly, the three firms’ 
resources comparison shows that there are two noticeable differences in production 
scale and degree of vertical integration. The analysis shows that both differences may 
not sufficiently explain the firms’ selective attention in responding strategies.  
 
Secondly, the firm ownership appears to be a more explanatory factor compared to 
firm resources in demonstrating firms’ variation in selective attention. However, the 
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 Solar one’s CTO implied that while the firm would be interested in emerging PV technologies such 
as CIGS, the firm owner had already invested in CIGS. Similar comments were confirmed by the 
firm’s deputy CFO. 
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analysis suggests that, the prediction of the influence of specific ownership 
characteristics (such as firm ownership type or owners’ industry experience) on firms’ 
selective attention can be subject to other moderating factor (such as owners’ goal for 
investment). The prediction can be varied in explaining firms’ distinct pattern in 
different time period. 
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5.3 Towards a causal combination view 
 
Section 5.3 starts with examining the influence of CEO’s experience on their selective 
attention and firms’ propensity in capability investments. Then Section 5.3 discusses 
how the causal combination view illustrates the analysis of firms’ capability 
investment patterns.    
 
CEO’s selective attention 
 
The investigation of CEO’ influence on firms’ attention focus draws from the classic 
concept of selective attention that individual decision makers’ knowledge, value and 
experience may affect how they attend to the environment and interpret the relevant 
issues.  The central role of CEO in firms’ strategic decisions has been emphasised s 
in Top management Team (TMT) and managerial capability studies (Finkelstein et al., 
2009; Teece, 2012). Specifically, founders’ or CEO’s prior experience has been 
considered as an important indicator in explaining how firms in the same industry are 
differentiated in terms of entrepreneurial focus (Cho & Hambrick, 2006), investment 
orientations (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002), or how they are constrained with investment 
choices (Fern, Cardinal, & O'Neill, 2011). 
 
Here the analysis focuses on the comparison of CEO’s experience, which is cross 
examined with their remarks (collated from their interviews on the business news) and 
these firms’ investment patterns.   
 
CEO’s experience in influencing market entry and exploratory investments –Solar 
one 
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In addition to the different pattern in capability investments (Table 5.4), a major 
difference among the three c-Si firms is the timing of their entry into the PV market. 
Solar one had a relatively early entry in 2000, but Greenchild and FabPV entered the 
market a few years later in around 2006, at the time when the solar PV market started 
to take off. Solar one’s vision of early entry into the PV industry was formed in the 
match between an entrepreneur’s attempt to transform the small electronics firm and a 
scientist’s observation of market opportunity. According to Solar one’s co-founder of 
the PV business (formerly a scientist working at the National Renewable Energy Lab 
in the US), back in 1997 he observed that the manufacturing technology of PV cells 
was close to the brink to mass production; while the German and Japanese 
Governments showed initial signs of providing generous government support, there 
were few players at the time (CW, 2005)
71
. This idea was supported by his college 
friend, Solar one’s founder, who was seeking to create new business for his small 
firm
72. The founding CEO’s entrepreneurial trait of developing new businesses may 
explain the firm’s exploration investments in the early years: Solar one’s investments 
in developing new capabilities were at their most active and diversified during his 
tenure up until 2007. 
 
CEO’ functional experience in influencing investment direction – FabPV and 
Greenchild 
 
                                                     
71
 This inspiration about of the PV industry is derived from the experience of working with PV 
technology at NREL: the co-founder described that the connection to some of the firm’s important 
customers was built when he worked as the UN (United Nation)’s technology consultant to several 
governments’ solar PV projects. 
72
 Solar one started as a small entrepreneurial firm designing and manufacturing testing equipment in 
1981. 
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While the unique experiences of Solar one’s two founders illustrates the firm’s early 
entry into the market and the diversified investment pattern, the prior working 
experience of Greenchild’s and FabPV’s CEO may also link to the two firms’ 
different investment directions, even considering their very similar market entry times. 
Unlike Solar one’s co-founder, the two CEOs had no prior experience in PV 
technologies, yet the clear distinction between a scientific background and 
management discipline shows in how they viewed PV market opportunity and their 
firm’s development direction.  
 
Greenchild’s CEO served as Chief Technology Officer at the firm’s parent company73. 
Before that he was chief scientist at Polaroid in the US. In a press interview in 2010, 
Greenchild’s Chairman/CEO expressed the view that in addition to current cell 
technologies and some new research projects (such as CZTS thin film), the firm may 
be interested in exploring the related areas of smart grid and storage technologies, 
particularly because solar PV is an intermittent energy source, and “smart grid can 
manage and adjust the misused electricity, which is the key to the future intelligent 
lifestyle” (Chiu, 2010). It is not surprising that the CEO initiated investment projects 
in emerging PV technologies and the downstream solar PV system.  
 
FabPV’s CEO served as Chief Information Officer in a large semiconductor company. 
As a senior executive in the semiconductor company, the Chairman/CEO had been 
well known for developing the company’s production and supply chain solution. In a 
press interview in 2010, the Chairman/CEO stated that “PV is expected to reach grid 
parity in 2011”, and that “cost, quality and operational excellence will be the key 
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 Greenchild’s founding CEO was appointed by the parent company in 2007, around two years after 
the firm was established.  
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competitive advantage in the PV industry.” (Huang, 2010). It is evident that the CEO 
has had the clear goal of being a professional c-Si cell manufacturer since founding 
the firm, which is consistent with the firm’s investment pattern of dedicating 
resources to c-Si cell technology.  
 
The observation of how the founding CEO’s prior experience differently influences 
the two firms’ investment directions is also supported by the VC’s (the investors of 
both firms) comments: “apart from the two firms’ financial performance indicators, 
Greenchild is influenced by the Chairman/CEO’s passion for technology, who 
personally owns numerous worldwide patents, although none of them are in the PV 
technologies”, and “FabPV’s is inherited with the CEO’s working style, who is the 
expert in the field of supply chain management“. 
 
Conditions for predicting the influence of CEO experience 
 
In the context of the three Taiwanese PV firms, the finding suggests that CEO’s prior 
experience may influence their firms’ selective attention and serve as an indicator to 
discriminating firms’ capability investment directions. However, the perspective of 
“priming effect”74 in interpreting successful experience suggests that, it appears to be 
easier to attribute the CEO effect based on the historical data, because it is such an 
obvious target to associate with the firm’s strategic orientation; particularly if the 
targeted firm analysis was a success story. The influence of CEO experience could be 
overemphasised because of the coincidence of timing and luck (March, 2010). For 
example, in the case of Solar one, although CEO’s related PV industry experience 
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 There is a specific meaning defining the priming effect in behavioural decision theory: it refers to 
one of the anchoring biases; the influence of the target anchor in the judgment process. 
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appears to have helped the early detection of market entry timing, the CEO (the 
Scientist of NREL) revealed that he didn’t expect the PV market to reach today’s 
scale, and that it was “luck” to discover the opportunity in his “accessible working 
environment” and to develop the business at the right time (with the support from his 
friend’s business). 
 
Further, there are some conditions for the prediction of CEO’s influence in the 
specific context of Taiwanese PV industry. Firstly, there is the similarity of seniority 
as an experienced professional in terms of both industry reputation and networks. 
These CEOs are characterized as being middle-aged entrepreneurs
75
. Most of them 
entered the PV business in their 50s, pursuing a new career path in the PV industry 
after retiring from firms (in large business groups) or research institutes. As the 
growing PV market has attracted a surge of investment funding for new entry firms 
(Bloomberg, 2010, 2011a; PIDA, 2011; Selya & Robert, 2010; WealthPress, 2005, 
2009) in the past few years
76
, the seniority of these CEOs indicates the importance of 
access to capital in the PV industry. Secondly, the condition to link their dominant 
influence with the firms’ investment orientation is their structural position both as 
Chairmen and CEOs, implying the interest alignment of the ownership and the power 
concentration in the firms (Table 5.4) 
 
Table 5.4 Comparison of three firms’ CEO and capability investment pattern 
                                                     
75
It seems to be common among Taiwanese PV firms: besides the three case firms, a similar case is 
found in the other two case firms and several other PV firms.  
76
 In fact, apart from Solar one, the vast majority of the Taiwanese PV cell firms entered the market 
after 2005. 
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Source: the three firms’ annual reports, business news and complied from the author. 
 
Towards a causal combination view 
 
The findings from Section 5.2 show that firm characteristics such as resources and 
ownership may have influences on firms’ selective attention yet not sufficiently 
explain each firm’s distinct pattern. In Section 5.3, the finding from CEO’s selective 
attention suggests that, despite CEO’s experience seems to be a more viable indicator 
explaining these firms’ variation in investment direction, there are still certain 
conditions for predicting the influence of CEO’s prior experience on firms’ new 
capability investments in the specific context of Taiwanese PV industry. 
 
From the perspective of seeking a contextual description of each firm’s unique pattern, 
the findings from Chapter 5 are consistent with the “attention-based view” in which 
the basic claim that organizational factors “may shape but not necessarily determine” 
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selective attention is emphasised in explaining firms’ decision behaviour. 
 
However, for the purpose of constructing a more stylized analysis to explain the  
interaction effect of these organizational factors, here the framework of “causal 
combination view” is proposed: Table 5.5 presents a simplified presentation of “truth 
table” (Ragin, 1994a, 2007) summarising the empirical investigations of the three c-Si 
firms. The emphasis is on comparing the similarities and differences of these factors 
to identify sources of variation. The element of “timing” is incorporated in the 
joint-assessment of causal factors.     
 
Table 5.5  The comparison of three firms’ causal combination pattern 
 
 
P.S: “1” stands for the presence of the investigated factor; and “0” stands for none.  
Sources: the author  
 
Firstly, from Table 5.5, there are some factors that can be identified as irrelevant in 
explaining firms’ variation in capability investment pattern. These factors include 
differentiated technologies and financing strength. Then with respect to “intention in 
developing new capabilities” in selective attention, it shows that three firms’ LTS in 
2011 can be irrelevant in explaining firms’ variation.  
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Secondly, Solar one is a positive case showing the relevance between selective 
attention and investment in new capabilities in the period of 2007-2008. The causal 
combination includes the factors of access to customers and CEO experience. The 
resources factor of access to customers appears to be critical in differentiating 
attention focus, which is highly related to the value proposition in the PV industry, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
Thirdly, FabPV is the negative case for new capability investments but a conforming 
case for the relevance between selective attention and investment pattern. The 
noticeable factor to differentiate FabPV from the two firms is CEO experience, which 
is also shared in Solar one and Greenchild’s causal combination. This finding indeed 
supports the statement that CEO experience can be a plausible indicator predicting 
firms’ new capability investment pattern in the context of the three Taiwanese PV 
firms. 
 
Finally, Greenchild is another positive case showing the relevance between selective 
attention and investment in new capabilities roughly in the period 2009-2011. The 
causal combination includes the factors of “lacking scales and operational 
excellence”, owners’ orientation and CEO experience.  However, Greenchild is not 
necessarily a fully conforming case demonstrating the relevance between selective 
attention and new capability investments for two reasons. The first is that the evidence 
of selective attention only partially links to the timing of new capability investment 
(no evidence of selective attention in 2011 yet with evidence of new capability 
investments). The second is that there is a three-year time lag in connecting the 
factors of owner‘s orientation and CEO experience to the firm’s investments in new 
capability development. 
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Summary 
 
The finding from Section 5.3 shows that there is evidence of CEO selective attention 
among the three firms. While the analysis suggests that CEO’s experience appears to 
be a more viable indicator than other firm-level factors (such as firm resources and 
ownership) in illustrating firms’ variation in capability investment pattern, such 
prediction can be limited to certain conditions in the specific industry context.  
 
In advancing the analysis of firm level selective attention and capability investment 
pattern, Section 5.3 further proposes that the framework of “casual combination view” 
may provide a more stylized analysis for explaining how the interaction effect of 
these organizational factors influences firms’ distinct pattern.    
 
In answering the research questions “What is the role of framing in the 
decision-making process for new capability investments, and what factors may 
influence the role of framing in such process?” the findings from Chapter 5 show that 
there is evidence of firm–level selection attention and that the causal combination 
view reveals different influences of the firms’ specific context in different time 
periods. However, the analysis suggests that such differentiated framing exists but 
does not sufficiently explain firms’ decision pattern of capability investments. 
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<Appendix 5-1  Three firms’ Sales and EPS Trend> 
 
Three firms’ Sales trends 
 
 
Three firms’ EPS trends 
 
Source: firms’ annual reports, compiled by the author. 
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<Appendix 5-2  Three firms’ new product releases> 
 
 
Source: the firms’ annual reports and press releases, compiled by the author. 
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<Appendix 5-3  Three firms’ R& D expense comparison> 
 
Three firms’ R&D Expenses 2006-2011 
 
 
Three firms’ R&D Expenses 2006-2011 (percentage of sales) 
 
Source: firms’ annual reports, compiled by the author. 
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Chapter 6 
Selective Attention at the Senior Manager Level 
 
Introduction 
 
In addressing the research questions “What is the role of framing in the 
decision-making process for new capability investment, and what factors may 
influence the role of framing in such process?”Chapter 6 focuses on selective 
attention at the decision maker level with the empirical investigation of senior R&D 
and finance managers from the five Taiwanese solar PV firms.  
 
As Chapter 6 employs an integrative view for the decision-maker level of analysis, the 
definition of framing in Chapter 6 incorporates both the organizational decision 
perspective of selective attention and behavioural decision perspective of heuristic 
judgement. This Chapter focuses on investigating factors that may influence selective 
attention at the senior manager level and examining how selective attention at senior 
manager level influences the judgment and decision process.  
 
Section 6.1 starts with investigating the presence of selective attention which is 
examined by the patterns of opportunity recognition at senior manager level. There 
are three indicators for the investigation of opportunity recognition: responses to 
short-term market signals, evaluation of long-term market scenario and attention 
towards technology development.  
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Section 6.2 examines to what extent senior managers’ selective attention is relevant to 
firms’ decisions process for capability investments. Firstly, it analyzes senior 
managers’ attitude towards competitors to illustrate why such selective attention may 
not necessarily be relevant to explain firms’ decision patterns. Secondly, it examines 
senior managers’ responses on the firms’ search activities. The investigation of firms’ 
search activities is employed as the measure of firms’ propensity to explore and 
develop new capabilities. Section 6.2 discusses to what extent the firms’ search 
patterns are influenced by senior managers’ selective attention.  
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6.1 Selective attention in opportunity recognition 
 
Extant studies use two different directions in evaluating selective attention at the 
senior manager level. Firstly, a number of studies from various industry sectors 
suggest that senior managers’ functional roles and working experience influence their 
problem-framing and opportunity-recognition
77
. For example, in a study of 4 bankers 
and 4 entrepreneurs, the authors found that while entrepreneurs tended to focus more 
on controlling the “return” of the decision outcome, bankers tended to focus on 
controlling the “risk” involved in the decision problem (Sarasvathy et al., 1998). The 
study of 9 executives from the marketing service and life science industries found that 
individuals’ prior knowledge may have significant influence in the cognitive process 
of opportunity recognition (Gregoire et al., 2009). In another study of 8 CFOs and 
VPs from the diversified food industry, the author found that these executives differed 
in their attention to business issues and the assessment of acquisition targets. Further, 
a similar line of reasoning is found among executives with the same functional role, 
which suggests that there is a “shared expertise” in corporate functional areas (Melone, 
1994). 
 
Secondly, other studies emphasise the organizational-level influence on senior 
mangers’ perception and problem-framing in the decision process. For example, the 
study of 23 executives in a large manufacturing company found that executives’ 
problem-recognition is associated with their departmental affiliation. The authors then 
propose that senior managers’ selective attention is a learned response driven by the 
goals and motivations of their departments (Dearborn & Simon, 1958). Studies 
emphasizing the influence of the decision context suggest that senior managers’ 
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 These studies employed the verbal protocol methodology. 
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attention focus and opportunity recognition is shaped by the organization’s 
characteristics. For example, the study of 30 firms in the airline industry found that 
the attention towards regulatory change was influenced not only by the firm’s TMT’s 
experience but also by the incentive structure in the organization (Cho & Hambrick, 
2006). In another study of firms in the telecommunications equipment industry, the 
authors found that CEOs’ attention towards the emerging fibre-optic technology was 
influenced by the firm’s propensities towards market entry time and the firms’ 
capabilities (measured by their years of experience in that area) (Eggers & Kaplan, 
2008; Kaplan, 2008a). 
 
Here senior managers’ selective attention is examined by opportunity recognition 
which is relevant to how senior managers perceived the environmental uncertainty in 
the decision –making process for new capability investments. There are three 
indicators for the investigation of opportunity recognition: responses to short-term 
market signals, evaluation of long-term market scenario and attention towards 
technology development. There are 8 senior managers – 4 senior R&D managers and 
4 senior finance and business managers participating (individually) in the in-depth 
interviews.  The analysis emphasises similarities and differences among senior 
managers and is cross –examined with their functional roles, professional experience 
and firm affiliation.  
 
Responses to market signals 
 
There are four categories of market signals
78
including macroeconomic conditions, 
policy announcement, technology progress and PV industry/market indicators.  
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 These signals are also reviewed by the industry experts before the interview. 
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Senior managers were asked to indicate the relative importance of these signals on 
their firms’ new capability investments and describe the reasons, particularly for those 
signals identified as very important or unimportant (Table 6.1). 
 
Table 6.1 Market signal analysis 
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Source: interviews and compiled by the author. 
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The influence of functional roles 
 
Among the four categories of market signals, the noticeable difference in dividing two 
functional groups (R&D and finance) lies in how they viewed the impact of 
“predictions of economic outlook” and “industry competitors’ price cuts” on their 
firms’ new investment decisions: the three senior managers with finance/business79 
roles appeared to be more sensitive to the effect of policy and market uncertainty on 
investment decisions. These senior finance managers agreed that economic condition 
was one of the most critical factors influencing their firm’s new investment decisions. 
On the other hand, senior R&D managers similarly described that the economic 
outlook would not affect their firm’s decisions in terms of new technology 
investments, although they admitted that the economic situation might affect cost 
issues in their new investment projects. 
 
The influence of prior working experience 
 
While these senior finance managers expressed a similar attention direction towards 
the external environment, they reported different action assessments on the signals of 
economic impact. The differences can be traced from their working experience. Solar 
one’s deputy CFO said:”we always incorporate the economic factors into our 
investment evaluation model”. Before attaining his position in Solar one, the deputy 
CFO worked as an analyst in an investment bank. FabPV’s CFO described that 
“sometimes the bad economic condition may just be the good timing for new 
                                                     
79
 There is no CFO (only an accounting manager) in Amorphous. The General Manager oversees the 
role of CFO (particularly in investment decisions). 
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investments – as long as we have a sufficient cash position during the recession”. 
Prior to FabPV, the CFO had been CFO of several electronic firms and had a 
reputation for operating financial derivatives and hedging on the foreign exchange
80
. 
Amorphous’ GM stated that “under the condition of a gloomy economic outlook, we 
might consider postponing new investments”. The GM worked at the research 
institute and was not involved with finance or business functions before he gained his 
position at Amorphous. According to
 
third-party interviewees (VC and MOEA), the 
small thin film firm has been under pressure during the industry downturn, and 
withdrew from its emerging stock listing market in 2011. 
 
The influence of current working context 
  
The influence of the individual’s current working context shows in the response to 
project deployment announcement. Only Newsun’s VC BOD and Amorphous’ R&D 
Head indicated that this signal would significantly impact on the firms’ new 
investment decisions. The two senior managers’ interpretations of this market signal 
are highly related to their specific experience in current working context: Newsun’s 
BOD has been in charge of his VC firm’s solar PV investment projects for the past 
few years. In view of the recent industry downturn, signals of a worldwide large-scale 
PV deployment would be a critical factor in justifying his judgment about the 
potential of their investment projects. Similarly, Amorphous’ R&D Head has been 
promoting the BIPV project in the firm; however the firm’s GM recently had some 
doubts on the potential of this market segments. Thus positive news about BIPV 
deployment would help to endorse the R&D Head’s position. 
                                                     
80
 According to the senior finance manager of another electronic company (informal interviewee, who 
has worked with FabPV’s CFO). 
172 
 
 
Finally, while senior R&D managers’ functional roles certainly lead their attention 
direction towards technological progress, only Greenchild’s R&D Head indicated that 
the signal of a lab report was critical to the firm’s investment decisions. The other 
senior R&D managers didn’t consider the lab report to be a signal affecting their firms’ 
decisions for the reason that it would involve a long lead-time from lab results 
through to mass production. Given the fact that at least two of the other three senior 
R&D managers at Solar one and Amorphous similarly possessed relevant PhD and 
research experience, Greenchild’s response may reflect the firm’s relatively intensive 
research activities (around 30% of research in R&D) compared to the other two 
firms
81
. 
 
Market scenario 
  
Among the four scenarios
82
, senior managers were asked to provide ranking and 
explanations for the most probable scenario in the next five years (Figure 6.1). 
 
Fig 6.1 Scenario analysis 
                                                     
81
 Greenchild’s RD Head also recognized the fact that lab reports do not necessarily influence current 
market, but he still stressed its importance in influencing the firm’s evaluation for new technology 
investments.  
82
 These scenarios are reviewed by the industry experts before the interview. 
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Source: interviews and compiled by the author.  
 
Under the general convergence trend towards the direction of policy driven scenario, 
the slight differences in the market scenario still show firm-specific patterns; 
particularly in the two contrasting cases of Solar one and Amorphous
83
. In separate 
interviews, Solar one’s CTO and Deputy CFO selected the same scenario – D 
(transforming prospect). Meanwhile, in separate interviews with Amorphous’ R&D 
Head and GM, both senior managers selected the same scenario – B (policy driven) – 
despite the two senior managers’ opposite views regarding the firm’s BIPV 
development
84
. Solar one’s two senior managers were both optimistic about future 
developments in the PV industry and the opportunities for c-Si products. Yet 
Amorphous’ R&D Head and GM both expressed a less optimistic view about market 
trends, and less certainty about the direction of thin film products. One contrasting 
fact about the two firms is that while Solar one is a worldwide top ten c-Si firm, 
Amorphous is a small thin film firm struggling to survive in the face of serious price 
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 Firm-specific patterns are also visible in Newsun. Only one senior manager from Greenchild and 
FabPV respectively participated in the scenario analysis.   
84
 While the R&D Head considers BIPV to be a potential niche market for the firm, the GM thinks 
otherwise and is convinced that the volume-driven market is still the right strategy.     
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competition from c-Si firms. These senior managers’ framing of future trends can be 
affected by the firm’s current competitive status in the industry. 
 
As for Newsun, despite the firm’s current dedication to CIGS thin film technology, 
neither the CSO nor the BOD particularly considered that the development pace of 
emerging PV technologies (such as CIGS thin film) would be accelerated in the next 
few years. In fact, their selection of scenario B (policy driven) more or less reflects 
the current situation of Newsun: since their inception in 2007, the firm has not 
achieved mass production of CIGS; also, the potential market for CIGS is expected to 
be dampened by current industry downturn
85
. 
 
The technical and research experience of senior R&D managers may not necessarily 
reflect their views on future scenarios: the three senior R&D managers from Solar 
one’s, Amorphous and Greenchild all possess PhDs related to PV technologies, and all 
worked in the same research institute before joining their firms, yet they selected three 
different scenarios. Specifically, Greenchild’s R&D Head’s selection of scenario C 
(technology driven) is consistent with the firm’s interest in pursuing technological 
leadership. In fact, this senior R&D manager’s own expertise is in the field of c-Si 
technology
86
 but he still acknowledged the accelerated development of emerging PV 
technologies compared to the other two managers. His comments are evidently 
influenced by the firm’s current projects in CZTS and CIGS technologies. 
 
Attitude towards PV technology development 
                                                     
85
However, the case of Newsun may not necessarily represent the firm’s pattern as in the case of Solar 
one and Amorphous, because Newsun’s BOD is not involved in the firm’s daily operation.  
86
 The R&D Head has a c-Si patent (under the firm’s name) and the CIGS project was later allocated to 
a new division. 
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In the interviews of attitude towards PV technology development, senior managers 
were asked to provide comments on the direction and potential of PV technologies in 
the next five years (Table 6.2). 
 
Table 6.2 Perception towards PV technology development in the next five years 
 
Source: interviews and compiled by the author. 
 
The influence of functional role 
  
Although all senior managers generally agreed that the c-Si platform would be more 
likely to dominate the PV market in the near future, senior managers’ functional roles 
firstly appear to differentiate their ways of assessing the potential of PV technologies 
in the next five years. The finding shows that while senior R&D managers tend to 
focus on the performance or the advantageous elements of the technologies, senior 
finance and business managers tend to evaluate the technologies more on the aspects 
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of markets and applications. For example, two senior finance/business managers
87
 - 
FabPV’s CFO and Newsun’s VC BOD similarly commented that different PV 
technologies (including a-Si/-Si and CIGS thin film, and even CPV – Concentrator 
PV cells) all have distinct market potential, because PV technologies are 
application-oriented. Yet the four senior R&D managers’ comments appear to be more 
restricted to the perspective of their firms’ current technology platform. Basically, the 
four senior R&D managers held reserved opinion on the potential of CPV and other 
PV technologies in the next five years. For example, senior R&D managers of the two 
thin film firms (Amorphous and Newsun) were more negative about the competing 
thin film technologies and emphasising the potential technological advantages of their 
firms’ thin film technology over the next few years88. Generally, these senior R&D 
managers’ comments about the potential of PV technology development reflect the 
focal R&D issues and goals of the firms’ domain technologies89. 
 
The influence of firm context 
 
The three senior R&D managers of Solar one, Amorphous and Greenchild have 
similar educational, technical and research experience, yet their views on 
technological opportunities are different. For example, when comparing the senior 
R&D managers of the two c-Si firms it is interesting to note that while Solar one’s 
CTO noticed issues along the supply value chain and acknowledged the cost-down 
                                                     
87
 Amorphous’ GM didn’t provide specific answers. Solar one’s deputy CFO expressed his 
unfamiliarity with PV technologies (he was new to the industry). 
88
 It is interesting the two senior managers expressed strong negative views towards the other thin film 
technology that the firm didn’t choose in the first place.   
89
 As discussed in Chapter 5, key R&D issues and goals for the c-S- technology include new materials 
and development of new cell structures. In this sense, the Solar one CTO’s response appears to be more 
concerned with the overall PV industry, which can be related to the firm’s current product offerings. 
Key R&D goals and issues for thin film technologies include the improved deposition technique and 
low cost packaging. For CIGS thin film, although the potential for efficacy is higher than a-S- thin film, 
there is another issue regarding improved stability for commercial-scale production. 
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potential from downstream PV systems, Greenchild’s R&D Head emphasised the 
development of related c-Si cell technologies such as new materials for conductive 
paste and new cell structures. Therefore, although senior R&D managers in the same 
industry (and the same technology group) may share opinions on the general direction 
of technological development, their propensity of viewing future opportunities may 
still diverge and are not necessarily determined by their technical and research 
experience. Rather, their perspectives may be more influenced by the firm- specific 
context such as the possession of resources and capabilities
90
.  
 
Summary 
 
The findings from assessment of senior managers’ opportunity recognition suggest 
that there is selective attention at the senior manager level. Specifically, senior 
managers’ responses to short-term market signals suggest that their initial attention 
towards the external environment is associated with their functional roles. The 
divergence between different corporate functional roles also shows in the basic 
approach of how senior managers assess the potential of technologies. 
 
The influence of senior managers’ current organizational context is particularly 
revealed in market scenario analysis. The evidence suggests that senior managers’ 
framing of the long-term prospect can be more related to the firms’ specific context 
rather than senior managers’ functional roles of prior working experience91. This 
                                                     
90
 Compared with Greenchild, Solar one is superior in vertical integration and access to customers as 
discussed in Chapter 6. Although in Chapter 6, the comparison of resources and capabilities is 
conducted for the three c-Si firms only – but the differences in firm scale and performance between 
Solar one and the thin film firm Amorphous are obvious. 
91
 As for the possible effect of tenure on the influence of the corporate perspective, data shows that the 
four senior R&D managers are indeed the firms’ founding management team. However, the two senior 
finance managers are relatively new to the firms compared to the R&D managers, and have no prior 
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finding is in line with senior R&D managers’ attitudes towards technology: their 
opportunity recognition of PV technology development over the five years is more 
influenced by firm –specific context, such as the choice of domain technology and 
current resources/capabilities, rather than their technical and research experience. 
 
As discussed earlier, the concept of selective attention proposes the heterogeneity of 
the judgment and decision process among firms by using two categories of 
explanation: the pattern can be influenced by individuals’ characteristics in perceiving 
the environment, or the pattern can be more driven by the mechanism of 
organizational identification. Here the findings suggest that senior managers’ 
discrimination regarding short-term salient signals and effects can be generally 
predicted from their functional roles and prior working experience. However, in terms 
of framing long-term opportunity, organizational context can be more influential in 
the effect of selective attention.  
 
This finding is supported by both behavioural decision and TMT perspectives: firstly, 
the accessibility of the decision context suggests that individual decision makers’ 
(senior managers) perception can be influenced by their specific organizational 
context (Kahneman, 2003b). Secondly, the process of acquiring experience from an 
organization suggests that senior managers can adapt to the familiar stimuli present in 
their organizational context (Starbuck & Milliken 1988).  
 
However, this finding can be better explained by the concept of decision makers using 
different frames in the framing process. In perceiving opportunities, functional roles 
                                                                                                                                                        
experience in the PV industry. In the interviews, both the CFO of FabPV and the senior finance 
manager of Solar one showed attempts to learn about the industry and adapt to the firm’s culture – 
which may also illustrate a strong corporate influence – despite their relatively short tenure in the firm. 
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and prior working experience can be acted as “background” filters (Starbuck & 
Milliken, 1988). Thus role-based expertise may be associated with the initial search 
and scanning of the opportunities. However, the expertise associated with professional 
training and experience may not always be the effective frame to use for decisions 
under uncertainties (Kahneman & Klein, 2009; March, 2010). The “foreground” 
filters, including the organization’s goals, expectations and operating procedures 
(Cyert & March, 1992) may impose a greater influence on judgment and 
implementation strategies, which would be reinforced over time. Therefore, when 
faced with making decisions under uncertainties in the same organization, the 
background filters (expertise) may tend to be diminished while the frame derived 
from the foreground filters prevails. The implication for firms’ decision for new 
capability investments is that selective attention at senior manager level may not be as 
influential as selective attention in the organization. 
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6.2 Why selective attention may not necessarily be sufficient 
 
In the interviews, senior managers indicated that competitors’ moves are the most 
salient signals that may influence the firm’s investment decisions regarding new 
technologies. In the analysis of selective attention towards competition, senior 
managers’ comments are compared with relevant objective data about their targeted 
competitors. 
 
Perception towards competitors 
 
The senior managers of two large c-Si firms – Solar one and FabPV – considered 
their competitors based on their comparative position in the worldwide PV cell 
shipment.  Thus the first-tier Chinese c-Si PV cell firms are regarded as their 
competitors. Although the senior managers of Solar one and FabPV declined to 
directly name specific firms
92
, it is reasonable to compare the top two Chinese c-Si 
with Solar one and FabPV (Table 6.3). 
 
Table 6.3 Solar one and FabPV in comparison with perceived competitors 
                                                     
92
 Even with the confidentiality promise in conducting the interview, as senior executives of the public 
firms, they were conscious about their comments on their peer firms. But they did mention the term of 
“first-tier Chinese firms” as main competitors.   
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Source: firms’ annual reports, various industry sources and compiled by the author. 
 
Firstly, the two firms’ senior managers’ remarks about their Chinese competitors’ 
financing capabilities appear to be correct. According to comments from Solar one’s 
deputy CFO and FabPV’s CFO, given the recent tide of bankruptcies in the solar PV 
industry, financial strength – particularly liquidity – is important during periods of 
industry downturn. Indeed, financial data shows that generally the two Chinese firms 
have much higher debt/equity ratios than Solar one and FabPV (Nomura, 2011). But 
secondly, their comments about the top Chinese firms’ technological investments 
seem to be leaning towards the impression of
 
second-tier Chinese PV firms. Although 
Solar one’s CTO admitted that one of the first-tier Chinese PV firms – Suntech – is 
leading in terms of patenting, both he and FabPV’s CFO claimed that Chinese PV 
firms were generally behind in terms of quality manufacturing and were inclined to 
buy external technologies rather than develop their own due to the high turnover rate 
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of skilled engineers. From the patent application record, it indeed seems that JA Solar 
did not focus on patenting in comparison to other firms over the past few years. Yet 
the firm had much higher sales and better margins, and actually increased its R&D 
spending in 2011 (while all other firms reduced R&D expenses in the same year). In 
fact, JA Solar enjoyed such impressive growth during the industry downturn in 2011 
that the firm recently announced its R&D partnership with one of China’s leading 
research institutes (EnergyTrend, 2012). As for the other firm – Suntech – the firm has 
apparently invested more in R&D than its counterparts. The propensity to emphasize 
technological development is considered to be associated with the firm’s long-term 
collaboration with academia (the University of New South Wales in Australia, one of 
the pioneer research institutes in PV technology). Moreover, compared to the two 
Taiwanese firms- Solar one and FabPV, Suntech has higher numbers of patents, in 
more diversified categories in terms of IPC
93
. 
 
Greenchild’s R&D Head also said that the firm’s competitors were first-tier 
Taiwanese firms (he particularly indicated FabPV in this remark) in terms of business, 
and the leading German PV firm – Q-cells – in terms of technology (Table 6.4). 
Q-cells has long been regarded as the technology leader in the PV industry: the firm 
has invested in diversified PV technologies, including c-Si, a-Si thin film and CIGS 
thin film technologies
94
. In terms of patent records, Q-cells leads by some significant 
distance from Greenchild. The fact that Greenchild’s R&D Head perceives Q-cells to 
be their competitor implies the firm’s value in terms of technology leadership. Rather 
than viewing Q-cells as a direct business competitor, Greenchild’s R&D Head 
                                                     
93
 Although patents may not necessarily constitute barriers in the industry, they do represent 
technology investments. 
94
 However, recently the firm has suffered from huge losses and has just filed for bankruptcy 
protection (a few months after my interview with Greenchild’s R&D Head). 
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admitted that it would be more appropriate to refer to them as supplying a technology 
benchmark for the industry. 
  
Table 6.4 Greenchild in comparison with perceived competitors 
 
Source: firms’ annual reports, various industry sources and compiled by the author. 
 
A similar situation applied to the case of the R&D Head of Amorphous. The senior 
manager consider Taiwanese a-Si thin film firm –Nextpower as the main competitors. 
Yet he admitted that this competitor is much bigger in terms of capacity and patenting 
(Table 6.5). Thus the senior R&D manager said that he also regards the competitor as 
a reference point in terms of production and technological progress for a-Si thin-film 
products. 
 
Table 6.5 Amorphous in comparison with perceived competitors 
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Source: firms’ annual reports, various industry sources and compiled by the author. 
 
The CSO from the CIGS firm Newsun mentioned Miasole – a US CIGS thin film 
firm – as being their competitor (Table 6.6). However, Miasole is a high-profile CIGS 
firm with an aggressive patenting strategy (67 US patent applications and 15 granted 
patents), while Newsun has zero patent applications up to now. Besides this huge gap 
in patenting, the two firms adopt different manufacturing technologies for CIGS thin 
film products
95
. 
 
Table 6.6 Newsun in comparison with perceived competitors 
                                                     
95
 The two firms’ CIGS thin film production is similarly based on the “continuous sputtering process”, 
but with different proprietary process technology.   
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Source: firms’ annual reports, various industry sources and compiled by the author. 
 
These senior managers’ perception of their competitors reflects how they position 
their firms in the industry. They tend to view competition in terms of their firms’ 
current position within the industry. Basically, their views appear to map the standard 
grouping of players in various PV industry analyses (EPIA, 2011; IEA, 2010; MOEA, 
2010). For example, senior managers of the three c-Si firms did not consider the 
emerging PV technology firms or the new vertically-integrated PV firms (from 
upstream or downstream) as potential competitors. Senior managers of the two thin 
film firms did not consider c-Si firms to be competitors; however, according to senior 
managers’ (Amorphous’ GM and Newsun’s CSO) remarks about their potential market, 
their target markets place them in direct competition with the c-Si firms. These firms’ 
definition of competitors tends to be limited to the firm’s current business focus.  
Further, their interpretation of the competition effect may not necessarily reflect the 
targeted competitors’ behaviour. Therefore, despite these managers’ claims about the 
influence of their competitors’ moves on their investments in developing new 
capabilities, in reality these firms’ decision behaviours may not necessarily be 
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predicted as being influenced by the actions of their perceived competitors.  
 
The anchoring bias 
 
As competitors are perceived as reference points for industry development or as 
internal justification of the firm’s strategic action, here the biased perception towards 
competitors can be illustrated by the insufficient adjustment from the anchoring 
heuristics
96
 . In fact, the choice of a target anchor may not necessarily be an issue if 
decision makers are aware of the anchoring effect (Kahneman, 2011). But problems 
arise when senior managers only selectively compared certain aspects of the 
competitors with their firms’ perceived position in the industry. The difficulty of 
adjusting these anchoring biases suggests that problems may occur in the evaluation 
of the complex system (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, when comparing 
competitors’ successful strategic action, senior managers may overestimate the 
probability that the same strategy would succeed in their organisations, given biased 
belief that their firms are equipped with similar or superior resources and capabilities. 
For example, it could be misleading for Amorphous to pursue the same strategy as 
Nextpower. On the other hand, senior managers may underestimate the risk associated 
with a particular product strategy adopted by the competitors, given biased belief that 
every part of the project would function as expected.  While the risk in parts of the 
project may look low, the overall failure rate for the project could be much higher in 
different organisations. For example, while anchoring Q-cells’ success in developing 
both c-Si-and thin-film technologies, the risk for Greenchild to adopt the same 
product strategy could be much higher
97
.  
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 Please see the discussion of anchoring heuristic in Chapter 2. 
97
 Although Q-cells announced bankruptcy in 2012, the firm’s technological capability was still a 
valuable asset when the firm was required by a Korean PV firm later. 
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Search activities 
 
Here five search activities including collaboration with research community, 
referencing worldwide technology roadmap, experimental projects, working with 
active customers and working with outside technology partners are examines. These 
activities are selected because they are relevant to exploration and new capability 
development in the firms
98
.  The four senior R&D managers were asked to provide 
the weightings and comments on the relative importance of these search activities to 
their firms (Table 6.7). Basically all these senior managers are the head of R&D 
department, therefore their answers should reasonable represent their firms’ search 
activities both in the planning and execution aspect. Their responses are also 
cross-examined with their firms’ data and third-party interviewees’ comments.  
 
Table 6.7 Firms’ search activities 
 
The author summarized these weightings based on senior managers’ evaluation: the comparison of their 
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 In the interviews, I also checked with the senior managers if there are other search activities in their 
firms. They responded that basically the listed items basically cover all the current activities. . 
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firms’ search activities.  
★ :Less important; ★★:Important; ★★★:Relatively important.. 
Sources: interviews and compiled by the author. 
 
Roadmap 
 
Among the five search activities, the four senior R&D managers similarly indicated 
that referencing the industry technology roadmap is the most important search activity. 
In regard to the two c-Si firms, there is an industry-standard roadmap for c-Si 
technologies, and the two senior R&D managers regard this roadmap as a guide for 
their technology development and planning process
99
 Although there is no standard 
industry roadmap for thin film technologies due to the variety of the technologies 
involved and the limited industry participants, Amorphous’ R&D Head said he 
collected various industry sources and self-compiled the technology roadmap. As for 
Newsun, the CSO said that although he considered the current CIGS technology 
roadmap to be mostly just claimed lab results (because of the lack of evidence on 
volume shipments), the technology roadmap (from different industry sources) is still 
the firm’s number one reference point in projecting the firm’s technological progress. 
The fact that referencing shared worldwide technology roadmap is the most highly 
weighted search activities among firms implies the common industry influence on 
firms’ attention towards the technological progress.  This factor provides support for 
illustrating firms’ similarities in capability investment pattern as discussed in Chapter 
5. 
                                                     
99
 They all pointed to the same industry sources, such as the ITRPV-International Technology 
Roadmap for Photovoltaic) SEMI. 2011. International Technology Roadmap for Photovoltaic 
(ITRPV.net): SEMI PV Group , SEMI. 2012. International Technology Roadmap for Photovoltaic 
(ITRPV.net)SEMI PV Group.. 
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Working with active customers 
 
This activity was generally weighted second to the activity of reference roadmap 
among the four firms. Basically, the search activity of working with active customers 
could be related to the propensity of exploring opportunities from downstream PV 
system.  These senior managers’ comments only partially reflect their firms’ 
experience in accessing customers and propensity in developing related capabilities. 
For example, while Solar one does have more experience in reaching end customers 
than other firms, Amorphous’ response is consistent with the firm’s recent BIPV 
(footnote) project. Greecndhild’s response of “short-term only collaboration” implies 
that working with active customers may not be considered as critical in the firm’s 
search activity. In fact, the firm did announce the related investment in downstream 
system in 2011. As for Newsun, although the senior manger indicated the importance 
of this activity, the firm has not had evident activity working with customers since the 
firm’s inception in 2007100. 
 
Collaboration with research community 
  
Two distinct patterns are found among the four senior R&D manager in the  
collaboration with the research community: while the senior R&D managers of Solar 
one, Greenchild and Amorphous all stated the importance of working with research 
communities in searching for new technological opportunities, Newsun’s CSO (also a 
former R&D Head) stated that collaboration with research communities was not 
necessarily critical, for the following reasons: firstly, the current threshold for the 
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 The comments are from Newsun’s BOD (also a VC) and from other third –party interviewees.  
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firm’s CIGS thin film technology is the volume production process, which is not 
necessarily something that can be addressed by the research community; and secondly 
the academia/research institutes in Taiwan are usually not equipped with the 
appropriate environment. From the firm’s perspective, and judging by its current 
situation, these reasons sound legitimate for Newsun. However, as the senior manager 
emphasises the importance of resolving the firm’s current technology problems, he 
may overlook the potential value of the research environment in exploring new ideas, 
something that is more appreciated by the other three R&D managers. 
 
Similarly, two different patterns are reflected in these senior managers’ attitudes 
towards the partnership with the research community in MOEA projects. On the one 
hand, Newsun’s CSO stated that the main purpose of applying for government 
projects was for better public relations, and that the partnership with research 
communities merely follows the requirements for MOEA projects
101
. On the other 
hand, the other three senior R&D managers considered the collaboration with research 
communities in MOEA projects to be critical: Amorphous’ R&D Head said that he 
worked closely with a professor’s research team in the firm’s a-Si/-Si thin film 
project; Solar one’s CTO confirmed that the firm utilized the small c-Si cell 
production line in ITRI for experiments on new cell structures
102
; and Greenchild’s 
R&D Head stated that the firm worked with two different research centres in ITRI for 
the CIGS thin film project.  
 
The activity of collaboration with research community is generally an indicator for 
exploration of new technologies. Here the senior mangers’ responses show the 
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 In fact, the research institute’s role in Newsun’s MOEA project being mainly concerned with testing 
and documentation is confirmed by the firm’s partner, ITRI. 
102
 The experimental production line in ITRI is also confirmed by the project leader of ITRI.  
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influence more from individuals’ experience than from firm-specific context.  The 
differences between Newsun’s CSO and the other three managers can be traced back 
to their educational and professional backgrounds. The prior working experience of 
Newsun’s CSO are mostly related to manufacturing and production-line management, 
while the three senior R&D managers at Solar one, Amorphous and Greenchild have 
similar working experiences with the research communities prior to joining the firms. 
 
Experimental projects 
 
The implementation of experimental projects is regarded as a direct indicator of the 
firm’s new capability development. Here this search activity was similarly received 
moderate weighting among the four senior R&D managers. Generally, these managers’ 
conception of the experimental project is associated with their current technologies, 
rather than exploratory technologies
103
. For example, all the senior managers 
mentioned experimental projects in the context of the fine-tuning of the 
manufacturing process for the existing technology platform. As for the two firms 
(Greenchild and Amorphous) with the evidence of exploration projects, both R&D 
heads recognized the practice of the MOEA project and the CZTS project (Greenchild) 
as another mode of experimentation. But they did not regard these projects as the 
firms’ experimental projects for “normal” search activities104  
 
Attitudes towards partnership 
 
                                                     
103
 For example, Solar one’s CTO mentioned experimental projects on improved cell structures and 
material composition (on the existing c-Si platform). Newsun’s CSO stated that to achieve mass 
production for CIGS, experimental projects are conducted on a regular basis at the firm.   
104
 They didn’t mention the MOEA projects until the author asks. 
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Four distinct patterns were found with respect to the activity of working with 
suppliers or outside technology partners. Solar one’s CTO said that because c-Si 
technology is relatively mature, the firm is cautious about working with outside 
technology providers. Apart from the partnership with the research community in 
MOEA projects, the firm’s only (public) technology partnership was a project with a 
US-based R&D lab in 2008
105
. Greenchild’s R&D Head indicated that the firm would 
enter some project-based partnerships on alternative PV technologies, but would not 
consider external partnerships involving core technologies on the c-Si platform. Apart 
from the partnership with ITRI in the MOEA project on CIGS, the firm’s only 
technology partnership was the CZTS thin film project with two foreign companies in 
2010. Amorphous’ R&D Head stated that apart from partnerships with the academic 
community in MOEA projects, there is little co-operation with the firm’s technology 
provider. The R&D Head emphasized that the firm’s thin film module efficiency rates 
have surpassed its supplier’s record106107. As for Newsun, the firm’s CSO described 
the importance of partnering with an outside technology partner. In fact, the firm has 
been collaborating with an equipment supplier in developing the firm’s CIGS 
manufacturing technology since 2008, and the partnership has strengthened to the 
point that the supplier later became the shareholder of the firm
108
   
 
There is evidence of collaborating with outside technology partners in the three firms’ 
(including Solar one, Amorphous and Greenchild) projects of new capability 
development. Thus this search practice can be an indicator of firms’ exploration 
                                                     
105
 The research project can be related to Solar one’s acquisition of a polysilicon wafer firm in the US. 
106
 According to Amorphous, the firm purchased a turn-key thin film solution from a German firm, and 
the supplier had little involvement on the fine-tuning of the manufacturing process. 
107
 Amorphous’ GM made the same remark.  
108
 From the perspective of Joint Venture partnership, this technology collaboration can be categorised 
as “internal” rather than “external” partnership. Also, the CSO implied that a certain level of conflict on 
the co-developed know-how: while Newsun regards it as the firm’s own property, the partner plans to 
sell the solution to other potential customers in the future. 
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activities. Also the differences in these firms’ partnership mode suggest that 
collaboration with external partners could be the most differentiated search activity 
among firms. However, given the minor weight indicated by the theses senior 
managers, this activity is not considered as a particularly critical practice in the firms’ 
search activities.  
 
With respect to the factors influencing the firms’ technology partnership, it appears 
that the firms’ past partnership experience may affect their preferences regarding 
modes of partnership with outside technology providers. However, these senior 
managers’ responses actually reflect the characteristic of the targeted PV technology 
in their collaboration projects. For example, regarding the projects on the c-Si 
platform, the relatively mature technology with available turn-key equipments, firms 
seemed to prefer acquisition (such as Solar one’s acquisition of a polysilicon wafer 
firm) or in-house development, like Greenchild. The rationale follows one of the key 
features of PV technologies – the importance of manufacturing know-how109. A 
similar situation applies to a-Si/-Si thin film technology110.  As for the emerging 
PV technologies, partnership with outside technology partners can be a feasible way 
to share the development risk from the perspective of practical consideration. For 
example, for its new capability investments in emerging PV technologies, Greenchild 
chose to develop CZTS thin film technology
111
 with partners on a project basis. 
Similar project-based mode with ITRI is applied for the five-year government-funded 
CIGS project
112
 In the case of Newsun, as CIGS is the firm’s core technology 
                                                     
109
 For example, even using the same equipment, the yield rates may be varied significantly among 
firms.  
110
 Compared with other thin film technologies, a-Si/-Si thin film technology is relatively mature, 
with standard turn-key solution equipment.  
111
 Compared with CIGS, the CZTS thin film technology is in much earlier lab stage. 
112
 Compared with Newsun’s CIGS product, Greenchild’s CIGS project uses printing process 
technology which is in a much earlier lab stage. 
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platform, the joint venture partnership with the technology partner suggests the 
benefits of both technological and financial risk-sharing in the longer term process of 
achieving mass production. Therefore, the seemly firm-specific pattern in partnership 
mode is actually derived from the characteristics of the chosen technologies in the 
industry. 
 
The industry influenced search 
 
Generally, the similarities in terms of the weightings of the search activities suggest a 
stronger influence from the industry than the firm specific context. Among these 
activities, collaboration with external technology partners can be a more viable 
indicator for firms’ new capability development and a potentially differentiated search 
practice. Yet the issue is that this search activity is similarly received minor weighting 
among these firms. With respect to the influence of individual experience, the only 
significant difference shows in the activity of collaboration with research community. 
However, the three senior managers (those with research experience) did not weight 
this collaboration particularly highly in their search activities. This fact implies that 
industry practice can still be more influential than the individual’s prior professional 
experience.  
 
Summary 
 
Firstly, the finding from senior managers’ perception towards competitors suggests 
that there is presence of selective attention with firm-specific patterns. However, 
while the effect of selective attention is illustrated in the way senior managers 
selectively perceive some aspects and neglect others of the competitors, the anchoring 
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bias towards competitors raises the question if such selective attention is relevant to 
firms’ decision rationale in investing new capabilities, as claimed by these senior 
managers.  
 
Secondly, senior R&D managers’ responses of their firms’ search activities show that 
their prior technical and research experience may influence certain search practice 
such as the link with research community. But overall the evidences indicate that 
senior managers’ search patterns can be more influenced by industry practice than by 
individuals’ prior experience113. Moreover, there is no significant evidence showing 
firm- specific pattern in the search activities. In particular, these senior R&D 
managers similarly indicated that referencing the industry technology roadmap is the 
most important search activity. The implication is that within the same industry, firms’ 
propensity in allocation of attention (search) may not necessarily be sufficient to 
explain their variation of new capability investment patterns. In the next Discussion 
and Conclusion Chapter we will discuss what potential factors other than selective 
attention may explain firms’ decision to invest in new capabilities. 
  
                                                     
113Senior R&D managers’ expertise acquisition from the same industry may also explain: the similar 
pattern of search activities may reflect the fact that with the qualifications of expertise in the specific 
domain, senior managers may be trained with similar knowledge and practices that are accessible in 
this environment. In particular, the Solar PV industry is characterized as a highly professional-centric 
industry. This concept is also illustrated in the institutional perspective (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
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Chapter 7 
Discussions and Conclusions 
 
Introduction 
 
This research finds that firstly, the concept of framing defined by behavioural decision 
theory of narrow framing and prevailing frame may help explain the emphasis on 
exploitation. Secondly, with the broad definition of framing as the interpretation of 
decision problem; this research finds that the organizational decision perspective of 
selective attention does exist at the firm and senior manager level, but such 
differentiated framing is not necessarily associated with different choice patterns. As 
the role of framing may only partially explain firms’ capability investment decisions, 
it then leads us to identify other factors that may explain the decision to explore. 
 
Previous empirical findings actually provide some potential directions of further 
investigation. In Chapter 4, judgemental heuristics and biases were found as the 
stylized principles to explain firms’ similar decision pattern. It implies the whether or 
not the use of deliberate heuristics (as suggested by the prescriptive view of 
behavioural decision perspectives) may encourage exploration? In Chapter 5, the 
finding of loosely coupling framing and choices suggests that differences in choices 
may not necessarily be related to the pattern of selective attention. It implies the 
direction of examining the decision‘s own dynamic in the process (March, 1994; 
Vidaillet, 2008). In Chapter 6, organizational context is found to be more influential 
than individuals’ professional experience in opportunity recognition, which suggests 
that the design of organizational mechanism may encourage exploration.  
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As a consequence, the potential role of deliberate practice is derived from the 
prescriptive views of both behavioural and organizational decision perspectives. 
Specifically, “deliberate” corresponds to the “deliberate heuristics” and “practice” 
emphasises the design of the decision practice and organizational mechanism. Here 
the suggestion is that deliberate practice, rather than framing has a stronger influence 
on the decision to explore. 
 
This finding moves the initial emphasis of framing more towards the role of deliberate 
practice in influencing the decision process. Firstly, the role of framing explains the 
potential biases in the judgement and decision process, which is central to the design 
of mechanism that can help overcome the limitations of framing. While the 
organisational decision perspectives assert that the factors influencing the 
organisational decisions are interdependent and connected by the contingency of the 
decision context, the behavioural decision perspectives provide stylized predictions of 
heuristic judgement. Secondly, appreciation of the role of deliberate practice stems 
from a more pragmatic standpoint. It incorporates the psychological mechanism 
suggested by the behavioural and organisational decision perspectives. The suggested 
mechanism of deliberate practice implies the application of rational model in the 
organisation as a process not necessarily as an analysis of the decision outcome 
(March, 1994).  Therefore, by investigating the role of framing and deliberate 
practice, this research contributes to unpack the relationship between descriptive and 
prescriptive views of the decision making process. 
 
This concluding chapter begins with a discussion of deliberate practice in Section 7.1, 
which is followed by a summarized discussion of the empirical results in Section 7.2. 
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Finally, Section 7.3 discusses the implications and examines the limitations of, and 
future directions to take from this research. 
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7.1 Deliberate practice 
 
The discussion of deliberate practice starts with explaining the theoretical concept 
drawing from behavioural and organizational decision perspectives. Then the 
potential role of deliberate practice in influencing the decision to explore is illustrated 
with the empirical finding from the case of Greenchild. 
 
The prescriptive view of decision process 
 
Previous discussions about the behavioural and organizational decision perspectives 
illustrate that narrow framing coincides with organizations’ tendency to favour 
exploitation.  Here the prescriptive view of behavioural and organizational decision 
perspectives informs us to design and adopt deliberate practice to overcome the 
judgemental and adaptive mechanism in the decision process.  
 
The controlled System 2, deliberate heuristics and procedural rationality 
 
Relative to the automatic System 1, the controlled process of System 2 is 
characterized by more abstract reasoning, and less inferences from experience (Evans, 
2008; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Stanovich & West, 2002). System 2 is also 
referred to as the “corrective thought” (Kahneman, 2003b:711). Therefore, under 
conditions that are vulnerable to judgmental biases, the suggestion is to utilise the 
analytical process of System 2 to override the associative process of the System 1 
process (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; Stanovich & West, 2002). Using the 
definition that heuristics are the simplified procedure or logic rules that decision 
makers use to solve complex problems, the deliberated heuristics generated from 
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System 2 differ from the heuristics (representative, availability, anchor and affect 
heuristics) described in the System 1 judgment process (Frederick, 2002). 
 
From the organizational decision perspective, the procedural aspect in the decision 
process refers to the “planning program” and is distinguished from the substantial 
aspect as the “planning program for the problem-solving process itself” (March & 
Simon, 1958: 140). While the substantial aspect of the problem depends on the 
context of a specific decision problem, there is certainly a recognizable pattern for the 
procedural aspect. In other words, the procedural program can be routinized  and 
rationalized to a certain degree in the organization (March & Simon, 1958). This 
concept of procedural rationality emphasises the design for the decision process 
(Simon, 1996b) and coincides with the behavioural decision perspective in the 
developing deliberate heuristic from the operation of System 2. 
 
Manipulated attention and attention management 
 
For the general prescription, behavioural decisions scholars propose ”manipulated 
attention”, meaning ideas such as increasing the exposure to statistical thinking, or 
practice with the logic rules to stimulate the functioning of System 2 (Kahneman, 
2003b; Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). Further, on the application side, it is suggested 
that the process of the debiasing strategy begins with identifying the heuristics utilized, 
and the biases resulting from the underlying assumptions. For example, in the case of 
the availability heuristic, the attention may need to be redirected to the less salient 
signals, which may be underestimated in the judgment process. In the case of 
overconfidence bias, it may help to reconstruct the decision task by deliberately 
considering alternative explanations and opposing evidence (Fischhoff, 2002). 
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Similarly, in the bias of anchoring, it is recommended that counter arguments are 
developed to compare with the established anchors in making judgments (Morewedge 
& Kahneman, 2010). 
 
Compared with System 2, System 1 is relatively highly contextualised. The emphasis 
on System 2 operation seems to suggest the importance of “decontextualisation” in 
monitoring the functioning of System 1. For example, scholars have questioned the 
central role of “environmental alteration” in the desired direction of the cognitive and 
behavioural change (Stanovich & West, 2002). The point here is not to ignore the 
contextual factors, but to be critical about the influence of the context in the judgment 
and decision process. This understanding of limitation is necessary in considering the 
prescription for the “manipulated attention” (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005).  
 
In the organizational decision process, the constraining aspects of the organization not 
simply relate to individuals’ selective filtering process of, but can also sometimes be 
utilized as the mechanism for overcoming the potential bias from System 1 
judgmental heuristics. Corresponding to the concept of manipulated attention, in the 
early study from March and Simon the concept of programmed stimuli has already 
been introduced as the deliberate mechanism to direct the attention of the organization 
(March & Simon, 1958). The notion of the “management of attention” refers to 
“changing the representation of the decision problems”, and the allocation of attention 
to different solutions (to the decision problem) with different time-frames. For 
example, attention can be allocated to solutions that “produce the immediate 
consequences” and solutions involve longer time frame. (Simon, 1996b: 132, 161 ). 
Linking the concept of manipulated attention with procedural rationality, it is 
suggested that the procedural program can be more critical than substantial program 
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in directing senior managers’ attention pattern (March & Simon, 1958). 
 
Separate mechanism for exploration and the idea of experimentation 
 
With respect to the design of organizational decision process in overcoming the 
potential bias toward exploration, scholars suggested the concept of “reducing 
interdependence” between exploitation and exploration programs (March & Simon, 
1958). In other words, the mechanism for exploitation and exploration should be 
differentiated in the organizational practice. In March’s own words, “whereas the 
mechanisms of exploitation involve connecting organizational behaviour to revealed 
reality and shared understandings, the recommended mechanisms of exploration 
involve deliberately weakening those connections” (March, 2008: 177). The reason 
for designing separate procedural program for exploration (March, 2008) lies in that if 
the procedural program is tied in with the organizational goal in the problem-solving 
process, it is inevitably influenced by selective attention in the organization (March & 
Simon, 1958).  
 
This perspective of proposing separate mechanism for exploration reflects the idea of 
investing in small experiments that are not necessarily tied to the current and 
organizational programs and immediate business goals. Another advantage of 
small-sized experiments is that it allows the flexibility of adjusting criteria and goals 
in the search process. The concept is illustrated in Simon’s notion of “designing 
without final goals” in which he emphasizes that the “exposure to new experiences” 
needs to “change the choice criteria” in the design of decision process (Simon, 1996b: 
162). 
On the conceptual level, it seems to deviate from the straight suggestion from the 
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behavioural decision perspective that decision makers should try to avoid the isolating 
effect in evaluating the exploitation and exploration projects (Kahneman & Lovallo, 
1993). However, in reality when the primacy of System 1 is present, it can be difficult 
to implement the procedural rationality program for all investment projects. Thus on 
the design level, the deliberate mechanism (not tied to current organizational goals) as 
the supplemented procedure for evaluating new uncertain projects can be more viable 
and practical for implementation in the organization. 
 
Deliberate practice 
 
Here the idea of deliberate practice is introduced to capture the prescriptive views 
from the behavioural and organizational decision perspectives. Firstly, drawing from 
the concepts of deliberate heuristic and attention management, deliberate practice is 
characterized by “specially designed” and “effortful” activity.  It differentiates from 
the heuristics immediate accessible in the judgemental process and the spontaneous 
adaptive mechanism in the organizations. Secondly, with a specific focus for 
exploration, the concept of separate mechanism suggests that deliberate practice is not 
necessarily linked to the evaluation of performance. That is, such deliberate practice 
for exploration may not necessarily generate “immediate returns” from the external 
environment. Rather, deliberate practice is motivated by the “instrumental value” of 
the potential in improving performance (Ericsson, Krampe, & Clemens, 1993)
114
.  
 
Table 7.1 summarizes the key concepts and mechanism proposed by the behavioural 
                                                     
114
 Here, the definition of deliberate practice is close to the concept utilized in the expertise research. 
In distinguishing deliberate practice and work, expertise scholars suggest that because the costs 
associated with work are greater, individuals tend to rely on existing knowledge and experience “rather 
than exploring new alternative methods with unknown reliability” (Ericsson et al. 1993). 
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and organizational decision perspectives. 
 
Table 7.1 Deliberate practice as a prescription 
 
Source : the author. 
 
An example of deliberate practice – the application of the real options approach 
 
Organizational scholars have proposed the application of the real options approach as 
a procedural rationality
115
 (Adner & Levinthal, 2004; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2004) 
which corresponds to the prescription from the behavioural decision perspective in 
mobilizing the deliberate heuristics from System 2 with the practice of logical 
thinking and analysis.  
 
In an empirical study investigating how Merck employed the real options approach in 
evaluating the investment of a small biotech firm, the authors found that in the 
                                                     
115
 Certainly the procedural programs are not limited to the real options approach; there are other 
programs such as deliberately adjusting the internal search criteria and the aspiration levels (March 
1994; March & Simon 1958; Simon 1996). 
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process of using the real options model, there are two potential problems that would 
significantly influence the option valuation: the first is “modelling assumptions” and 
the second is “determining the inputs” (Bowman & Moskowitz, 2001:774-775). The 
required capability for developing customized modelling analysis generally is beyond 
the capacity of organizations. Although the authors point out the limitations of using 
the real options approach as strategic analysis in the organizational decision context, 
they found that rather than improving the actual assessment for investments, the 
advantages of using the real option models are the implication for project design and 
the use of the option logic in rethinking the investment proposals for systematic 
search. In the authors’ words, the use of the real options approach “encourages 
experimentation and proactive exploration of uncertainty”(Bowman & Moskowitz, 
2001:777). 
 
The insights from the Merck case illustrate the two concepts of viewing the option 
valuation as an example of deliberate practice. First, the value of the using the real 
options approach as deliberate practice does not lie in the rigid strategic analysis but 
in the deliberate heuristic of option thinking. Second, the option logic is linked with 
the concept of small or control-sized experiments, the classic advice for exploration 
investments (March, 2008, 2010). Therefore the option logic in the real options 
approach can be simply applied as a counter logic to correct the potential 
under-investment in new capabilities. 
 
Deliberate practice in Greenchild 
 
Here the investigation of deliberate practice in this research context focuses on the 
evidence of case firms’ MOEA projects. There are two reasons for re-examining these 
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firms’ MOEA projects: the one is that the mechanism of MOEA projects serves as a 
good comparison base to evaluate the case firms’ attitude and practice towards 
technology development projects. The other is that previous finding has shown that 
there are two firms (Greenchild and Amorphous) with the evidence of developing 
exploratory technology in the MOEA projects. Following the concept of deliberate 
practice, the investigation focuses on two aspects: the first is that whether or not the 
two firms demonstrate the deliberate heuristics in the decision process; and the second 
is that if there is specific decision practice in place for exploration investments in the 
organisation.  
 
The option thinking logic 
It is not evident that the senior managers of Greenchild and Amorphous applied the 
strategic heuristic of the real options logic in the decision to invest in new capabilities: 
the two firms’ decisions to invest new capabilities were not necessarily followed by 
applying the real options logic in concurrently evaluating existing and new 
capabilities(Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001)
116
. 
 
However, the option thinking of hedging future opportunities with initial trial 
investments firstly shows in the two firms’ decisions to utilize the MOEA projects to 
develop technologies that were not based on their existing platform. Here the external 
funding support in encouraging option thinking for exploration appears to work for 
the two firms (but not for the others)
117
. Further, this option thinking logic only 
applies to the two firms’ investments in alternative technologies, not their core 
                                                     
116
 The suggestion of utilizing the option thinking of capability investments is the framing of core 
competence in the market evaluation, 
117
 Both R&D Heads of Greenchild and Amorphous indicated that their firms would not invest in new 
technology projects (other than their existing technology platform) without the support of government 
funding. 
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technology investments. Particularly, the R&D Head of Greenchild stressed that the 
firm would not leverage government funding or external resources in developing the 
firm’s core c-Si technology. 
 
There is evidence of staging of R&D investments in MOEA projects: after making 
initial investments, the firms would wait for signals to decide whether or not to make 
further investments or to abandon the projects
118
. For example, Greenchild’s R&D 
Head described that after the firm’s MOEA polysilicon wafer projects ended in 2010, 
the firm discontinued its related investments in view of the continuing trend of 
dropping market price for polysilicon. On the other hand, Greenchild decided to make 
a subsequent investment – the five-year CIGS thin film project – after evaluating the 
results of the one-year CIGS pre-study project in 2010. With respect to Amorphous, 
the firm withdrew from the CIGS project (a year earlier then the expected completion 
date) because the firm found that the timeline for CIGS development was too lengthy. 
 
Decision practice in the organization 
While both the cases of Greenchild and Amorphous show the evidence of simple 
option thinking rather than the rigid strategic analysis, the next question is whether or 
not this option-practice of utilizing government-funded projects for new capability 
investments can be found on a regular basis. For Amorphous, after dropping the CIGS 
project before the initial commitment date, the firm shows no intention of applying 
other MOEA projects for new technologies other than the firm’s current thin-film 
technology
119
.  
 
                                                     
118
 As suggested by the real options theory.  
119
 Comments from Amorphous’ R&D Head. 
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With respect to Greenchild, the firm’s option thinking practice can be observed not 
only in the MOEA projects but also in their decision process for new investments.  
Firstly, evidence shows that Greenchild’s parent company and the associated firms 
have been the most frequent winners of MOEA projects (targeting exploration 
investments) over the past few years
120
. Further, insider sources (including a senior 
finance manager from Greenchild’s parent company, Greenchild’s VC, and the deputy 
CFO of another large electronic group) similarly indicated that Greenchild’s parent 
company has a specific practice in place for evaluating new ventures: while the 
company is accustomed to provide opportunities for the trial or experimental period of 
new ventures, if the unpromising outlook of a project persists for a certain period, 
then the company would ruthlessly kill the project to halt further losses. Judging from 
Greenchild’s composition of boards of directors121  as well as from the comments 
from Greenchild’s senior manager and other third-party interviewees, Greenchild has 
indeed inherited this practice from its parent company. 
 
The case of Greenchild illustrates a recognizable pattern of deliberately allocating 
resources for new investment projects in the decision process. In contrast to 
Greenchild’s pattern, the tendency to rely more on certain individuals (executives or 
senior managers) than specific decision rules is observed in other firms. For example, 
Amorphous’s R&D Head implied that the firm’s GM had the final call in all the firm’s 
investment decisions, and that the potential problem is the GM is relatively 
conservative about exploration and reluctant to make new capability investments 
during industry downturn.  
 
                                                     
120
 Information from MOEA and MOEA officials.  
121
 The majority of the firm’s boards of directors are the executives from the parent company or its 
associated firms. 
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With respect to the other two firms (without new capability investments in MOEA 
projects), both the deputy CFO of Solar one and the CFO of FabPV emphasised the 
importance of the R&D Head or the CEO’s personal commitment to convince boards 
of directors about the investment projects that have a high degree of uncertainty. As 
pointed out by Solar one’s deputy CFO, such personal endorsement is often necessary, 
because senior boards of directors usually prefer (and recognize) traditional ROI or 
payback periods in evaluating investment projects.  
 
Therefore, the case of Greenchild shows that the decision practice for new investment 
projects is sustained by organizational mechanism rather than by the judgment of key 
decision makers. Although Greenchild (and the parent company) did not evidently 
follow the rigid strategic decision analysis such as the real options approach, the 
firm’s practice differentiates its pattern from the others122 and demonstrates the 
concept of deliberate practice: first, it can be regarded as “specially designed” for new 
capability investments. Second, there are evidences of “consistent efforts” in 
leveraging government funding (MOEA projects) for option investments in both 
Greenchild and the parent company. Finally, the characteristic of not being connected 
to “immediate returns“ shows in that there is an explicit rule encouraging and 
allowing certain trial period for all new investments projects in the decision process. 
 
Separated organisational mechanism for exploration  
The case of Greenchild corresponds with the concept of the separated mechanism for 
exploration and exploitation: whereas the investments for exploitation are tied to 
                                                     
122
 At first sight, this finding seems to contradict the findings in Chapter 4 that Greenchild is similar to 
other firms in terms of its investment project evaluation. But the point here is that while the firm may 
follow some similar decision criteria in the process for new project evaluation, it deliberately allocates 
certain resources for investment in new capabilities. 
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current business programs, new capability investments are not necessarily bound with 
these current business goals. For example, the R&D Head of Greenchild described 
that MOEA projects would be both financially and operationally independent from the 
firms’ current R&D activities. On the contrary, in the case of Solar one, the CTO 
stressed the relationship between the firm’s MOEA projects and its current R&D 
projects. The firm’s deputy CFO also indicated that the firm’s MOEA projects might 
have been bundled together with the firm’s R&D expenses, or the R&D department’s 
projects in the investment evaluation process. 
 
Further, the case of Greenchild supports the idea that exploratory projects could be 
positioned (partially) outside of the firm through collaboration with outside partners. 
Apart from the benefits of sharing risk and the cost of the irreversible investments for 
new capabilities development, here it is emphasised that the partnership mode for 
developing new capabilities provides a convenient organizational mechanism for 
separating the firm’s existing projects from the exploratory projects.  
 
In Greenchild’s CZTS project aiming at breakthrough technology (a new material 
composition for thin film technology), the firm teamed up with two strong technology 
partners – IBM, and Solar Frontier, a leading Japanese CIGS manufacturer. Also, 
through the partnership with two research centres (a material technology research 
division and a PV cell and system research division) in ITRI, Greenchild continued 
investing in the CIGS project after the one-year pre-study project
123
. The case of 
Greenchild shows the example of how partnership mode for new experimental 
projects serves as the separated organizational mechanism for developing new 
capabilities. 
                                                     
123
 Greenchild also decided to hire the project lead from ITRI after the one-year pre-study project. 
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Different from Merck’s adoption of using the real options approach in evaluating 
investment decision (Bowman & Moskowitz, 2001), the case Greenchild 
demonstrates simple option thinking and practice embedded in the firm’s decision 
process for new capability investments.  The fact that Greenchild uses separate 
mechanism for exploration in a way sustains the mode for experimentation. 
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7.2 Discussion of the results 
 
The discussion of results is organized into two parts: the role of framing and the role 
of deliberate practice.  
 
The role of framing 
 
This research argues that framing can explain the decision to exploit current 
capabilities, but is not sufficient to explain the decision to explore. While the general 
definition of framing refers to how choices are affected by the interpretation of the 
decision problem, here two phenomena derived from the framing effect are 
particularly addressed: the first is narrow framing, referring to the lack of 
consideration of the relevant consequences and opportunities when making choices. 
The second is the passive acceptance of the prevailing frame.    
 
The finding that narrow framing leads to an overemphasis on exploitation is in line 
with the proposition from organization decision studies (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; 
March, 1991; March, 2008). Yet the underlying mechanism of the framing effect in 
influencing firms’ capability investment decisions is less explored. In the theory of 
framing effect from the behavioural decision school, the terms “framing” and “frame” 
are similarly treated as the same construct (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). In this 
research, the role of framing addresses two distinct concepts: “framing” refers to the 
process of constructing the meaning, whereas “the frame” refers to the specific 
perspective adopted by the decision makers. Thus the principle of heuristic judgment 
and the associated biases can be applied in the investigation of the framing process, 
whereas the prevalence of a decision frame illustrates how the assessment of decisions 
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is directed towards a particular perspective. This research suggests that in real-world 
settings, decision makers may use different frames in the framing process. Through 
integrating the investigation of the “framing process” and “the decision frame”, the 
contribution of this research lies initially in differentiating the two concepts of 
“framing” and “the frame” in order to illuminate influences in the judgment and 
decision process. 
 
Diminishing sensitivity to uncertainty and the conditions for the prediction 
 
From the framing of the external environment, the argument that framing explains 
exploitation is based on three observations from the empirical work in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5: the first is the diminishing sensitivity to uncertainty. In the research context 
of the PV industry, decision makers’ perceived effect of policy uncertainty on new 
investments has been decreasing, after experiencing similar patterns over the past few 
years. The insight of this observation lies in that it questions the central role of 
perceived environmental uncertainty in influencing investment decisions. 
 
The research identifies the conditions for this prediction: the pattern and the source of 
the uncertainties in the investigated industry context. The pattern is defined by the 
temporality of the incidents in the uncertainty. This research suggests that the framing 
of the uncertainty effect on investment decisions can be subject to the point of time 
near or distant from the threshold points
124
 of the uncertainty (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Tversky & Fox, 2000 In the context of the PV industry, the pattern of this 
                                                     
124
 Referring to the point of time when the probability of uncertain events turns from impossibility to 
possibility or from possibility to certainty. In the context of the PV industry, another example is that the 
timing of the first launch of large-scale government incentive measures can be viewed as the point of 
time when possibility turned to certainty, indicating a stronger effect than the later period following the 
continued implementation of similar programs. 
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policy uncertainty can be applied to the prediction of diminishing sensitivity to this 
perceived uncertainty. For example, the first wave of government incentive cuts 
started in 2008-2009, and has been related to the first PV industry downturn. Then, 
after a short period of recovery, the PV industry experienced the second industry 
downturn resulting from another wave of government spending cuts. Policy 
uncertainty remains a critical factor in influencing the development of the PV industry, 
but senior mangers responded that after experiencing recurring policy uncertainty 
over the past few years, the perceived effect of policy uncertainty in influencing the 
firms’ investment decisions had been reduced125.  
 
In terms of the source of uncertainty, the term refers to the relationship between the 
source of the uncertainty and the decision makers’ competence area. For example, 
c-Si PV cell manufacturing is the competence area of Taiwanese PV firms. Despite 
the uncertain prospect
126
, these PV firms continued to invest heavily in capacity 
expansion of their current c-Si platform. The “competence hypothesis” concept 
illustrates that these firms would still prefer to bet on the area of their perceived 
competence – the manufacturing of their domain technology – despite their 
knowledge of the presence of uncertainty and the prospect of a low probability of gain 
(Fox & Tversky, 2000; Heath & Tversky, 1991; Tversky & Fox, 2000). 
 
Narrow framing, prevailing frames and conditions for the prediction 
 
The second observation from the framing of the external environment regards the 
narrow framing in assessing the choices and attributing the causes of the decision 
                                                     
125
 There are other factors such as industry dynamics involved; details are discussed in Chapter 4. 
126
 For example, the overcapacity of c-Si cell and modules, and the changing value proposition in the 
supply chain; as discussed in Chapter 4.  
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problem. Specifically, the tendency to rely on over-optimistic market forecasts and to 
attribute the decision problem of new capability investments as institutional resource 
issues are both found among the case firms. The insight of this observation lies in that 
it calls for re-examining the common view of regarding the resources constraint in the 
institutional environment as the root cause for limiting the firms’ new capabilities 
investments. 
 
The third observation from the empirical investigations of Chapter 4 regards the 
prevailing decision frame in capability investments among decision makers. Firstly, 
the decision frame of “loss aversion” has been commonly illustrated in the decision 
task of exploratory investments, which is also observed in the empirical Chapter 4. 
The focus of Chapter 4 then moves to another prevailing frame at the institutional 
level: the common mind-set of national competitive advantage. This research suggests 
that as this prevailing thought encourages the exploitation of current competitiveness, 
it may impede investment in developing new capabilities. 
 
Therefore, in illustrating the prevalence of narrow framing, this research extends the 
concept of the “passive acceptance of a decision frame” from the experimental 
environment to real-world business settings, and addresses the influences of industrial 
and institutional environments. The observation of the prevailing frame in the 
institutional environment appears to be similar to the notion of institutional logic 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Yet this research departs from the institutional school in 
that it emphasizes psychological mechanisms such as association and availability in 
the heuristic judgment process, rather than the social mechanism of imitation, or of 
following the norm (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
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The conditions for the prediction of narrow framing and the prevalence of the 
decision frame lie in the presence and relevance of successful experience in the 
investigated decision context, which is specifically applied to the phenomenon of the 
prevailing frame of adaptation. This research suggests that the prevailing frame can be 
identified by the availability of best practice in the industry itself, or in related 
industries in the same institutional environment. Further, the relevance of the 
experience can be evaluated through the characteristics of the technology employed in 
the industry. For example, although the PV industry is characterized as an emerging 
industry, its c-Si PV cell manufacturing and management processes are closely related 
to semiconductor technologies, in which competence has already been established in 
the Taiwanese institutional environment. 
 
Differentiated framing (selective attention) 
 
As shown in the empirical investigation in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, differentiated 
framing, or referring to selective attention, does exist at both firm and decision maker 
levels. The findings suggest that such a difference in framing does not necessarily 
lead to different choice pattern. Chapter 5 demonstrates that at the firm level, the 
pattern of selective attention can be influenced by firms’ resources, ownership or 
CEO’s experience. But such differentiated framing does not necessarily lead to 
differences in the capability investment pattern. 
 
In examining differentiated framing at senior manager level, the finding from Chapter 
6 shows that while professional experience may affect the attention focus on 
short-term market signal; it is less relevant than organizational influence in framing 
long-term prospect. Beyond the mechanism of organizational identification proposed 
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by organizational scholars (March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1996a), this finding  
illustrates that decision makers may use different frames in the framing process. 
Specifically, here one of the decision frames can be defined as the decision makers’ 
professional experience; the other decision frame refers to the organization’s decision 
problem (such as its resources or competitive position within the industry). This 
concept of the relative influence of the decision frames corresponds with the 
“perceptual filter” proposed by organization scholars (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). 
Here this research advances the argument that in terms of framing future development, 
the background filter that is defined as the individual’s expertise can be less 
influential than the foreground filter of the organization’s decision frame. In Chapter 6, 
the observation of senior managers’ selective attention influenced by a corporate 
frame is consistent with the finding of selective attention of responding strategies at 
the firm- level investigation of Chapter 5. But again, the question is whether such 
differentiated framing is relevant in the decision to invest in new capabilities for the 
future. 
 
The moment-based experience effect vs. the accumulated experience effect 
 
The above discussion of the role of framing and frames in the decision process points 
to the influence of experience. The experience effect plays a central role in the 
psychological mechanism proposed by behavioural decision scholars. While the 
behavioural decision school initially focused on the heuristic judgment process, 
scholars’ pursuit of the experience effect in the judgment and decision process has 
revealed a later divergence of focus. In fact, Kahneman and Tversky emphasize 
different temporal effects of experience on the framing of the decision. Kahneman 
proposes the “moment-based” experience, with the focus on unpredictable preferences 
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for future events, while Tversky takes a long-term view on the “accumulated” 
experience effect which appears to be close to the notion of path-dependency 
(Kahneman, 2000a). While the two views are similarly constructed using the basis of 
heuristic judgment in the framing process, different psychological effects are 
highlighted: the accumulated experience effect addresses the feeling of control; the 
moment-based effect focuses more on the immediate perceptual experience of losses 
and gains
127
. Therefore, while the moment-based effect emphasizes the general 
pattern of ad-hoc attribute substitution in the judgment process, the accumulated 
effect takes into account the specific background of the decision makers
128
.  
 
This research argues that both long and short-term views of the experience effect can 
be consolidated in order to elaborate the role of framing in influencing the decision of 
capability investments. While behavioural scholars have not further pursued the 
settling of differences between the two views (Kahneman, 2000b), this research 
demonstrates the reconciliation of the two views in applying these concepts to a 
business setting. Firstly, the long-term view of accumulated effect helps to identify the 
potential dominant frame. The prediction would be based on the relevance of past 
experience. Particularly in this research, the accumulated view explains the 
competence effect and the prevailing frame. Secondly, the short-term view of 
moment-based effects permits the possibility of altering the perspectives and 
unpredictability of future preferences in the judgment process. The prediction would 
be based on the experience of changes compared with the status quo or the 
expectation level. In this research, the moment-based view is particularly illustrated in 
the diminishing sensitivity to uncertainty. With the emphasis on changeable 
                                                     
127
 Kahneman also refers to the moment-based view as the “hedonic” experience.   
128
 For example, in his later research, Tversky examines the role of belief in influencing judgment 
under uncertainty. 
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preferences in the judgment and decision process, this moment-based view further 
implies the reality that decision makers may use different frames in the framing 
process, as pointed out in this research.     
 
How does the role of framing matter? 
 
This research suggests a two-fold problem of framing in the judgment and decision 
process of capability investments. The first problem is the excessive reliance on 
experience. Applying the availability and representative heuristics, decision makers 
tend to attribute and justify the causes of the decision problem based on the 
association of their experience in the decision context. This experience-steered 
judgment is reinforced by the role of belief derived from accumulated experience in 
the specific area. The second problem is that of insufficient adjustment. In this 
research, there are two observations similar to the concept of the anchoring heuristic. 
Firstly, decision makers may set the wrong target and reference (although they are not 
assigned with a specific anchor, as in the experiment). Secondly, even they can notice 
the correct target and trend, the associated adjustment is still not sufficient to cope 
with change, especially the downward influence of the external environment.  
 
This two-fold problem leads to the phenomenon of the prevailing adaptation frame. 
From the perspective of evaluating the decision outcome, this decision frame does not 
necessarily appear to be inferior during the context-dependent assessments over 
different time periods. The prevalence of the adaptation frame seems to be inevitable, 
as it is easier to be sustained throughout short-term focused market trading and the 
corporate management mechanism. However, the problem with the adaptation frame 
is not only that it tends to favour exploitation, but also that it may prohibit alterative 
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frames in the judgment and decision process. 
 
Therefore, in respect to “framing”, the problem is associated with heuristic biases, 
whereas in respect to “frames”, the problem lies in perspective biases. To deal with 
the “framing” problem, the behavioural decision school generally proposes the 
prescription of the controlled System 2 processes to override the automatic System 1 
heuristic judgments. To deal with the problem of the persistence of a particular 
decision frame, more emphasis appears to be placed on the manipulation of external 
influences. From this perspective, the organizational decision school provides the 
better prescription based on the organizational mechanism. The concepts of 
“deliberation” and “program” in these two prescriptions lead us to the discussion of 
the role of deliberate practice. 
 
The role of deliberate practice 
 
The investigation of deliberate practice is motivated by the findings of the loosely 
coupled framing and choices in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. As discussed, the 
differences of framing at firm level and at senior manager level are not evidently 
linked to differentiated choice patterns. The common view of management cognition 
studies usually links the framing of future prospects and competitive position to the 
firm’s strategic actions. But the findings of this research suggest that such framing is 
not necessarily relevant to the decision to explore opportunities through investing in 
new capabilities.  
 
This research argues that the potential role of deliberate practice may explain the 
behaviour of exploration. In the context of narrow framing in favour of exploitation, 
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the prescription from the behavioural decision school points to utilizing deliberate 
heuristics from the controlled System 2. In this research, the application of option 
logic in evaluating new investment projects is an example of this. The case firm of 
Greenchild seems to fit this recommendation. Yet the findings show that Greenchild 
only exhibits a simple option approach toward exploratory projects on the condition 
of government funding, and that there is no evidence that such specific practice is 
established on the awareness of deliberately applying the option heuristic in the 
evaluation of capability investments. Further, the firm did not evidently follow the 
rigid real options approach in analysing the investment options. The fact that the case 
of Greenchild is not a perfect fit for rationality logic and the real options approach 
actually distinguishes the application of rational decision model for strategic analysis 
from the concept of deliberate practice. 
 
Deliberation vs. mechanism 
 
This research suggests two approaches for deliberate practice that are specifically 
designed for exploratory investments. They incorporate prescriptions from both the 
behavioural and organizational decision perspectives, but with some refined 
suggestions. The first is to develop the low-level procedural program. Here the term 
“low-level” refers to the implementation level of the rationality procedure to 
differentiate high-level coherence in the application of the rational decision model. At 
first sight, this proposition seems to contradict the suggestion from the behavioural 
decision perspective in which the accuracy of judgments and decisions is stressed. 
The point here is that while the behavioural decision scholars illustrate the 
incoherence in the assumptions of rational decision models, adopting the more 
demanding rationality standard for judgments can be just too difficult in real-life 
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decision context settings. For example, option thinking logic can be easy to apply to 
the concept of experimentation for exploratory investments. But the concept of 
framing the capability investment as options in market tests, and the approach of 
following the assessment in the real options model can be too complicated in the 
practical sense. In fact, from the standpoint of “practice”, the emphasis of procedural 
rationality in this proposition is still in line with the prescription of activating the 
deliberated System 2 process. 
 
The second approach is to provide the separate evaluation and implementation 
mechanism. This prescription addresses the concept of the specially designed 
mechanism (with separate measurements) to facilitate experimentation for exploratory 
investments. Here the proposal is to suggest a stronger form of separate mechanism 
such as an external partnership mode
129
, rather than the concept of organizational 
slack, which embeds the mechanism inside the organization. From the organizational 
perspective, the external partnership structure is a convenient design for separating 
evaluation and implementation from the existing organizational decision routine, 
which is inclined to favour exploitation and the pursuit of immediate business goals. 
From the behavioural decision perspective, the benefit of external partnership lies in 
providing an outsider viewpoint, and the potential to develop alternative frames. In 
this sense, this proposition implies that the mechanism for exploration may be better 
situated at least partially outside of the organization. 
  
                                                     
129
 Corporate venture can be regarded as another mode of the separate evaluation and implementation 
mechanism outside of the organization.   
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7.3 Implications, limitations and future research 
 
This research contributes towards understanding how firms respond to uncertainty, 
and what factors influence their decisions regarding capability investments. In 
addressing the debates on rationality assumption and the interaction of influences in 
the decision context, this research provides implications from two perspectives: one is 
the application of rational decision models, and the other is the triggering mechanism 
for exploration. 
 
Implication: the application of the rational decision model 
  
It is a common view that accumulated experience may generate the lock-in effect, but 
here a specific phenomenon of reliance upon experience refers to the influence of 
established rational decision analysis. The implications of this research suggest that 
rational decision analysis may not necessarily explain actual decision behaviour, and 
that sometimes the assumed rationality analysis may constrain judgments in the 
context of uncertainty. The reason is that usually a certain (biased) perspective that 
has been influenced by experience has already been put into place before the 
normative framework of rational decision analysis is applied. It is argued that the 
psychological phenomenon of “cognitive dissonance” seems to be inevitable in the 
process of rationalizing the connection between cognition and decisions (Festinger, 
1962), and therefore rational models are usually suited (and utilized) to justify 
decision behaviour (March, 1994, 2008). Two examples of this are the strategic 
applications of the environmental analysis of opportunities/threats, and the 
competence analysis of competitive advantages, which are well known among 
managers with business educations. 
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The problem with the rational decision analysis is not necessarily the model itself, but 
rather the implicit assumptions that are made when applying these decision models. 
Therefore, there is a two-fold implication from the standpoint of the firm and the 
third-party stakeholders such as analysts, academics and policy makers: for the latter, 
the recommendation is to incorporate the descriptive decision analysis to supplement 
the rational model in explaining and predicting the firm’s behaviour; for the former, 
the suggestion is that the rational decision model can still be a useful tool for 
structuring thinking and procedure in the decision process. Organizational scholars 
describe “simple low dimensional representation” (Levinthal, 2011:1520) and 
“strategic heuristics” as the simplification of deductive reasoning logic suggested in 
the strategic framework (Kogut, 2008; Levinthal, 2011). The application of the 
rational approach views “rationality as a process not as an outcome” (Levinthal, 2011: 
1522; March, 1994). Here, it further suggests that the caveat is to re-examine both 
assumptions that have been taken for granted, and the underlying logic derived from 
experience-steered judgements.  
 
Implication: the triggering mechanism 
 
Firstly, the implication of this research suggests that despite the inevitable and 
constraining role of framing in the judgment and decision process, such process could 
be improved through deliberate practice. In this research the concept of deliberate 
practice is not entirely the same as in the expertise research
130
. Also, the idea that 
deliberate practice could improve performance particularly refers to the activation of 
                                                     
130
 In the expertise research, the acquisition of expertise is through deliberate practice. In this research,” 
deliberate practice” refers to the utilization of the controlled System 2 process, not the activity of 
acquiring the expertise in a specific domain.  
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the deliberate System 2 and the improvement of the thinking process
131
, not 
necessarily a direct link with the performance of a specific decision outcome. 
 
Secondly, the implication of this research suggests that despite the individuals’ 
potential to improve the thinking process, certain individuals’ attributes are not 
necessarily linked with the mechanism for exploration in the organization. Compared 
to individuals, the organizational mechanism can more reliably serve as the driver for 
exploration and change. I suggest two recommendations for the design of the 
deliberate mechanism: the first is that the design of the procedural program should be 
based on simple principle rather than tied to the details of the firm’s idiosyncratic 
attribute. The idea is that since it is designed as a separate mechanism for exploration, 
deliberate practice as procedural rationality will not necessarily be restricted by the 
firm’s current state in terms of size and resources132. However, considering the reality 
of implementation and potential heuristics biases, the second recommendation implies 
that sometimes it could be more effective to let action rather than thinking drive the 
mechanism for exploration in the organization (March, 1994), for example by 
leveraging external resources through collaborating with partners in implementing the 
deliberate mechanism for exploration. It is useful not only in terms of extra resource 
support (because investing in such mechanisms can be costly for the firm), but also in 
terms of helping to initiate and sustain the development of new ideas outside of the 
firm’s boundary of capabilities and the framing of opportunities. 
 
                                                     
131
 The improvement of thinking processes is easily measured by the “decision performance” in the 
behavioural experiments. But in this research, there is no empirical evidence on the improvement of the 
thinking process. The expected improvement of “performance” on System 2 process is based on the 
proposition drawing on behavioural decision theory.   
132
 In the expertise research, the resource constraint is suggested as one of the factors influencing the 
deliberate practice. In this research, both the case firm Greenchild and Amorphous were able to 
leverage government funding support. 
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Thirdly the implication of this research suggests that there are certain systematic 
patterns based on the assessment of heuristic judgment. To some extent, such patterns 
of response to environmental uncertainty could be predictable (although not 
necessarily in the expected direction as predicted by the rational decision analysis), 
particularly if the “experience effect”133 is placed at the centre of the analysis. From 
the standpoint of policy analysis or design, the first suggestion is to consider the 
perception of the change effect compared to the status quo, or the expectation level in 
influencing the anticipated result of a policy measure. In addition to the experience 
effect of diminishing sensitivity to policy uncertainty (as discussed earlier), another 
example is the reverse effect of incentive reduction in the PV industry. One of the 
goals in reducing the government incentive program was to aim at balancing supply 
and demand. However, the case showed that the announcement of the policy change 
induced a large amount of production and deployment in a short period of time, which 
was influenced by the expectation of grabbing larger gains before the anticipated 
incentive cut in the near future. The second suggestion is to consider the effect of 
persistent ideology in the institutional (in a national context) environment. While the 
prevailing thought may not be easy to change, one feasible way is to not necessarily 
focus on high-level theoretical debate, but rather address the low-level practice in 
implementation. For example, rather than debating whether or not there should be a 
top-down national technology policy to drive the development of certain competitive 
advantages, maybe a better practical solution would be to focus more on the design of 
the policy program for promoting exploratory investment. 
 
Limitations and future research 
 
                                                     
133
 See the discussion of the moment-based and accumulated experience effect in Section 7.2. 
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Firstly, the narrow framing effect observed in this research seems to be closely related 
to a specific industrial and national context. Indeed, there are two phenomena which 
are specific to the PV industry and to Taiwan. The first is that of policy uncertainty. 
The influence of policy-regulated demand may not be easily found in other industries, 
yet it can be generally applied in the renewable industry sector. The fast-paced change 
in policies and the co-evolved industry dynamics makes the PV industry a good case 
to illustrate both industrial transition and firms’ responses to uncertainty. The second 
is in the characteristics of PV technology. The similarity with semiconductor 
technology in terms of manufacturing know-how appears to demonstrate that Taiwan 
is a specific case. Such a phenomenon may not necessarily be observed in other 
institutional environments. However, it is the objective of this research to examine the 
influence of the legacy effect in industrial and institutional contexts. Rather than 
viewing the two industry-related phenomena as limitations, the investigation of this 
specific decision context identifies and highlights conditions for the prediction of 
narrow framing and the prevailing frame. Therefore, future research could further 
examine proposed conditions of the uncertainty pattern and the experience effect in 
other industries, or institutional settings.  
 
Secondly, the limitation of this research may lie more in the organizational decision 
complex, in which the collective decision behaviour of multiple actors and the social 
influence of power and politics could be involved in the decision process. But the 
topic of group decision dynamics is another research area, and is not the objective of 
this research. In fact, this research emphasizes the interviewee’s representativeness of 
their firm’s decision behaviour in order to moderate the potential group decision effect 
in the investigation. According to their position within the organization, the chosen 
interviewees (especially senior R&D managers) are the final decision makers in the 
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functional department in their firms. Additionally, the choice of selecting functional 
heads rather than CEOs is made on the grounds that the investigation of these senior 
managers may better reflect the process of interpreting the decision problem and 
actions at a practical level. As this research emphasizes the issue of functional 
expertise at an individual level, future research could look into the influence of 
expertise on the framing effect in the context of group decision dynamics. 
 
The third limitation is related to the investigation of deliberate practice. In fact, this 
topic emerges later in the process of examining the role of framing in the decision 
process for capability investments. There are two issues: the first one is the lack of 
direct observation of the decision routines regarding investment decisions in these 
case firms
134
. The second is that given the nature of the decisions (critical, and 
business related), direct observation
135
 of the process is just too difficult to put into 
practice. While the validity of the findings in this research is still solid based on the 
evidence and information sources, a different research design and methodology for 
investigating the role of deliberate practice and decision routines could be developed 
in the future.  
 
Drawing from the concepts of the System 1 and System 2 process, procedural 
rationalities and decision routines, this research proposes a deliberate mechanism 
designed for exploration. This proposition would require further empirical 
examination, and could signify a promising area of future research in the interests of 
both practitioner and academia. In addition, future research could look into the 
                                                     
134
 The empirical findings of deliberate practice in this research are based on interviews with the firm’s 
senior managers and
 
third-party interviewees as well as archival data sources.    
135
 Here, direct observation refers to the researcher being physically able to observe the 
decision-making process.  
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relationship between organizational structural factors and deliberate decision practice. 
Further studies could also compare deliberate mechanisms implemented outside of the 
firm (e.g. collaborations with partners) to those that exist within the organization.  
 
Finally, a related area of future research is the link between the decision procedure 
and the decision performance. In fact, the measurement and assessment of the 
decision performance is another research topic. While this research stresses how the 
deliberate mechanism – rather than the role of framing – explains the behaviour of 
exploration, it does not make a direct connection between the deliberate decision 
practice and the decision performance. From the standpoint of organizational design, 
the argument for the deliberate mechanism is based on two concepts: the first is the 
procedural and the substantial program. In this research, the substantial program 
rather than the procedural program is related to the decision performance. Thus 
although the idea of procedural rationality aims at improving the decision process, it 
does not necessarily offer the guarantee of a superior decision outcome (performance). 
The second is the separation of the mechanism for exploration from the existing 
decision routine. In this research, the idea refers to that the link between the 
exploratory investment and the evaluation of the decision outcome (something that is 
usually linked to short-term business performance) is purposefully weakened in order 
to sustain the deliberate mechanism within the organization. 
 
As discussed, the investigation of the relationship between the decision procedure and 
the decision performance is not the objective of this research. Yet the proposition of 
deliberate practice does imply that the chances of better decision outcomes can be 
increased, as the design of such mechanisms is to overcome potential biases in the 
judgment and decision process. The question of whether, and to what degree, decision 
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procedure leads towards better decision performance is one of the central themes in 
strategic research. The topic of how deliberate practice can enhance strategic thinking 
and the relationship with the expected decision performance would be an interesting 
area for further study that could be extended from this research. 
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Glossary of Acronyms 
 
a-Si  Amorphous Silicon 
ASP  Average Selling Price  
BIPV Building- Integrated Photovoltaic  
BOD Board of Director 
BOS Balance of System 
CdTe Cadmium Telluride 
CIGS Copper Indium Gallium Selenide 
CPV Concentrator Photovoltaic 
CSO Chief Strategy Officer  
c-Si Crystalline Silicon 
CTO Chief Technology Officer 
CZTS Copper Zinc Tin Sulfide 
DSSC Dye-sensitized solar cell 
EPC Engineering Procurement and Construction 
EPS Earnings Per Share 
FIT Feed-in-Tariff  
GM General Manager 
IPC International Patent Classification 
ITRI Industrial Technology Research Institute 
JV Joint Venture 
LCOE Levelized Cost of Electricity 
LTS Letter to Shareholders 
MOEA Ministry of Economic Affairs 
MW Megawatt 
NGO Non Government Organization 
NREL National Renewable Energy Laboratory  
PV Photovoltaic  
ROI Return on Investment 
TF Thin Film 
VC Venture Capitalist 
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